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ABSTRACT
Within the present dissertation, determinants of leader dismissals, promotions, and
demotions are explored. A model of CEO dismissals is adapted to the context of the National
Football League (NFL), whereby head coaches represent CEOs. Building upon empirical studies
of the CEO dismissal model, a proxy is established which is representative of actual candidates
to replace an executive rather than proxies based on industry and firm characteristics. Using the
proxy for candidates provided statistically insignificant results that challenge the theoretical
relationship between candidate availability and executive dismissals. Additionally, the present
dissertation proposed and found empirical justification for incorporating an additional sociopolitical force within the empirically tested CEO dismissal model. Interestingly, within the
deviant culture of the NFL, deviant behavior may increase or decrease executive dismissal
likelihood depending on the type of deviant behavior, punishments received for deviant behavior,
and implementation of institutional policies regarding deviant behavior. Finally, the present
dissertation emphasized the relationship between executive dismissals and candidates available
to succeed executives, and therefore, examined determinants of managerial promotions within
the NFL. Specifically focusing on race and centrality as promotion and demotion determinants,
the present dissertation found race and centrality to be statistically significant factors in
promotions and demotions, though the influence of these variables depends on whether the
manager is being considered for promotion or demotion as well as their current rank within the
organization (i.e., upper- or lower-level management). Implications for practitioners and
scholars as well as future research opportunities are also discussed.

ix

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Leadership and managerial ability are important topics to scholars and practitioners
(Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Kippenberger, 2002).
The substantial interest garnered by leaders, managers, and the activities of leaders and managers
is a result of their potential influence on organizations (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Huson, Parrino,
& Starks, 2001; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Parrino, 1997; Pedace & Smith, 2013), shareholders
(Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Farquhar, 1995; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk,
1999; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), firm employees (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Simpson, 2002),
customers (Geis, 2007), taxpayers (Gobert & Punch, 2007; Rosoff, 2007) and local residents
(Ermann & Lundman, 1982). Though leadership research in the past century primarily focused
on leader qualities and how leaders interact with followers, some scholars argue that an
understanding of the context and role of leadership must first be understood (Hall et al., 2004;
Selznick, 1957). Early literature by Selznick (1957) provided a framework for much of the
recent research examining previously neglected leadership factors, especially in the fields of
strategic management and executive turnover (e.g., Chen, Luo, Tang, & Tong, 2014; Cowen &
Marcel, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gomulya & Boeker, 2015).
In forging the framework for leadership in strategic management, Selznick (1957)
defined leadership as an activity which revolves around critical decision-making as opposed to
routine interactions between leaders and followers. Therefore, Selznick (1957) proposed the
“executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative management to
institutional leadership” (p. 4, 154). Selznick (1957) used the notion of an executive as a
statesman to demonstrate the political nature of leadership activities. He described how political
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power struggles between organizational units and personnel form within organizations. Often
these political contests are among personnel vying for top management team promotions.
Moreover, promotions, and the dismissals that pave the way for others’ promotions, are decided,
in part, by the institutionalization of rules and values within the organization as a result of
current and past leaders whom have infused their values within the organization (Selznick,
1957). Selznick’s (1957) ideas of political competitions for promotions and dismissals being
determined by organizations embodying the values of their leaders have led many scholars to the
connection between politics and executive dismissals and promotions (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Daily
& Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Frederickson et al., 1988; Gomulya
& Boeker, 2015; Ocasio, 1999).
Following Selznick (1957), research regarding executive departures has been identified
as an important area of research (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). The
importance of executive departures stems from the CEO being viewed as the most powerful
member of an organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Farkas & De Backer, 1996) and responsible
for organizational results (Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Soebbing & Washington, 2011). Despite
research findings to the contrary by some scholars (e.g., Day & Lord, 1988; Meindl, Ehrlich, &
Dukerich, 1985), it is widely believed CEOs can have a substantial impact on organizational
performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hambrick & Quigley,
2014), which could lead to their departure from the organization (Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Executive Departures
A substantial portion of the extant literature examining executive successions failed to
identify whether the predecessors’ departures were voluntary prior to examining the causes of
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those departures or subsequent organizational performance following the departure (Bennett et
al., 2003; Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop,
1991). Voluntary and involuntary executive departures occur as a result of retirements,
resignations, deaths, or dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado &
Kuran, 1990). More specifically, Weisbach (1988) identified 13 reasons CEOs voluntarily
resign according to an examination of Wall Street Journal reports. Some of these reasons
include departing due to compulsory retirement policies, poor performance, disagreements with
board of directors, and personal reasons. However, during the process of a succession, the true
reasons for the succession are often not revealed (Brown, 1982; Haynes et al., 2015; Maxcy,
2013; Weisbach, 1988).
Executive retirements, specifically, have received a marginal amount of attention from
scholars. Weisbach (1988) found a high correlation between the likelihood of a planned
resignation and CEO age by connecting a substantial amount of resignations to CEOs’ 65th
birthdays. Specifically, Weisbach (1988) found about 38% of CEO turnover from 1974 through
1983 to be a result of retirement. Similarly, Maxcy’s (2013) study of college football coaches
from 2002 through 2011 found 25% of head coach turnover was a result of retirements. Though
all successions can have organizational performance implications (Cannella & Rowe, 1995),
there is little mystery in many retirement decisions. Therefore, it appears retirement decisions
are of less theoretical interest than dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
CEO Dismissals
Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined a CEO dismissal as a “situation in which the CEO’s
departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will”
(p. 255). Frick et al. (2010) defined a dismissal as “the result of a premature termination of a
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contract of employment. It can be by mutual consent or without the explicit approval of both
parties to the contract” (p. 151). Between Fredrickson et al. (1988) and Frick et al. (2010), there
seems to be a difference of opinion with regard to the consent of the dismissed party. This
difference of opinion may be cleared up through understanding the individual(s) who make
dismissal decisions. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) explained board of directors are typically
responsible for making CEO turnover decisions. For the similar position of head coaches in
college football, it is the athletic director (Marburger, 2015).
Dismissals are a tool used to hold CEOs accountable (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993;
Crossland & Chen, 2013). In making the decision to dismiss a CEO, a board must evaluate the
ability of that CEO and sometimes compare that CEOs ability to that CEO’s compensation in
order to decide if the CEO is still valuable to the firm. Ertgrul and Krishnan (2011) stated boards
of directors assess the ability of their CEOs by examining various facets of their work (e.g.,
investment proposals, strategy initiatives, short and long-term decisions). Borland and Lye
(1996) argued board of directors will acquire private information on the CEO’s ability. Since
those stakeholders outside the firm typically do not have access to this private information, the
market for CEOs will assume that CEOs retained by a firm are high-ability CEOs, which causes
the CEOs wages to increase until the board of directors deems it unprofitable to retain the CEO
relative to that CEO’s ability (Borland & Lye, 1996).
Boards of directors appoint CEOs as leaders of their organizations to control and manage
the outcomes of their organization (Soebbing & Washington, 2011). However, these
organizational outcomes are often multidimensional which can be measured a variety of ways
(e.g., stock price, sales growth, return on assets, profit; Day & Lord, 1988; Donoher, Reed, &
Storrud-Barnes, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). As a result of particular
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organizational performance criteria, the overall consensus among scholars is poor performance
results in higher dismissal probabilities (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
Though organizational performance is a significant factor, it has only been moderately
effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner &
Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000). For instance, Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011)
found 49% of CEO dismissals occurred without evidence of poor stock performance in their
industry which is one of many measures of organizational performance. Similarly, other
scholars concluded organizational performance accounts for less than half of the variance in the
dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000; Warner
et al., 1988). Nevertheless, when a CEO is dismissed, a replacement is required whom is often
promoted from lower managerial ranks (Foreman & Soebbing, 2015)
Managerial Promotions
A firm seeking a candidate to replace their CEO may choose to search for the
replacement using several different criteria depending on the situation. These criteria may be
based on whether to the firm should seek an internal candidate, a former CEO, a candidate with
specific or general management experience, or a candidate whom possesses certain physical or
personality traits. Different circumstances will dictate whom the board of directors will seek to
replace the CEO.
When organizational performance within a firm is high, firms are more likely to promote
top managers internally (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Furthermore,
as time passes, more firms seek external candidates (Huson et al., 2001). The trend toward
external hiring is likely a result of top internal candidates not having internal promotion
opportunities because top management turnover in more successful firms is less likely (Fee et al.,
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2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988), internal promotions in a given firm decrease the likelihood of
future promotions within that firm (Acosta, 2010), and top candidates who are not promoted to
CEO when opportunities arise often depart from the organization (Cannella & Shen, 2001).
Successors with more general management experience typically have more relevant
expertise to CEO positions than executives from more specialized backgrounds such as
marketing (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). However, consistent with the idea that better
performing firms have fewer opportunities for upward mobility (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson et
al., 1988), non-former CEOs typically come from firms with better performance than successors
with CEO experience (Elsaid, Wang, & Davidson, 2011). Nevertheless, the stock market reacts
more favorably to firms that appoint former CEOs as opposed to successors with no CEO
experience (Elsaid et al., 2011). Additionally, this positive reaction occurs despite the fact that
former CEOs may be hindered by past experiences or reliant on past experiences that occurred in
different contexts (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015). Since the contexts changed, but the CEOs
decisions are based on the old context, the new decisions may be detrimental to firm
performance (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015).
Top management promotion criteria may also be based on a candidate’s physical or
personality traits. For instance, hiring demographically homogenous candidates (i.e., candidates
with the same demographic characteristics as the board of directors) increases acceptance and
ease of communication (Kanter, 1977). Therefore, powerful people tend to promote people
similar to themselves (Useem & Karabel, 1986; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
One of the most studied physical characteristics examined by scholars in the fields of
economics, management, and sociology is race (Cook & Glass, 2014; Kanter, 1977; Solow,
Solow, & Walker, 2011). Overall, the consensus among the literature is there is a bias against
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racial minorities in top management positions, sometime referred to as the glass ceiling (Cook &
Glass, 2014; Kanter, 1977; Solow et al., 2011). However, many of the studies which have
examined racial bias in the labor market rely on survey data or labor force statistics which may
not accurately reflect the capabilities of candidates or data regarding the supply of applicants
(Solow et al., 2011). Therefore, many scholars use sport as an empirical setting for examining
racial discrimination in the labor market.
Sport as an Empirical Setting
A number of studies examined various issues of importance related to management,
economics, organizations, and leadership using sport (Day et al., 2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al.,
2005). Sport has been used to examining non-sport-related phenomena for either its data or
unique context (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). Data from the sport industry are
particularly advantageous because sport provides an ample amount of observable and accurately
measured individual and organizational performance data spanning extended time periods
(Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). Moreover, data from sport comes
from a setting which often uses highly incentivized and motivated participants which is a
limitation faced by many researchers conducting traditional laboratory research (Goff &
Tollison, 1990).
Research on managerial turnover and promotions in the corporate world is one area
where access to information is often limited or poorly measured (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000; Solow et al., 2011).
However, sport has been used as a viable empirical alternative to managerial turnover and
promotion studies conducted in corporate settings (Day et al., 2012; Holmes, 2011; Solow et al.,
2011; Wolfe et al., 2005). Several studies examined racial discrimination in the labor market
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using sport as an empirical setting (e.g., Braddock, Smith, & Dawkins, 2012; Holmes, 2011;
Madden, 2004; Solow et al., 2011).
Holmes (2011) adapted Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals to college
football head coach dismissals. Within, Holmes (2011) incorporated organizational
performance, along with three of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four socio-political forces, to a
model of head coach dismissals. However, Fredrickson et al. (1988) warned “[t]hose interested
in testing the present model should be aware that its ceteris paribus argument requires all
variables to be included” (p. 268). The one socio-political force identified by Fredrickson et al.
(1988) that was missing in the Holmes (2011) model was the availability of qualified candidates
to replace the CEO which was not present due to data limitations.
The empirical setting used in the dissertation is the National Football League (NFL).
Given sociologists opine that sport reflects the greater society in which it exists, sport behaviors
and practices seen in the NFL can also be observed in society (Coakley, 2015; Eitzen & Sage,
1997). For example, the implementation of the Rooney Rule in the NFL, which was established
to provide minorities with more equal access to upper management positions, has been likened to
affirmative action policies (Pike, 2011) and other organizational policies (Frier, 2015; Haselton,
2017). Another example comes from the NFL’s personal conduct policy which is representative
of a growing trend of organizations holding their employees accountable for deviant behavior
committed within and outside the workplace (Lyons et al., 2016). Due to the availability of
quality data from the NFL, combined with interesting policies established by the NFL, the NFL
has proven an ideal setting for many labor and personnel studies that can be generalized to nonsport industries (e.g., Lyons et al., 2016; Madden & Ruther, 2010). The remainder of the
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dissertation focuses on using data from the NFL to examine labor and personnel issues occurring
within and outside sport.
Dissertation Chapters
To fulfill the three-paper dissertation format set forth by the School of Kinesiology and in
accordance with the Graduate School, this dissertation explores three separate research questions
to further understand the leadership activities of dismissal and promotion of the executives.
Similar to Holmes’ (2011) adaptation of the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model of CEO dismissals
to football head coaches, I adapt the model for CEO dismissals to NFL head coaches in Chapter
2. In doing so, the focus is specifically on the pool of qualified candidates for head coaching
positions. In Chapter 3, I propose a fifth socio-political force of deviance to be incorporated
within the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model of CEO dismissals and empirically test the model, as
well as an NFL policy change regarding deviant behavior, using data from the NFL. In Chapter
4, I examine determinants of coach promotions in the NFL, specifically focusing on issues of
race and centrality. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the three studies within this
dissertation while offering overall contributions, implications, and avenues for future research
for practitioners and scholars.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF CANDIDATE AVAILABILITY IN CEO DISMISSALS: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE1
Dismissing a chief executive officer (CEO) is a major event for an organization
(Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) and one of the most
important actions a board of directors takes (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Huson, Parrino, &
Starks, 2001) as a CEO can represent part of the firms strategic resources (Keller, 2014).
Fredrickson, et al. (1988) defined a dismissal as involuntary, where “[…] the CEO's departure is
ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will” (p. 255).
These CEO dismissals, and subsequent successions, may result in short-run financial losses for
the firm and shareholders (Weisbach, 1988), long-run financial and organizational implications
(Huson et al., 2001; Parrino, 1997), and organizational disruptions within the firm (Shen, 2003).
In addition, “the dismissal of the CEO is particularly important to organizational theory because
this form of succession most requires the understanding of organizational factors” (Fredrickson
et al., 1988, p. 255).
Little is known about the factors influencing decisions to dismiss CEOs (Haleblian &
Rajagopalan, 2006). Organizational performance is a significant factor, however, it has only
been moderately effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora,
1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000). Fredrickson et al. (1988) stated dismissing a CEO is
not always a rational decision based on organizational performance and proposed a theoretical
model for CEO dismissals incorporating socio-political constructs, those factors dealing with
“interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power” (Fredrickson et al., 1988, p. 256). These

1

This chapter previously appeared as Foreman & Soebbing, The Role of Candidate Availability in CEO Dismissals:
An Examination of the National Football League, Journal of Management Policy & Practice, 2015. It is reprinted by
permission of North American Business Press.
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constructs identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) were the (a) board’s expectations and
attributions, (b) board’s allegiances and values, (c) power of the incumbent CEO, and (d)
availability of qualified candidates. Furthermore, they warned “[…] those interested in testing
the present model should be aware that its ceteris parabis argument requires all variables to be
included” (p. 268). Data limitations prevented many researchers from including all four sociopolitical constructs in their models, predominantly excluding the availability of qualified
candidates (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Due to data limitations providing only partial empirical
tests of the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, “we are not yet in a position to test the whole model
with large sample methods” (Pitcher et al., 2000, p. 626).
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the comprehensive Fredrickson et al.
(1988) model, specifically examining the role of candidate availability in CEO dismissals.
Candidate availability is differentiated from other proxies such as firm and industry size and
utilizes findings from previous research to develop a measurement of actual qualified candidates
to fill CEO vacancies. To test the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, NFL head football coaching
involuntary dismissals from 1978 through 2012 are examined. Previous research noted many
similarities between the role and responsibility of an NFL head coach and a CEO (e.g., Ndofor,
Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009). Estimating a logistic regression model, the present research
finds candidate availability does not impact dismissals. This result challenges previous research
using proxies for candidate availability which showed a significant impact. As a result, the
present research contributes to the literature by challenging the existing literature regarding the
role that candidate availability plays in regards to organizations deciding to dismiss their CEO.
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Literature Review
Fredrickson et al. (1988) argued, in addition to organizational performance, sociopolitical factors help explain boards’ decisions to retain or dismiss CEOs. Three of the four
socio-political factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) have been examined extensively in
the literature. Board’s expectation, proxied by financial analysts’ earnings and earnings per
share forecasts, provided empirical evidence in support of CEO dismissals occurring after an
organization, and by extension a CEO, achieves results which fail to meet expectations (Farrell
& Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). Boards of directors who have allegiances toward
CEOs will likely be less critical of the CEO’s performance, especially for directors who
appointed the CEO (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Additionally, longer tenures shared between
the directors and the CEO result in enhanced trust, and therefore, stronger allegiances (Kosnik,
1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). CEO dismissals were also less likely to occur when CEOs
hold power in a firm, whether through ownership (Boeker, 1992; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980),
CEO duality (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), or CEO tenure (Lausten, 2002).
The fourth socio-political factor identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) is the availability
of qualified candidates. Fredrickson et al. (1988) theorized if a supply of qualified candidates
exists to replace the incumbent CEO, a dismissal is more likely to occur, holding constant all
other socio-political factors. Directly examining the link between candidate availability and
CEO dismissals is a difficult task. The hiring process of firms is secretive, further limiting the
abilities of researchers to examine its effect on dismissals (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan,
2011). Therefore, researchers examined the availability of qualified candidates by utilizing
characteristics pertaining to country-specific industry and firm sizes (e.g., Crossland & Chen,
2013; Parrino, 1997) or omitted the variable altogether (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).
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One justification for excluding candidate availability from CEO dismissal models is the
assumption that a Board of Directors would not dismiss a CEO if a pool of qualified candidates
were not readily available (Crossland & Chen, 2013). Neglecting candidate availability in the
CEO dismissal model by assuming Board of Directors competence challenges the framework
and warning brought forth by Fredrickson et al. (1988). Furthermore, assuming Board of
Directors’ competence instead of including qualified candidate availability in a model can be
challenged by the irrationality in the succession decision making process (Khurana, 2002).
Another discrepancy in assuming the existence of a qualified candidate pool is the pool of
candidates with the necessary leadership experience is limited and may be further limited when
searching for candidates with experience within the particular industry (Davidson, Ning,
Rakowski, & Elsaid, 2008).
Dalton and Kesner (1983) stated larger firms have more potential candidates. Therefore,
it is commonplace for researchers to proxy for internal candidates availability by using measures
of firm size such as number of employees in a firm (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003) or sales figures
(Huson et al., 2001). These proxies often neglect the availability of external candidates and are
highly correlated with other factors such as size of the Board of Directors (Huson et al., 2001),
which may be linked to CEO dismissals due to decreases in profitability (Eisenberg, Sundgren,
& Wells, 1998) or lack of consensus among directors (Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). Thus, these
factors are not necessarily due to increased candidate availability.
Though many studies have either neglected candidate availability or attempted to proxy
for candidate availability without examining the quantity of actual available and qualified
candidates, researchers have been able to produce information regarding candidates for CEO
vacancies. Parrino (1997) stated “CEOs at firms in homogeneous industries are more likely to be
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forced from their positions and are more likely to be replaced by executives from other firms in
their industries” (p. 195). Jalal and Prezas (2012) contributed to Parrino’s (1997) findings by
revealing firms from larger industries (i.e., industries with larger numbers of firms) were more
likely to appoint successors from within their industry. Greve (2009) stated the labor market for
CEOs is a national one, prompting Crossland and Chen (2013) to operationalize the availability
of qualified candidate in their international research to a country-specific candidate pool.
Previous research identified organizational performance, expectations, allegiances and
values, CEO power, and candidate availability as possible causes of CEO dismissals. The
availability of qualified candidates is often neglected in empirical models, however, variables
such as firm size are used as a proxy which does not necessarily reflect availability. The NFL is
examined to look at the role that candidate availability impacts decision to dismiss the CEO.
Empirical Setting
To test the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, data on head coaching dismissals in the NFL
from 1978 through 2012 is used. Fredrickson et al. (1988) compared NFL head coaches to CEOs
in terms of tenure. Previous research cited the usefulness of data available using sport as an
empirical setting to quantitatively examine economic and managerial theories and phenomena,
with executive turnover and succession being a common area of research (Day, Gordon, & Fink,
2012).
Formed in 1920, the NFL grew to become the most popular professional sport in the
United States. For the 2014-2015 season, the NFL has 32 teams in 30 U.S. Government defined
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. According to Forbes magazine, the average franchise value for
an NFL team in 2013 was $1.17 billion. In terms of examining involuntary dismissals, the NFL
provides homogenous industry (i.e., specific to elite football) in which firm sizes (i.e., rosters and
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coaching staffs) are similar and industry size is relatively stable (28 teams in 1976 to 32 teams in
2014). Contrary to other industries, the league, its member clubs, and its coaches represent a
relatively closed group of individuals whereas one does not see a movement out of the industry
(e.g., football coach to automobile company) compared to other industries.
Method
To examine coaching dismissals in the NFL, secondary data are utilized covering a
sample period from the 1978-1979 season through the 2012-2013 season regarding head coach
turnover and team and coach characteristics. The unit of observation is a team-season. The 35
season sample period yields 1,041 team-season observations. The binary dependent variable of
involuntary dismissal (DISMISS) was coded with the value of 1 if the head coach who began the
season was involuntarily dismissed from the team’s head coach position. To decipher whether a
coach left voluntarily or involuntarily, a review of newspaper articles was utilized through
Factiva (academic license) where key terms synonymous with fired2 were used to separate
voluntary from involuntary dismissals.
Independent Variables
The independent variables revolve around the pool of available and qualified candidates
who would be likely replacements for a dismissed head coach. Most NFL head coach successors
are already employed by an NFL team as offensive and defensive coordinators. In addition,
former NFL head coaches who departed from their previous position are also available to be
hired (Mielke, 2007; Solow, Solow, & Walker 2011). As a result, variables for available and
qualified candidates for both NFL coordinators and former NFL head coaches are used. The
assumption made in the present research is NFL offensive and defensive coordinators aspire to

2

Other keywords used to differentiate dismissals from voluntary departures were dismissed, ousted, and forced to
resign.
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secure NFL head coaching positions, and are, therefore, available per the criteria established by
Fredrickson et al. (1988). Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2006) found NFL coordinators promoted to
NFL head coaches were often high performing individuals on high performing teams. Therefore,
NFL coordinators are deemed to be available and qualified if they meet both of the following
criteria. First, in the observed season, they were on a team which exhibited sustained
organizational performance defined by an average team winning percentage within the top 20
percent of the NFL (which would be the top six teams in the current NFL structure, including
any additional teams who are tied for a top six position) over the three year period prior to the
observed season. Second, in the observed season, their team had a top 20 percent offense
(defense) in terms of points scored (allowed). If an offensive (defensive) coordinator satisfies
both of these criteria, he is included in the offensive and defensive coordinator pool
(OCDCPOOL).
For the pool of available and qualified former head coaches, head coaches who were
involuntarily dismissed (e.g., did not retire or otherwise voluntarily leave the organization) in the
observed or previous season and who were not hired as head coaches at the end of the observed
season are considered to be available candidates for head coaching positions. Since former head
coaches already demonstrated their abilities as head coaches, and some of the uncertainty
associated with promotions is reduced (Longley & Wong, 2011), coaches can be evaluated based
on their head coaching performance. Former head coaches are identified as qualified if they: (a)
had more winning seasons (i.e., full seasons in which they won more games than they lost) than
non-winning seasons or (b) won more than half of their games in their career as a head coach. If
a former head coach is available, qualified, and involuntarily dismissed in the previous season,
he is included in the PREVYRHC pool of candidates and if the available, qualified head coach
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was dismissed in the observed season, he is included in the CURRYRHC pool of candidates.3
For teams dismissing their winning head coach during the season, one candidate is subtracted
from CURRYRHC since the dismissing team is not likely to rehire the same head coach
dismissed during the observed season. The three aforementioned independent variables (i.e.,
OCDCPOOL, PREVYRHC, and CURRYRHC) are tabulated to form a fourth variable, the entire
NFL head coach candidate pool (CANDPOOL).
Control Variables
To control for other confounding factors, 21 control variables are utilized. These control
variables fall into the following categories: (a) organizational performance, (b) the other three
socio-political factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) (i.e., expectations and attributions,
values and allegiances, and incumbent power), (c) candidate-related controls, (d) ownership
types, and (e) demographic variables. Regular season winning percentage in the observed season
(WINPCT) is used to measure organizational performance.
Expectations can be based on previous organizational performance, which may have
established a standard for the organization, as well as current expectations. Performance
expectations are modeled in two ways. The first way is based on historical organizational
performance similar to Holmes (2011), accounting for performance in terms of regular season
win percentage from the previous season (WINPCTj-1), two seasons prior to the observed season
(WINPCTj-2), and three through 10 seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-3→10). For
teams which have not been in existence one, two, or three years prior to the observed season, the
observation is removed from the sample. For WINPCTj-3→10, if a team has not been in existence

3

There was no significant difference between the raw number of fired head coaches and the number of head coaches
standardized by the number of teams per season.
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for the full 10 years prior to the observed season, the average for the available years in that time
span is used.
The second way looks at evaluations by outside individuals. In non-sport businesses,
these expectations generally come from outside investment analysts (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).
These outside analysts provide estimates regarding key performance measures and “mediate
information flows between companies and other market participants who may invest in or do
business with these firms” (Pollock & Gulati, 2007, p. 347). Previous research found upper
managers of organizations not performing relative to the expectations are more likely to be
dismissed (e.g., Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991).
To model outside performance expectations, the percentage of regular season games a
team covered against the point spread as established by the betting markets (COVERATS) is
used. A point spread is a prediction regarding the closeness of the game when including all
relevant information (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). Despite various biases found in betting
markets (e.g., sentiment bias), point spreads are still efficient predictors of actual game outcomes
(Sauer, 1998). In addition, unlike non-sport CEOs who actively manage external performance
expectations (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003), NFL coaches do not actively manage point spreads.
Frederickson et al. (1988) noted that board’s allegiances and values were also important
indicators of a CEO dismissal. Board’s allegiances and values are operationalized in three ways.
The first allegiances and values variable accounts for the observed head coach’s win percentage
against conference opponents which was also used by Holmes (2011). Due to the scheduling
differences between college football and the NFL, examining games against division opponents
in the NFL would be highly correlated with overall winning percentages since for a large portion
of this sample, half of a team’s opponents were from within their division. Another allegiances
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and values variable Holmes (2011) used was a bowl games variable which subtracts the number
of bowl game losses from bowl game. Holmes found this variable to be statistically
insignificant. Bowl games, which are postseason games typically played by highly visible and
top performing college teams, are similar to playoff games in the NFL. A head coach’s playoff
success in this study was calculated in the same fashion as in the Holmes model with playoff
losses subtracted from playoff wins (PLAYOFFS).
The board of directors makes the CEO dismissal decisions (Mintzberg, 1983). Therefore,
if a relationship has been established and concurrent tenures have forged a partnership in which
both parties have agreed on the desired direction of the organization, allegiances will be strong
and CEO dismissal will be less likely (Mizruchi, 1983; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). To model this
relationship, Holmes (2011) used a dichotomous variable indicating if the college had a new
athletic director. Athletic directors are responsible for making personnel decisions in athletic
departments such as the dismissal of a head coach (Marburger, 2013). In the NFL, a general
manager who may also be responsible for personnel decisions regarding the hiring and firing of
athletes (Brown, Farrell, & Zorn, 2007). Instead of using a dichotomous variable to establish
whether a new general manager was hired for an observed season, the present research uses a
variable that subtracts the number of seasons the general manager has been employed by the
team from the number of seasons the head coach has been employed by a team (HCGMDIFF).
The remaining major factor influencing CEO dismissal according to Fredrickson et al.
(1988) is incumbent power. In the NFL, it is possible for the head coach to hold an additional
position within the organization which allows him to make direct decisions on matters such as
the hiring and firing of athletes such as a general manager or director of player personnel
position. A dichotomous variable (DUALROLE) in this study is used to identify whether a head
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coach has this additional role and is coded with the value of 1 if he does have a dual role.
Fredrickson et al. (1988) also stated that, due to the increasing power of the CEO over time, there
is an inverse relationship between CEO tenure and the likelihood of dismissal. Therefore, a
variable for head coach tenure (TENURE) is included. Additionally, to account for a possible
reluctance to dismiss a CEO with less than one year of tenure, a dichotomous variable indicating
whether a CEO is in his first year (coded with the value of one) or not (coded with the value of
zero) is included in the models (FIRSTYR).
To separate the effects of the candidate pool independent variables from often used
proxies such as firm size, a firm size variable is included in the models (FIRMSIZE).4 FIRMSIZE
is the size of the market for the metropolitan statistical area population (in millions) of the
organization. Since the independent variables of interest measure the supply of qualified
candidates available for head coach positions, it is also important to control for candidate
demand. Consistent with Allen and Chadwick (2012), the number of head coaching vacancies in
the observed season (OPENINGS) is included, regardless of head coach departures.5 This
approach prevents artificially inflating the correlation among the observations with dismissals.
Different types of ownership structures can result in distinct variations in the
organizational decision-making process. Carroll (1984) suggested founders of organizations
typically possess characteristics which guide their decision-making differently from their
successors. Andres (2008) reinforced the idea that founders operate differently by examining
differences between founding-family owned organizations and family owned organizations

4

Another often used proxy for candidate availability is industry size. The number of franchises in the NFL was
included as a control variable, but since the number of franchises remained relatively constant (only varying from 28
to 32) in the sample period and the variable is statistically insignificant and did not alter the other variable
coefficients in terms of sign and significance, the variable was excluded from the model.
5
For the observations in which a dismissal is recorded, the OPENINGS variable consists of the number of
vacancies minus the vacancy which is a result of the observed dismissal.
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which were not founders. Therefore, a dichotomous variable indicating whether an owner was
the original owner of the organization (ORIGINAL) is included in the model. This variable is
coded with a value of 1 for original owners and 0 otherwise.
Though Fredrickson et al. (1988) focused on publicly owned organizations, the unique
data set in the present study incorporates publicly owned, consortium owned, sole proprietor
owned, and family owned organizations. As stated previously, different ownership structures
may cause an organization to behave differently (Winfree & Rosentraub, 2012). Thus, four
dichotomous and mutually exclusive ownership variables are used in the model with the
reference group being franchises that are publicly owned. The majority owner of each observed
franchise is categorized as either owners by consortium (CONSORT), single owners (SINGLE),
or family owners. Acknowledging the first generation of family ownership may be significantly
different from subsequent generations (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), family owners are partitioned
into the first generation of family ownership (FIRSTGEN) and subsequent generations of family
ownership (SUBGEN). Data on ownership types were gathered from online media sites, which
identified majority and original owners (primarily through pro-football-reference.com). Once
majority owners were identified, media sites were used to best decipher whether the majority
owner was a sole owner, consortium owner, first generation owner, or subsequent generation
owner.
The final two control variables are demographic variable for the age of the head coach
(AGE) and whether the head coach is a visible racial minority (MINORITY). The minority status
of head coaches in relation to dismissals has been examined in previous research regarding NFL
head coach employment opportunities (Holmes, 2011; Solow et al., 2011).
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Model
The model takes the broad form:
DISMISSij = β1(INDVAR)ij + β2(WINPCT)ij + β3(WINPCT)i(j-1) + β4(WINPCT)i(j-2) +
β5(WINPCT)i(j-3→10) + β6(COVERATS)ij + β7(PLAYOFFS)ij + β8(DIVISION)ij +
β9(HCGMDIFF)ij + β10(HCOWNDIFF)ij + β11(DUALROLE)ij + β12(TENURE)ij +
β13(FIRSTYR)ij + β14(FIRMSIZE)ij + β20(OPENINGS)ij + β15(ORIGINAL)ij + β16(SINGLE)ij +
β17(CONSORT)ij + β18(FIRSTGEN)ij + β19(SUBGEN)ij + β21(MINORITY)ij + β22(AGE)ij + eij
where i indicates team, j indicates season, and e is the error term. Since the dependent variable
(DISMISS) is a dichotomous variable, discrete estimation techniques such as logit and probit
should be used (Maddala, 1983). In the present study, a logistic regression model is estimated.
Estimation Issues
The correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were examined to
look for multicollinearity. None of the coefficients exceeded the standard threshold of 0.8,
indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). A Hausman test
was conducted and indicated controlling for random effects was more appropriate than fixed
effects.
In addition, some team-season observations are eliminated in the present research. Some
teams have not been in the NFL for at least three seasons. The 1978 observations from the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Seattle Seahawks were removed due to being established in 1976
and not having sufficient data for WINPCTj-3→10. Sufficient data were also not available for
WINPCTj-3→10 for the Carolina Panthers or Jacksonville Jaguars in 1995, 1996, and 1997 since
there first NFL season was in 1995. Similarly, the Cleveland Browns emerged again in 1999 and
the Houston Texans’ first season was in 2002, so each of these teams is missing data for
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WINPCTj-3→10 for the first three seasons of their respective existences. As a result of these
eliminations, the final sample has 1,027 team-season observations.
Results
Summary statistics revealing the means and standard deviations of the dependent
variable, independent variables, and control variables are exhibited in Table 2.1. In this sample,
the average annual dismissal rate was 15.1%. An average of five coordinators and one dismissed
Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
Variable
DISMISS
OCDCPOOL
PREVYRHC
CURRYRHC
CANDPOOL
WINPCT
WINPCTj-1
WINPCTj-2
WINPCTj-3→10
COVERATS
PLAYOFFS
DIVISION
HCGMDIFF
HCOWNDIFF
DUALROLE
TENURE
FIRMSIZE
OPENINGS
ORIGINAL
SINGLE
CONSORT
FIRSTGEN
SUBGEN
PUBLIC
MINORITY
AGE

Mean Std. Dev.
0.151
0.358
5.022
1.527
1.246
1.131
0.339
0.675
6.608
2.098
0.501
0.188
0.502
0.188
0.502
0.189
0.496
0.117
0.513
0.119
0.455
2.257
4.101
12.979
-2.316
7.295
-14.844 16.567
0.136
0.343
3.467
4.279
4.309
4.196
5.828
2.251
0.202
0.401
0.394
0.489
0.219
0.414
0.213
0.410
0.139
0.346
0.034
0.182
0.097
0.297
50.559
6.867
N=1,027
23

Min
0
1
0
0
1
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.188
-4
-18
-45
-83
0
0
0.220
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
32

Max
1
9
4
3
13
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.786
0.875
12
67
22
24
1
28
19.832
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
72

Median
0
5
1
0
6
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.494
0.500
0
2
0
-11
0
2
2.857
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
50

head coach from the previous season were identified as for the proxy of being available and
qualified for a head coach position. About one head coach per three seasons who was dismissed
within the season fit the criteria of being a qualified head coach candidate.
Table 2.2 displays the random effects logistic regression results. In Table 2.2, five
different models estimations are displayed. The first three models include only one of the three
elements of the candidate pool explained earlier in this article. The fourth model includes each
candidate pool qualification. The final model includes a combined count of these three elements.
The independent variables of interest OCDCPOOL, PREVYRHC, and CANDPOOL have
negative coefficients and are statistically insignificant in each of the models. On the other hand,
CURRYRHC has a positive coefficient, but is also statistically insignificant.
Table 2.2
Logistic Regression Results; Dependent Variable is DISMISS

PREVYRHC

OCDCPOOL
Model
-0.052
(0.070)
--

CURRYRHC

--

-0.067
(0.097)
--

CANDPOOL

--6.194***
(0.893)
-0.638
(0.729)
0.917
(0.641)
1.331
(1.120)
-2.431**
(1.211)

Variable
OCDCPOOL

WINPCT
WINPCTj-1
WINPCTj-2
WINPCTj-3→10
COVERATS

PREVYRHC
Model
--

CURRYRHC
Model
--

--

0.156
(0.152)
--

All Pools
Model
-0.055
(0.071)
-0.043
(0.100)
0.153
(0.155)
--

--

-6.149***
(0.893)
-0.638
(0.730)
0.890
(0.643)
1.310
(1.120)
-2.453**
(1.208)

-6.165***
(0.891)
-0.652
(0.729)
0.877
(0.642)
1.333
(1.117)
-2.453**
(1.209)

-6.162***
(0.893)
-0.616
(0.731)
0.874
(0.642)
1.385
(1.120)
-2.457**
(1.212)
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CANDPOOL
Model
----0.030
(0.052)
-6.177***
(0.893)
-0.638
(0.730)
0.912
(0.642)
1.316
(1.120)
-2.438**
(1.209)

(Table 2.2 continued)
OCDCPOOL PREVYRHC
CURRYRHC
Variable
Model
Model
Model
PLAYOFFS
-0.231***
-0.226***
-0.224***
(0.077)
(0.077)
(0.077)
DIVISION
-0.044***
-0.044***
-0.044***
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.017)
HCGMDIFF
-0.032**
-0.031**
-0.033**
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.014)
HCOWNDIFF
-0.006
-0.006
-0.005
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
DUALROLE
-0.432
-0.443
-0.460
(0.352)
(0.351)
(0.350)
TENURE
0.102**
0.103**
0.104**
(0.046)
(0.046)
(0.046)
FIRSTYR
-1.511***
-1.488***
-1.496***
(0.358)
(0.357)
(0.357)
FIRMSIZE
-0.020
-0.022
-0.021
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.027)
OPENINGS
0.010
<0.001
-0.004
(0.047)
(0.049)
(0.049)
ORIGINAL
-0.285
-0.275
-0.264
(0.298)
(0.297)
(0.297)
SINGLE
0.263
0.266
0.174
(0.794)
(0.797)
(0.794)
CONSORT
0.723
0.718
0.602
(0.869)
(0.870)
(0.868)
FIRSTGEN
0.245
0.240
0.158
(0.815)
(0.815)
(0.814)
SUBGEN
0.140
0.147
0.012
(0.892)
(0.894)
(0.889)
MINORITY
0.111
0.129
0.126
(0.367)
(0.367)
(0.367)
AGE
0.013
0.013
0.014
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.015)
Constant
0.442
0.340
0.297
(1.554)
(1.540)
(1.535)
Random Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **p<.05; ***p<.01
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All Pools
Model
-0.230***
(0.078)
-0.045***
(0.017)
-0.032**
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.009)
-0.428
(0.353)
0.102**
(0.046)
-1.493***
(0.358)
-0.020
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.050)
-0.293
(0.299)
0.269
(0.801)
0.707
(0.876)
0.245
(0.819)
0.143
(0.902)
0.129
(0.367)
0.014
(0.016)
0.509
(1.554)
Yes

CANDPOOL
Model
-0.229***
(0.077)
-0.044***
(0.017)
-0.032**
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.009)
-0.435
(0.353)
0.102**
(0.046)
-1.502***
(0.357)
-0.021
(0.027)
0.008
(0.047)
-0.281
(0.298)
0.272
(0.799)
0.733
(0.874)
0.250
(0.818)
0.155
(0.900)
0.117
(0.367)
0.013
(0.015)
0.397
(1.552)
Yes

In all five models, the variables WINPCT, COVERATS, PLAYOFFS, DIVISION,
HCGMDIFF, and FIRSTYR all have negative and statistically significant coefficients. TENURE
is also statistically significant in each of the models, but has a positive coefficient. All of the
measures of previous winning percentages, HCOWNDIFF, DUALROLE, FIRMSIZE,
OPENINGS, all of the ownership types, and both demographic variables were statistically
insignificant in all five models.
Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were conducted to analyze the robustness of the findings
presented in Table 2.2, especially in relation to the independent variables. Various other
measures were utilized in an attempt to objectively identify and accurately measure the pool of
candidates such as college coaches who were ranked in the top five of the team rankings and
under the age of 50 years old, top offensive coordinators who worked under head coaches from
defensive-minded backgrounds and vice versa, all head coaches who were dismissed the year
prior who were unable to secure head coaching positions in the observed year rather than just
those with winning records, and all head coaches who were dismissed during the observed
season rather than just those with winning records. Other control variables were included in the
model such as tenure squared, organization age, season (i.e., year), dummy variables for major
institutional changes within the NFL (i.e., the salary cap6 and the Rooney Rule7), and a count of
voluntary exits in the season. None of these variations significantly altered coefficient
magnitudes or statistical significance of the independent or control variables which provides
evidence for the robustness of the results presented in Table 2.2.

6

The salary cap was instituted in 1993 and set limits on how the collective salary of the team which could be paid
by an NFL franchise.
7
The Rooney Rule was instituted in 2003 and requires NFL teams to interview at least one minority candidate for
head coaching vacancies (Solow et al., 2011).
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Discussion
Understanding the socio-political determinants of CEO dismissals is an important area of
research (Fredrickson et al., 1988). The focus of the present study was to use the framework
provided by Fredrickson et al. (1988) to develop a comprehensive model for dismissals which
included the availability of qualified candidates by identifying actual candidates rather than a
proxy for the variable such as firm or industry size. Previous research guided the formation of a
pool of available and qualified candidates to quantify the degree to which candidate availability
increased the likelihood of CEO dismissals. Additionally, other factors pertinent to CEO
dismissal decisions were identified such as ownership types were included in this study.
Whether estimating regression models to examine the impact of each of the independent
variables separately, together, or all combined in a single variable, the availability of qualified
candidates, as defined in the present study, has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood
of a CEO being dismissed. Furthermore, with one exception, each of the independent variables
measuring candidate pools had negative coefficients which, if statistically significant, would be
counterintuitive since previous literature states candidate pools and CEO dismissals should have
a positive relationship (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Parrino, 1997). The statistically insignificant
findings challenge the previous research which used firm and industry size to proxy for candidate
availability. The insignificant results may also be a reflection of candidate pools which include
unqualified candidates or exclude qualified candidates, or the irrationality of decision makers in
the CEO dismissal process.
The candidate pools were proxies for dismissed CEOs and promising top managers who
could likely be promoted to fill a CEO vacancy. Though necessary measures were taken to
determine which candidates would be included within the candidate pools, it is probable that
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candidates were included in the pool that was not being considered for any CEO vacancies, and
conversely, there were candidates being considered for vacancies who were not included in the
pools. However, the extent to which these instances occurred are unknown since data are limited
with the information pertaining to team’s candidate list. One factor which could have
significantly affected the candidates being considered to fill vacancies is the preferences of the
firm and possible CEO-firm matches. Fee et al. (2006) found no statistically significant
difference in promotion rates between offensive and defensive coordinators, however, Solow et
al. (2011) noted “[b]eing an offensive coordinator increases the probability of
promotion…although [the effect is] small and only marginally significant” (p. 335). Perhaps
certain firms will be more inclined to hire a specific type of CEO, whether the criterion is based
on the executive’s specialty, strategic philosophy, or what type of CEO the predecessor was.
Another possible explanation for the null results of the independent variables, and the
explanation most supported by previous literature, is the idea of decision makers behaving
irrationally. Boards of directors have been known to behave irrationally when dismissing CEOs
by not acting in the best interest of the firm. These irrational decisions may come at the
detriment of organizational performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988) and may not have included a
complete set of information on which to base these important decisions (Khurana, 2002).
Therefore, boards of director may dismiss CEOs without having a sufficient pool of candidates
to secure a proficient successor.
The FIRMSIZE variable was also statistically insignificant in this study. Though
previous studies have found significant results for this variable, the differences in the observed
industries and proxies are likely the cause for the differences in results. Firms within the NFL
are relatively homogenous in terms of the number of the CEOs oversees. Therefore, firm size is
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largely controlled for already. In comparison to the studies which have used firm revenues as
measures of firm size and therefore candidate availability, the proxy used in the present study
may not be representative of firm revenues due to unique attributes of the NFL such as revenue
sharing. Furthermore, even if revenue was an adequate proxy for firm size in the NFL, the data
are not publicly available. Even though firm size was not measured in this study, the relative
homogeneity of firms within the NFL virtually controls for this factor.
Despite evidence indicating ownership structures affect decision making, no evidence
exists in the context of the present study to support this claim. This lack of supporting evidence
may be attributed to the varying degrees of involvement in decision making from the firm
ownership. Some NFL owners may play an active role in the decision to retain or dismiss CEOs,
whereas other owners may leave this decision entirely to the discretion of general managers. The
lack of owner involvement by at least some organizations may have contributed to the
statistically insignificant coefficients for the HCOWNDIFF variable when the HCGMDIFF
variable was significant.
The regression models did, however, produce statistically significant results for
organizational performance as well as at least one variable representative of each of the other
three sociopolitical factors identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988). Table 2.3 presents the actual
change in the probability of dismissal. As shown in Table 2.3, going from the worst
organizational performance to the best organizational performance, within the scope of this
sample, decreases the likelihood of CEO dismissal by 62%, with all other variables held constant
at their means. Organizational performance accounts for the most substantial change in CEO
dismissal likelihood. The second most substantial factor is that of CEO tenure which, according
to Fredrickson et al. (1988), represents both the board’s allegiances and values and the
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incumbent CEO’s power socio-political constructs. CEOs with 28 years of tenure within an
organization results in a 42% increase in the likelihood of dismissal when compared to a CEO
with less than one year experience. This positive relationship between CEO tenure and
likelihood of dismissal is contrary to the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model for CEO dismissals,
however, it is a relationship found in similar studies (Holmes, 2011). Differences among
previous literature and the present study may be attributable to the inclusion of a variable in the
present study which measures difference in tenure between the head coach and board of
directors. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant indicating an increase in
CEO tenure, relative to board of director tenure, decreases the probability of CEO dismissal.
This variable represents incumbent CEO power and reduced the likelihood of dismissal by 19%
when examining the difference between the maximum years of CEO tenure less board tenure
(i.e., 22 years) and the minimum years of CEO tenure less board tenure (i.e., 45 years) in this
sample.
The other significant variables representing the board’s allegiances and values were
measures of career success against close rival and elite competitors. A CEO with the maximum
success against close rivals realizes a 16% decrease in dismissal likelihood when compared to a
CEO with the minimum success against close rival competitors in this sample. Similarly, a CEO
with the most success against elite competitors can expect a 17% decrease in the likelihood of
dismissal relative to the least successful CEO in terms of competing against elite rivals. These
two board allegiances and values variables are consistent with previous literature stating the
more a CEO embodies characteristics valued by the board of directors, the less likely a CEO
dismissal will occur. The only statistically significant variable representing the board’s
expectations was that of the expectations of the observed year (i.e., not expectations based on
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previous organizational performance). A CEO who meets or exceeds expectations the most in
this sample experiences an 11% decrease in dismissal probability compared to a CEO who most
infrequently meets or exceeds expectations.
Table 2.3
Change in Dismissal Probability as Values Move from Minimum to Maximum
OCDCPOOL PREVYRHC CURRYRHC All Pools CANDPOOL
Model
Model
Model
Model
Model
OCDCPOOL
-0.027
---0.029
-PREVYRHC
--0.018
--0.011
-CURRYRHC
--0.035
0.035
-CANDPOOL
-----0.023
WINPCT
-0.620
-0.616
-0.617
-0.615
-0.619
WINPCTj-1
0.042
0.042
-0.043
0.040
0.042
WINPCTj-2
0.060
0.059
0.058
0.057
0.060
WINPCTj-3→10
0.062
0.061
0.062
0.064
0.061
COVERATS
-0.111
-0.112
-0.112
-0.112
-0.111
PLAYOFFS
-0.167
-0.164
-0.163
-0.166
-0.166
DIVISION
-0.160
-0.161
-0.161
-0.161
-0.161
HCGMDIFF
-0.192
-0.188
-0.200
-0.194
-0.189
HCOWNDIFF
-0.050
-0.047
-0.037
-0.045
-0.048
DUALROLE
-0.024
-0.025
-0.026
-0.024
-0.025
TENURE
0.428
0.431
0.438
0.423
0.429
FIRSTYR
-0.070
-0.070
-0.070
-0.069
-0.070
FIRMSIZE
<-0.001
-0.025
-0.024
-0.023
-0.024
OPENINGS
0.006
<0.001
-0.003
0.006
0.005
ORIGINAL
-0.017
-0.017
-0.016
-0.017
-0.017
SINGLE
0.017
0.018
0.011
0.018
0.018
CONSORTIUM
0.060
0.056
0.045
0.054
0.057
FIRSTGEN
0.017
0.016
0.011
0.017
0.017
SECONDGEN
0.010
0.010
<0.001
0.010
0.011
MINORITY
0.007
0.009
0.009
0.009
0.008
AGE
0.034
0.034
0.036
0.036
0.033
Variable
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Conclusion
This research examined the role of candidate availability in CEO dismissal decisions by
examining NFL head coaching dismissals. The present study offered an original perspective on
candidate availability in which candidates were viewed as individuals available for CEO
vacancies rather than being proxied by industry or firm sizes. The unique sample of data were
able to control for both industry and firm size further isolating the effects of the candidate pools.
The null findings contribute to the extent literature by challenging the effect of candidate
availability on CEO dismissals and providing guidance on identifying candidate pools.
Organizational theorists are encouraged to build upon this study to further evaluate the effect of
candidate pools separate from firm and industry size.
The present study is not without its limitations. One limitation faced revolves around
how the candidate pools were measured and the boards of directors make their decisions.
Limited information is available regarding which candidates are interviewed to potentially fill
CEO vacancies. Furthermore, the criteria used by boards of directors to evaluate and select
candidates are not disclosed to the public. Future research can work towards reducing these
limitations by searching through media sources to identify which candidates were actually
interviewed for which vacancies to determine how firms decide who to interview and ultimately
who they select. A component of this may incorporate board’s allegiances and values in
determining the pool of candidates. Future research could also examine if the caliber of
candidates influences decisions rather than limiting the candidate pool to a count of available and
qualified candidates. Future research can examine whether boards dismiss CEOs based on herd
behavior in which boards decisions are based on the actions of boards at other firms (Banerjee,
1992). Finally, future research could build on the role of ownership structures in CEO
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dismissals, specifically examining the role of ownership structure and involvement in CEO
dismissal decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
EXECUTIVE DEVIANCE AS A SOCIOLPOLITICAL FORCE IN CEO
DISMISSALS
Within Chapter 2, Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988) provided a theoretical
framework for understanding CEO dismissals. They defined a dismissal as “a situation in which
the CEO’s departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or
her will” (Fredrickson et al., 1988, p. 255). These complex events are not solely based on the
organization’s performance, but also on sociopolitical forces which span several domains
including the expectation of the organizational performance, the CEO’s power within the
organization, coalitions formed, and relations with others (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Chapter 2
analyzed the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model, paying particular attention to the role candidate
availability plays in the dismissal or retention of a CEO.
Absent from Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model and subsequent research is a discussion
regarding the impact of executive or employee deviance on CEO dismissals. This absence is
particularly interesting because executive deviance is a force that affects and is effected by
interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power; thus making it a sociopolitical force that may
contribute to CEO dismissals (e.g., Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2015; Haynes, Josefy, & Hitt,
2015; Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).
The purpose of this chapter is to understand executive deviance as an additional
mediating sociopolitical force in the model of CEO dismissals. Executive deviance is a subset of
elite deviance and encompasses executives own deviance but also the deviance of subordinates.
In addition to understanding the mediating role that deviance plays in the dismissal decision, the
present study explores how an institutional policy pertaining to the personal conduct of
employees potentially moderates the relationship that deviance plays in executive dismissals.
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To study these relationships, the present study uses data regarding coaching dismissals
from the National Football League from 2000 through 2016. During this sample period, not only
are data on deviance inside and outside of the workplace available, but the league also instituted
and modified a personal conduct policy outlining punishments for acting in such a way that is
detrimental to the league.
To analyze coaching dismissals, the present research estimates a hazard model. The
results indicate dismissals of executives based on executive deviance are not limited to the direct
deviant actions of the executive, but also the deviant behaviors of subordinates within a given
executive’s organization. Empirical support indicates head coaches are held responsible for
deviance committed by players when the players’ actions result in team consequences.
However, following a policy modification emphasizing personal conduct in which team
consequences are more prevalent following acts of deviance, head coaches may be able to
forestall their dismissal by using player suspensions as an excuse for poor performance.
Furthermore, prior to the institutional emphasis on personal conduct, head coaches were more
likely to be retained if they had deviant players, however, after the increased emphasis on
personal conduct, head coaches were more likely to be dismissed when players were being fined
or incurring on-field penalties for their deviant actions. Therefore, head coaches may be able to
strategically utilize deviant behaviors and the PCP modification to forestall their dismissal.
The findings in the present study make a number of contributions. First, while previous
research explored various elements of employee and organizational deviance and misconduct
(e.g., Lyons et al., 2016; Michalak & Ashkanasy, 2013; Robinson & Bennett, 1995), limited
research explores the reactions by internal and external stakeholders to these behaviors. While
Barnett (2014) explored the complexity related to the punishment of stakeholders, he noted that
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“stakeholders’ attention is directed in certain ways that bound where they look, limit what they
notice, bias their assessment, and constrain their willingness to act” (p. 694). As such, my
findings explore many of these bounds.
Second, previous research explored the role of social control agents as it relates to
deviance and misconduct among individuals and organizations (e.g., Greve, Palmer, & Pozner,
2012). While social control agents have the legitimate authority to define specific conduct as
right or wrong, little is known how misconduct or deviance defined by the social control agent is
reacted to by other top executives. The present study examines reactions of executive dismissal
decision makers to deviance committed within and outside the organization and finds the
likelihood of executive dismissals to increase following instances of deviance committed by the
executive, subordinates engaging in job duties, and subordinates outside the workplace.
Finally, the findings are important for scholars examining corporate governance or leader
turnover because an understanding of the effects of leader turnover must begin with an
understanding of the causes (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Both scholars and practitioners can
benefit from the present study when considering the effects, whether intended or unintended, of
implementing a policy emphasizing personal conduct within organizations.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The “most theoretically interesting type of CEO exit is the dismissal” (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009, p. 168). Understanding the limited role of organizational
performance in executive dismissal decisions, Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a model
consisting of four sociopolitical forces in combination with organizational performance to
provide a comprehensive theoretical model of CEO dismissals. The first sociopolitical force
they presented was the effect of the board of directors’ expectations and attributions of the
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CEO’s performance on CEO dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988). The rationale behind this
sociopolitical force is simple: a CEO’s probability of dismissal increases with the board’s beliefs
that the CEO can affect performance and perform at a high level. The second sociopolitical
force identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) was the boards’ allegiances and values. Because the
board of directors decides whether to dismiss or retain a CEO (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), and
may be motivated by self-interest (Fredrickson et al., 1988), they may choose to retain (dismiss)
a poor (high) performing or low (high) ability CEO based on their individual interests or
pressures they may face to make a particular decision (Mintzberg, 1983). These biases, both
conscious and unconscious, affect the perspectives of board members as they seek information
regarding the CEO’s performance and ability (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dahl, 1994;
Fredrickson et al., 1988). These self-interest directed CEO dismissal decisions may be based on
how the CEO will affect directors’ fees, the overall personal wealth of the director, the status and
reputation of the director, or directors’ various relationships (including the relationship with the
CEO; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) third sociopolitical force was the availability of qualified
candidates to replace the CEO. Fredrickson et al. (1988) reasoned the CEO dismissal decision
was at least partly contingent upon the pool of available and qualified candidates whom could
replace the CEO. Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) fourth sociopolitical force in their CEO dismissal
model is the incumbent CEO’s power. A CEO’s power may be derived from numerous sources
including personal characteristics (e.g., charisma, prestige, founding CEO), control over
resources (e.g., key relationships, intellectual property), and voting control (Fredrickson et al.,
1988).
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Using Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model, several scholars empirically investigate the
components. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) concluded CEO dismissals to be more affected by
gaps in financial analysts’ earnings expectations and actual earnings than by organizational
performance. Boeker (1992) found when an organization is exhibiting low organizational
performance, directors whom were more closely tied to the organization and CEO were less
likely to dismiss the CEO. Following Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) assertion that industry size
represents available candidates to replace an executive, Crossland and Chen (2013) found boards
of directors of poor performing firms to be more inclined to dismiss a CEO when the CEO labor
market is more developed (e.g., more firms in the industry). Finally, CEO power was analyzed
in terms of experience in the upper echelons of corporate structures and found to assist CEOs in
protection from dismissal (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Ocasio,
1994).
Within sport, several studies incorporate some of or all the sociopolitical forces outlined
by Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) research. Holmes (2011) examined college football head coach
dismissals using three of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four forces of CEO dismissals, excluding the
availability of qualified candidates due to data limitations. Holmes (2011) found negative
relationships between head coach dismissals and head coach experience as well as post-season
and rivalry game victories. Consistent with Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) proposition that prior
organizational performance is a determinant of executive expectations, Holmes (2011) found a
negative relationship between past organizational performance and head coach dismissals.
Similarly, using the NFL salary cap as a proxy for performance expectations, Allen and
Chadwick (2012) found head coaches experience a higher probability of dismissal since the
salary cap was instituted. Though focused on the role of organizational structures and candidates
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available to replace NFL head coaches on head coach dismissals, Foreman and Soebbing (2015)
empirically examined all four of Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) socio-political forces of executive
dismissal. However, Foreman and Soebbing (2015) discovered no evidence to support their
hypotheses of organization structures or candidate availability influencing head coach dismissals.
In addition to the socio-political forces identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988), Holmes
(2011) included a measure of deviance in the dismissal decision, namely, sanctions imposed on
the program from a college football governing body. He observed infractions increased the
probability of head coach dismissal. However, research regarding the effect executive deviance,
whereby executives are responsible for their own deviance as well as the deviance of their
subordinates (Simon & Eitzen, 1990), has on dismissals is limited. At face value, the allegiances
and values force within Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model may seem to encompass deviant
behavior, however, allegiances and values do not refer to moral values or laws within the legal
system, but to relationships between the board of directors, the CEO and the CEO’s predecessor.
Therefore, the present study proposes the addition of a fifth socio-political force, executive
deviance, to the Fredrickson et al. model of CEO dismissals.
Executive Deviance
Corporate scandals and routine wrongdoing within firms are acts of elite deviance which
includes financial, physical, or morally harmful behavior committed by elites and members of
their organizations (Bangwanubusa, 2009; Simon & Eitzen, 1990). The term elite may identify
people who possess elite skills or knowledge within their respective industries or societies and
may be considered elite due to their high ability, status, wealth, or position (Bangwanubusa,
2009). Additionally, some elites belong to more than one of these categories, such as wealthy
and influential celebrity executives (Bangwanubusa, 2009; Hall, Blass, Ferris, & Massengale,
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2004; Simon, 1996). The focus of the present research is on a subset of elite deviance, namely
executive deviance, whereby executives are responsible for their own deviance and the deviance
of their subordinates. Furthermore, executive deviance may be committed while acting on behalf
of the organization or while off-duty (Lyons et al., 2016). Within the literature on executive
deviance, there are three areas of deviance important to the present study. These areas are
outlined below.
Workplace Deviance of Executives. Michalak and Ashkanasy (2013) defined
workplace deviance as “a form of behavior that violates organizational norms and that
consequently negatively impacts the well-being of the organization and its members” (p. 20).
Workplace deviance is detrimental to organizations in several ways, including damaged
reputations, exposure to lawsuits, and financial loss (Dilchert, Ones, Davis, & Rostow, 2007;
Litzky, Eddleston, & Kidder, 2006; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Of the organizations faced with
the aforementioned consequences of workplace deviance, executives are often responsible for
several reasons such as often being directly involved with deviance or at least being aware of the
deviant activities occurring within the organization (Beasley, Carcello, & Hermanson, 1999;
Michel, Heide, & Cochran, 2014; Simon & Eitzen, 1990). Furthermore, executives are not only
responsible for their organizations public image and financial position, but the top executives
within an organization are also the most likely people within in that organization to engage in
deviant acts (Daboub et al., 1995; Litzky et al., 2006).
Anecdotally, several accounts of workplace deviance committed by top executives led to
dismissals at organizations such as Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth (Lease, 2006).
Furthermore, empirical support establishing a relationship between executive deviance
committed directly by the top management team and executive dismissals has been established
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by a number of researchers (e.g., Gomulya & Boeker, 2015; Khanna et al., 2015; Wiersema &
Zhang, 2013). Wiersema and Zhang (2013) found CEO dismissal likelihood to increase
instances of stock option backdating, a specific form of executive deviance committed directly
by the top management team. The likelihood of dismissal following instances of stock option
backdating was further increased by the pervasiveness of the deviance and the media attention
devoted to the deviance (Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).
Khanna et al. (2015) examined fraud measured by instances of CEOs being named as
respondents in lawsuits pertaining to corporate fraud. They found, following instances of
corporate fraud, stronger relationships with boards of directors can decrease the likelihood of
CEO dismissal. However, relationships between boards of directors and CEOs often become
strained following instances of executive deviance (Gomulya & Boeker, 2015). Due to the
substantial implications of deviance and the often direct responsibility of top management in
their organization’s workplace deviance and the effect of deviance on relationships between
boards of directors and CEOs, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Workplace deviance committed by an organization’s top management team
increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Workplace Deviance of Employees. Even when top executives were not charged with a
criminal violation or did not directly engage in wrongdoing, they were often aware of the illegal
activities (Daboub et al., 1995; Litzky et al., 2006). Additionally, top executives establish the
culture, incentives, and reporting procedures which not only influence the ethical conduct of
subordinates, but also help to reduce the link between the top executives and the unethical
behavior (Daboub et al., 1995; Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011; Litzky et al., 2006).

41

Due to the leadership and responsibilities of CEOs, they may be held accountable for the
transgressions of their subordinates and organization (Daboub et al., 1995; Simon, 1996). In the
Volkswagen scenario, the CEO was forced to resign as a result of workplace deviance committed
by subordinates (Puzzanghera & Hirsch, 2015). Executives may be held accountable for the
deviant behaviors of their organizations because they are often held responsible for establishing
the culture of their organization and disciplining subordinates (Daboub et al., 1995; Lease, 2006;
Litzky et al. 2006, Lyons et al., 2016; Zahra et al., 2005). Furthermore, executives may be used
as scapegoats following instances of workplace deviance committed by employees, despite
evidence that the CEO did not contribute nor had knowledge of the misconduct (Gangloff et al.,
2015).
Deviance among employees may be categorized in two, often very different, types of
deviance: minor workplace deviance and serious workplace deviance (Litzky et al., 2006;
Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The distinction between minor and serious violations is essentially
a distinction between poor ethical behavior and minor policy violations, as opposed to more
severe and excessive behavior which may even result in physical harm (Litzky et al., 2006;
Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Furthermore, some instances of workplace deviance could be acts
committed by subordinates under the direction of executives (Daboub et al., 1995; Zahra et al.,
2005), whereas other transgressions result from behavioral issues, which often are a result of
environmental and leadership issues within the organization (Litzky et al., 2006; Robinson &
Bennett, 1995). Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. Minor workplace deviance committed by organizational members under
the direction of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal.
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Hypothesis 3a. Serious workplace deviance that is attached with a punishment only for
the individual deviant actor increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Hypothesis 3b. Serious workplace deviance resulting in punishment that impacts the
function of the organization increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.
Off-Duty Deviance. Lyons et al. (2016) defined off-duty deviance (ODD) as “behaviors
committed by an employee outside the workplace or off-duty that are deviant by organizational
and/or societal standards, jeopardize the employee’s status within the organization, and threaten
the interests and well-being of the organization and its stakeholders” (p. 464). Research
regarding ODD and its implications is limited, despite over 10% of Fortune 500 companies
publicly provide information on their websites regarding their company ODD policies – and
likely many more companies provide this information via internal documents (Lyons et al.,
2016). Of the organizations that provided justification for company ODD policies, 82.8% of the
organizations identified the reputation of the organization as a justification for the policies,
however, several other justifications were provided such as employee safety or ability to perform
at work. Given that executives are ultimately responsible for their organizations’ reputations and
subordinates’ work performance, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. Off-duty deviance committed by organizational members under the
leadership of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal.
In summary, executive deviance can be partitioned into three types: workplace deviance
by executives and top management teams, workplace deviance by employees, and off-duty
deviance. Figure 3.1 outlines these types along with the associated hypotheses. The present
study uses data from the NFL to test these hypotheses as well as the moderating relationship of
the league’s policy governing personal conduct.
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Empirical Setting
Head coaches in professional and amateur sports leagues around the world have been a
popular profession to study managerial and organizational theories and phenomenon, including
issues of succession such as dismissals (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Frick, Barros, & Prinz,
2010; Wolfe et al., 2005). Both Soebbing et al. (2015) and Soebbing, Wicker, and Watanabe
(2016) outlined some of the commonalities between head coaches and non-sport executives,
including decisions regarding on-field tactics and off-field administration of players and
members of the coaching staff. In addition, head coaches must operate within hierarchical
organizational structures (Brown, 1982; Keidell, 1987; Maxcy, 2013) where they are responsible
for optimizing performance while being constrained by resources and rules (Cannella & Rowe,
1995; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005). These factors are particularly true for NFL
coaches, who both hire and delegate responsibilities to coordinators and assistant coaches under
their authority (Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009). Thus, examining head professional
football coaches represents an interesting setting to explore the likelihood of dismissals.
Furthermore, the NFL adopted and modified its policy regarding personal conduct of employees.
This policy is explained below.
NFL Personal Conduct Policy
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue (1989-2006) implemented a Personal Conduct Policy
(PCP) in 2000 to deter off-field deviance in response to negative public attention from the media,
fans, and politicians (Benedict & Yaeger, 1998; Edelman, 2008). However, research reviewing
the PCP noted many limitations and viewed the policy as insignificant in deterring behavior
(e.g., Mahone, 2008). For example, Mahone (2008) discussed that the policy was constructed to
allow the commissioner to punish an individual only after all the legal proceedings had
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concluded for an incident (e.g., trial and appeal) and the individual was found guilty. He
concluded that the initial policy not only failed to deter behavior but also protect the overall
image of the league (Mahone, 2008).
Since current Commissioner Roger Goodell was appointed in 2006, he placed an
increased emphasis on NFL personnel (i.e., players, coaches, team staff, team owners, and
administrators) conducting themselves properly off the field (Ambrose, 2007). In response to
growing concerns regarding NFL personal conduct deemed detrimental to the league, a modified
PCP was adopted in April 2007 (Mahone, 2008). The modified policy provided the
commissioner with the power to act unilaterally to punish any person associated with the league
if his/her conduct was deemed to harm the brand of the league in the eyes of the public and
stakeholders, regardless of criminal charges being filed (Ambrose, 2007).
While much of the research directly examining the NFL’s PCP examined the policy and
commissioner power from a legal perspective (e.g., Mahone, 2008), recent empirical research
looked at the impact the policy plays in team decisions. Allen (2015) examined rookie NFL
Draft positions and the number of days veterans spent on the free agent market. Results from his
research indicated neither a rookie nor a veteran’s personal conduct impacts draft position or
days on the free agent market, respectively. Palmer, Duhan, and Soebbing (2015) also looked at
the impact personal conduct had on NFL rookies’ draft positions. Their findings suggest players
who were in trouble the year prior to the draft were selected lower in the draft. This result was
particularly true for players labeled as defensive skill players. The league’s increased efforts to
police off-field personal conduct provide an interesting dynamic to empirically examine how offfield player misconduct impacts dismissals of head coaches. Given the increased media attention
devoted to personal conduct and increased emphasis on holding personnel accountable in the
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NFL, dismissal decisions based on executive and employee deviance may be more prevalent
starting in the 2007-2008 season than in seasons prior.
Football coaches engaged in deviant acts including the promotion of dangerous behavior
and violations of public trust (Ambrose, 2007; Coakley, 2015; Harary, 2002; Kidwell, 2004).
For example, violating public trust involves falsifying injury reports and violating league rules
that are intended to deter unfair competitive advantages (e.g., unapproved surveillance of
opponents; Ambrose, 2007; Mahone, 2008; Statz, Cordell, Ham, Karcher, & Shukie, 2007). In
the corporate world, executives are more likely to be dismissed for similar acts of executive
deviance in regards to violations of public trust, such as releasing deceptive financial documents
(Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). Coaches typically promote dangerous
behavior in two ways: by engaging in violent or aggressive acts themselves or condoning
dangerous acts committed by subordinates. For example, New Orleans Saints’ Defensive
Coordinator Gregg Williams coordinated an incentive system whereby players received bonuses
for injuring opponents (Pfleegor, 2013). Though these incidents may initially result in fines if
discovered by the league, evidence from the corporate world indicates dismissals may eventually
occur, particularly in the wake of a modified policy regarding personal conduct (Haynes, Josefy,
& Hitt, 2015; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999; Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015; Persons, 2006).
Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5. Deviance committed by the team’s coach and its staff will increase the
likelihood of a CEO dismissal following a change in the corporate personal conduct
policy.
Due to the leadership and responsibilities of CEOs, they may be held accountable for the
transgressions of their subordinates and organization (Daboub et al., 1995; Simon, 1996).
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Notably in sport, coaches rewarded and coerced players to engage in deviant acts which often
lead to fines or suspensions by the NFL (Ambrose, 2007; Harary, 2002; Pfleegor, 2013).
Furthermore, the NFL’s PCP may raise additional concern and emphasis on employee deviance
in the workplace. Thus,
Hypothesis 6. Minor workplace deviance committed by organizational members under
the direction of a given CEO increases the likelihood of that CEO’s dismissal following a
change in the corporate personal conduct policy.
Hypothesis 7a. Serious workplace deviance that is attached with a punishment only for
the individual deviant actor increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal following a change
in the corporate personal conduct policy.
Hypothesis 7b. Serious workplace deviance resulting in punishment that impacts the
function of the organization increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal following a
change in the corporate personal conduct policy.
In the NFL, issues regarding off-field behavior of players have become increasingly
salient for the league and its teams (Ambrose, 2007; Statz et al., 2007). A study by Benedict and
Yaeger (1998) of the 1996-1997 NFL season found 21 percent of NFL players sampled were
either arrested or indicted for a minimum of one crime in which the authors determined was a
serious crime. Ambrose (2007) commented that the perception in the 1990s was that “‘murder’
was the only criminal offense said to bar an athlete from playing in the NFL” (p. 1071).
Recent research examined trends in player off-field misconduct and their impacts on
players and organizations. Leal, Gertz, and Piquero (2015) compared player arrest rate to the
arrest rate of the general population by three types of crime: property, public order, violent.
Their findings indicated the arrest rate for NFL players for what they determined as property and
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public order crimes were lower than the general population, while violent crime arrest rate was
higher compared to the general population. Subsequent research by Leal, Gertz, and Piquero
(2016) found that a small percentage of NFL players were arrested multiple times over a 14 year
period (2000 to 2014). Those players that were repeatedly arrested, however, generally engage
in violent crimes compared to players who are only arrested once during the sample period.
As per performance impacts, Stair, Mizak, Day, and Neral (2008) found the number of player
arrests did not impact organizational performance measured by the number of regular season
wins. Weir and Wu (2014) found a player’s deviance in the final year of college may have an
adverse effect on draft position. Once in the NFL, they found that arrests where the player was
subsequently not charged along with the total arrests (regardless of if they were charged with an
offense) had a positive effect of the number of starts per season in the NFL. Specifically for
running backs and wide receivers, total arrests led to an increase in total yards per season and
touchdowns.
Operating in contrast to league policies, some coaches have discussed, condoned, and
even encouraged criminal activity off the field (Ambrose, 2007; Harary, 2002). Due to the
increased concern among the league and teams regarding negative publicity (Ambrose, 2007;
Statz et al., 2007) in combination with the role of the coach to instill discipline within the
organizational culture of the team (Harary, 2002; Seifried, 2008; Statz et al., 2007), the
transgressions of players occurring outside the workplace may result in the dismissal of a head
coach. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 8. Deviance committed by the team’s players outside the workplace will
increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal following the modification of the corporate
personal conduct policy.
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development
In summary, literature and empirical evidence suggest deterring deviance is important to
organizations and the organizational leader, or in the sport team context, the head coach, is
responsible for deviance committed by organizational members (Lyons et al., 2016; Statz et al.,
2007; Seifried, 2008). Given the wealth of attention devoted to post-succession organizational
performance in Sport Management (e.g., Dohrn et al., 2015; Roach, 2016; Soebbing et al., 2015),
there is a need to understand dismissal causes prior to understanding their effects (Fee et al.,
2006; Maxcy, 2013). Within the literature, there is limited examination regarding deviance as a
potential dismissal determinant (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011; Kidwell,
2004; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), and the presence of institutional policies which may be
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affecting the deviance dismissal relationship (Lyons et al., 2016). The present study
hypothesizes expected behavior covering these two areas. These hypotheses are tested below.
Method
To examine the impact of executive deviance on CEO dismissals, the present research
examines NFL head coach dismissals from the 2000-2001 season through the 2015-2016 season.
The unit of observation is a team-season. For each of the 16 seasons, there is one observation
per team that creates a unit observation of a team-season. Each of the current 32 NFL teams
were active throughout this 16 season period with the exception of the Houston Texans–a
franchise which was established in the 2002-2003 season. Therefore, the 16 season sample
period yields 510 team-season observations. To best account for when a given executive is
responsible for a given organization, a team-season begins the day following the previous
season’s final game and ends the final day of the observed season due to head coach turnover
often occurring around the final game of a team’s season. Therefore, team-season observations
will be longer for teams with post-season games.
Dependent Variable
The dichotomous dependent variable is whether the head coach of the team-season was
dismissed (DISMISS), which is coded with the value of 1 to represent a head coach dismissal and
0 otherwise. To determine if a head coach was dismissed, I examine whether there was a change
in head coach after the beginning of the observed season and prior to the beginning of the first
regular season game of the following season. If the head coach of the observed season is
different from the head coach of the following season, a head coach departure is noted. To
determine whether the departure was voluntary or involuntary (i.e., a dismissal), a review of
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newspaper articles was conducted through Factiva (academic license) where key terms such as
fire, oust, dismiss, or forced resignation were used to indicate a dismissal.
Independent Variables
To isolate the effects of executive deviance from the other four sociopolitical forces of
CEO dismissals, the present research utilized data regarding (a) workplace deviance committed
directly by the executives, (b) workplace deviance committed by employees, and (c) off-duty
deviance committed by employees. The data are aggregated for team-season units of
observation.
Hypothesis 1 examines deviance of the management staff. To identify deviance
committed by the coaching staff, I use the total amount of monetary fines assessed against the
team’s coaching staff by the National Football League standardized by season (CFINEAMT). To
standardize the CFINEAMT variable by season, the mean coaching fine amount during the
season in which the observation took place is subtracted from the observed coaching fine
amount. Then, the difference is divided by the mean coaching fine amount during the season,
thus creating a standardized variable. These fines can be attributed to various transgressions
including verbal and physical altercations, falsifying injury reports, or off-field criminal activity.
By standardizing the independent variables by season, comparisons may be made across seasons
and variations in independent variables over time, such as increases in fines, can be analyzed
within the context of the seasons in which they occurred.
Hypothesis 2 examines minor workplace deviance. To examine minor workplace
deviance, penalties yards for the observed team are used and standardized by season (PENYDS).
Data regarding penalty yards were obtained from Pro Football Reference (i.e., http://www.profootball-reference.com/). Hypotheses 3a and 3b examine serious workplace deviance. To
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examine serious workplace deviance committed by players whereby only the individual player is
affected by the punishment (H3a), player fines are included in the model and measured using the
total dollar amount of monetary fines resulting from league violations for all the players on the
team (PFINEAMT). Similarly, serious workplace deviance committed by players with
punishments having the potential to affect the performance of the organization (H3b) are
measured by player suspensions using the total weeks players of a team were suspended due to
violating league rules (SUSPWKS). Data regarding player fines and suspensions were collected
from the same sources as the coaching fine data (i.e., http://www.justfines.com/ and
http://www.spotrac.com/). Like CFINEAMT, both PFINEAMT and SUSPWKS are standardized
by season.
Hypothesis 4 examines employee behavior outside of the workplace measured by the
total number of separate player incidents with law enforcement officers (LAW). To examine
outside of the workplace behavior, data were collected on all off-field player incidents through
the San Diego Union Tribune website. The website recorded any player incidents beyond a
standard parking violation. These incidents were confirmed and checked through various other
secondary sources including national and local newspapers as well as sport websites such as
ESPN.com to ensure the completeness of the database. Similar to the variables regarding onfield incidents, the total number of separate player incidents for the team are used and
standardized by season (LAW).
To examine the PCP’s impact on deviance and executive dismissals, the variable
GOODELL is incorporated into the present research. This variable is coded 1 for the 2007-2008
season and subsequent seasons, and 0 for seasons prior to the 2007-2008 season. This variable is
then interacted with the above deviance variables. To test hypotheses 5, 6, 7, and 8, the variables
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CFINGOOD, PFINGOOD, SUSPGOOD, PENGOOD, and LAWGOOD are used respectively.
Control Variables
Consistent with previous theoretical and empirical research involving executive and
coaching dismissals, numerous control variables are included in the present study to control for
organizational performance, socio-political factors, and other demographic characteristics. As
recent head football coach dismissal models used (e.g., Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Holmes,
2011), I control for current organizational performance using regular season winning percentage
in the observed season (WINPCT). In addition to overall regular season performance, I also look
at the performance against close rivals (DIVISION) and in the postseason (PLAYOFFS).
Following previous studies, DIVISION and PLAYOFFS are measured by subtracting career
division or playoff losses from career division or playoff wins, respectively (Foreman &
Soebbing, 2015; Holmes, 2011).
Per the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model for CEO dismissals, each of the four sociopolitical forces are accounted for in the present model. Expectations and attributions are
modeled by past organizational performance and evaluations by external analysts. Past
organizational performance is measured using regular season win percentages from the previous
season (WINPCTj-1), two seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-2), and the mean of
three through 10 seasons prior to the observed season (WINPCTj-3→10; Foreman & Soebbing,
2015; Holmes, 2011). External analysts’ expectations are measured by the percentage of regular
season games a team covered against the point spread in the observed season (COVERATS;
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Humphreys, Paul, & Weinbach, 2016; Soebbing et al., 2015).
Allegiances and values are modeled by the relationship between the executive and the
executive dismissal decision maker (Fredrickson et al., 1988). To operationalize this relationship
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in professional football, I use the number of seasons the general manager (GM) and the head
coach have worked together (HCGMTOG). HCGMTOG may also decrease the likelihood of
dismissals resulting from deviance (Khanna et al., 2015).
Alternatives to the incumbent executive are modeled using Foreman and Soebbing’s
(2015) proxy of qualified NFL head coach candidates (CANDPOOL). I operationalize the
candidate pool as a count of current offensive/defensive coordinators and former head coaches
whom exhibited either recent or career-long success in terms of points scored/allowed for
coordinators and winning seasons for former head coaches (see Foreman & Soebbing, 2015 for a
more detailed discussion).
Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) final socio-political force is incumbent power. Fredrickson et
al. (1988) stated CEO power increases over time and cited experience as a CEO as a determinant
of CEO power which decreases the probability of dismissal. Therefore, the years of experience
as an NFL head coach (NFLHCEXP) is included in the present model. Additionally, to control
for the reluctance of decision makers to dismiss new leaders (Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) an
indicator variable is included in the model which is coded 1 for head coaches in their first year
with the team and 0 otherwise (FIRSTYR). Lastly, many head football coach dismissal studies
examined demographic characteristics of head coaches (e.g., Audas, Goddard, & Rowe, 2006;
Madden & Ruther, 2010; Volz, 2009). Therefore, demographic variables such as age (AGE) and
visible racial minority status (MINORITY) are included in the model.
Empirical Specification
To examine whether changes in an institutional policy regarding executive deviance
impact the likelihood of executive dismissal, the present research follows previous head coach
dismissal models (e.g., Holmes, 2011; Volz, 2009) in using survival analysis to examine NFL
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head coach dismissals from the 2000-2001 season through the 2015-2016 season. Survival
analysis has many benefits over cross-sectional and panel data when examining factors that
change over time and their effects on the likelihood of an event occurring over time. For
example, cross-sectional and panel data approaches are limited in their abilities to establish
direction of causality, examine the time associated with reaching an event (e.g., dismissal), or
estimate the function of the relationship between time and the dependent variable following a
change in the independent variable (Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007). However, similar
studies examining determinants of leader dismissals used limited dependent variable models,
such as logit, probit, and tobit models (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). Therefore, a probit model is
estimated so results can be compared between the two techniques, but the results and discussion
will focus primarily on the survival analysis results.
The unit of observation in survival analysis is an episode occurring prior to the event.
However, when using time-dependent independent variables, episodes may be split into shorter
durations (Blossfeld et al., 2007). Therefore, to account for independent and control variables
changing within a coaching episode in the present study, coaching episodes are split into NFL
seasons and the unit of observation will be a team-season. Within the 16-season sample period,
505 team-season observations exist.
The dismissal hazard function takes the following form:
h(t) = h0(t)exp(β0 + β1Xit + β2GOODELL + β3XitGOODELLt + β4Zit + θt)
where i indexes individual coaches, t indexes seasons, and θ denotes season fixed effects. The
vectors Xit and Zit represent vectors of independent and control variables, respectively, and θt
denotes season fixed effects.
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Estimation Issues
There are several estimation issues to acknowledge and potentially correct. To ensure the
use of season fixed effects was appropriate for the analysis, the Wald test was used to test the
collective statistical significance of each season fixed effect and the result indicated season fixed
effects are statistically significant (i.e., p < 0.01) and appropriate for the analysis. The second
estimation concern is multicollinearity, which I examine in two ways. An examination of the
correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were found to not exceed 0.7,
indicating there is no need to omit variables to correct for multicollinearity (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). Moreover, none of the variance inflation factors for the independent and control
variables exceeded a value of six. This result further indicates multicollinearity is not an issue of
concern in this model (Menard, 2002).
Finally, I estimate parametric hazard models with exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz
distributions as well as a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model. These estimations are
consistent with previous research by Volz (2009). To determine the most appropriate model, I
perform graphical checks of the models’ pseudo residuals against the Cox-Snell residuals and
find the difference in residuals to be minimized under the Weibull distribution, indicating the
Weibull distribution provides the best fit for the data in the given model (Blossfeld et al., 2009).
Results
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the model. In this
sample, 17.6% of head coaches were dismissed. Within the sample period, 57% of the
observations occurred after the implementation of Goodell’s PCP. Among the independent
variables, the mean fine amount attributable to the coaching staff, adjusted for inflation and
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reported in 2015 dollars, is $2,650 with a maximum of $571,561.1 Among the observations in
the sample, 95.6% had no coaching fines.
The mean player fines accrued by a team in the sample in 2015 dollars is $225,866 with a
maximum of $5,267,276 and 31.3% of the observations had no player fines. The mean number
of weeks players on a given team were suspended is 2.5, with a maximum of 48, and 65.3% of
the observations had no player suspensions. The mean number of penalty yards in the sample is
843 with a minimum of 418 and a maximum of 1,313 yards. The mean number of legal
incidents in which players of a given team were involved is 1.6, with a maximum of 10, and
25.9% of observations had no players involved in legal incidents.
Exploring the performance, sociopolitical and demographic variables, average regular
season winning percentage is 0.502 with the coaches in the sample winning an average of three
divisional games. On average, head coaches and GMs worked together for 2.45 seasons. The
average age of head coaches is 51 and they have an average of 5.5 years of head coaching
experience. In the sample, 16% of head coaches are visible racial minorities.
Table 3.2 presents the results. Within Table 3.2, a probit estimation is included for
comparison against the survival analysis results. For the purposes of the present research, the
survival results will be the ones used for interpretation and discussion. Hypothesis 1 looked at
deviance of the head coach and top management team, operationalized by coaching fines. The
results indicate a positive and statistically significant effect on head coach dismissals. Thus, one
can fail to reject Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 examines minor workplace deviance through the

1

Monetary fines were transformed to account for inflation by calculating the real value of the fines in 2015 dollars
based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) urban consumers price index (CPI-U) non-seasonally adjusted annual
average. See http://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/data/consumerpriceindexhistorical_us_table.pdf
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics (n=505)
Variable
DISMISS
GOODELL
CFINEAMT
PENYDS
PFINEAMT
SUSPWKS
LAW
WINPCT
DIVISION
PLAYOFFS
WINPCTj-1

Description
Head coach is dismissed (1=dismissed)
Goodell’s personal conduct policy in effect (1=in effect)
Sum of coaching staff fines standardized by season
Sum of penalty yards standardized by season
Sum of player fines standardized by season
Sum of weeks players were suspended standardized by season
Sum of legal incidents involving players standardized by season
Team win percentage in observed season
Head coach’s career division wins less losses
Head coach’s career playoff wins less losses
Team win percentage in previous season

Mean
0.176
0.570
<0.001
-0.004
<0.001
0.001
-0.003
0.502
3.350
0.537
0.502

Std. Dev.
0.381
0.496
0.744
0.988
0.985
0.928
0.979
0.193
9.161
2.425
0.192

Min
0
0
-0.393
-3.151
-1.275
-0.958
-1.522
0
-16
-7
0

Max
1
1
5.480
3.012
5.249
5.292
3.751
1.000
46
13
1.000

Median
0
1
-0.177
-0.071
-0.301
-0.240
-0.284
0.500
2
0
0.500

WINPCTj-2

Team win percentage two seasons prior

0.501

0.193

0

1.000

0.500

WINPCTj-3→10

Mean team win percentage from 3 to 10 seasons prior

0.497

0.106

0.125

0.789

0.500

COVERATS
HCGMTOG
CANDPOOL
NFLHCEXP
FIRSTYR
AGE
MINORITY

Percent of games team covered against the spread
Years head coach and GM simultaneously employed by team
Estimated count candidates to replace head coach
Years of NFL head coach experience
Head coach s in first year with team (1=first year)
Current age of head coach
Head coach is a visible minority (1=minority)

0.511
2.450
7.626
5.568
0.214
51.123
0.160

0.118
2.807
1.868
5.209
0.410
6.783
0.367

0.188
0
5
0
0
32
0

0.875
15
11
22
1
69
1

0.500
1
7
4
0
51
0
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accumulation of penalty yards. Penalty yards do not have a statistically significant effect on
head coach dismissals, thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
Hypothesis 3 separates serious workplace deviance into penalties associated only with the
individual (H3a) and penalties associated with the organization (H3b). The present study uses
player fines to operationalize Hypothesis 3a, which has a negative and statistically significant
effect on head coach dismissals. Thus, Hypothesis 3a is rejected. Player suspension weeks are
used to operationalize penalties that can hurt the organization. Results from Table 3.2 show that
player suspensions have a positive and statistically significant effect on head coach dismissals.
As a result, one can fail to reject Hypothesis 3b. Finally, Hypothesis 4 examines players’ offduty deviance measured by the cumulative number of player run-ins with law enforcement
officers. These incidents are not statistically significant, thus, Hypothesis 4 is rejected.
Hypotheses were also developed to understand the potential changes that the NFL’s
Personal Conduct Policy has on the decision to dismiss head coaches due to deviance by players,
coaches, and the coaching staff. Recall, the deviance variables are interacted with the
GOODELL variable in order to understand this relationship. There is no statistically significant
separate effect of coaching fines assessed after the PCP modification, thus, Hypothesis 5 is
rejected. One can fail to reject Hypothesis 6 as penalty yards have a positive and statistically
significant effect on head coach dismissals. Player fines are positive and statistically significant
following the modification of the league’s policy, failing to reject Hypothesis 7a. The effect of
suspensions on dismissals is negative and statistically significant. As a result, Hypothesis 7b is
rejected. Run-ins with law enforcement officers are not statistically significant following the
policy change. Thus, Hypothesis 8 is rejected.
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Table 3.2
Model Results (Dependent Variable: DISMISS)
Weibull Distribution Survival Model
Probit Regression Model
Variable
Hazard Ratio
Coefficient
Std. Error
Coefficient
Std. Error
-0.332
0.529
0.760
-0.274
0.620
GOODELL
0.367***
0.127
1.433**
0.360**
0.184
CFINEAMT (H1)
-0.242
0.170
0.750
-0.288
0.225
CFINGOOD (H5)
-0.008
0.126
1.100
0.095
0.181
PENYDS (H2)
0.381**
0.171
1.358*
0.306*
0.181
PENGOOD (H6)
-0.444
0.320
0.464***
-0.767***
0.288
PFINEAMT (H3a)
0.358
0.333
1.908**
0.646**
0.300
PFINGOOD (H7a)
0.405
0.294
1.873**
0.628**
0.312
SUSPWKS (H3b)
-0.539*
0.326
0.488**
-0.718**
0.346
SUSPGOOD (H7b)
0.109
0.150
1.056
0.054
0.242
LAW (H4)
-0.060
0.176
0.992
-0.008
0.282
LAWGOOD (H8)
-3.078***
0.793
0.056***
-2.879***
0.907
WINPCT
-0.041**
0.019
0.934***
-0.068***
0.025
DIVISION
-0.140**
0.056
0.899
-0.106
0.076
PLAYOFFS
-1.194*
0.714
0.126***
-2.068***
0.697
WINPCTj-1
1.063*
0.571
0.988
-0.012
0.804
WINPCTj-2
2.059**
0.822
13.708*
2.618*
1.363
WINPCTj-310
-4.648***
1.170
0.014***
-4.292***
1.200
COVERATS
-0.041
0.054
0.786***
-0.241***
0.051
HCGMTOG
0.115
0.083
1.147
0.137
0.093
CANDPOOL
0.019
0.022
0.930
-0.073
0.045
NFLHCEXP
-1.320***
0.261
3.295***
1.192***
0.331
FIRSTYR
0.024**
0.011
1.051**
0.050**
0.024
AGE
0.143
0.211
1.387
0.327
0.258
MINORITY
-0.086
1.211
0.009**
-4.694**
2.126
Constant
--ρ
-3.020***
0.234
-134.941
-Log Likelihood
--40.273
-0.426
-McFadden’s R2
---0.877
-Count R2
---Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted
by ***. Season fixed-effects statistically significant at the 1% level for both models (i.e., p <
0.001). Hypotheses addressed are in parentheses next to their corresponding variable.

Examining organizational performance, the results indicate career playoff performance
does not have statistically significant effect on head coach dismissal, however, career
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performance in the division does have a significant and negative effect. Examining overall
regular season performance, I find negative and significant effects on regular season winning
percentage in the current and the previous season. Regular season winning percentage two
seasons prior has no statistically significant effect on dismissal. The average regular season
winning percentage three to 10 seasons prior to the observed season has a positive and
marginally significant impact on dismissals.
The percent of games covered and the seasons the head coach and GM were simultaneous
employed by the team are negative and significant. Variables for first-year head coaches and the
age of the head coach are positive and significant. Finally, the number of qualified candidates
for a head coach position, the years of NFL head coaching experience, and whether a head coach
is a visible minority are not statistically significant.
Discussion
This dissertation chapter is designed to increase the understanding of executive deviance
as a sociopolitical force in CEO dismissals as well as the mediating role of an institutional
emphasis on personal conduct represented by a policy modification. Previous research suggested
deviance may affect executive dismissal decisions (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell & Ferrell,
2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). However, it is unclear how institutional policies governing
deviance impacted dismissal decisions. The present research asked the question of whether the
modification of the NFL policy moderated team behavior as it related to deviance and the
likelihood of a head coach dismissal. I looked at three types of deviance outlined within the
literature: executive deviance, workplace deviance, and outside of the workplace deviance.
Looking at head coaching dismissals in the NFL over 16 seasons, the findings yield some
interesting insights. Broadly, they indicate deviance does affect dismissals and its effects are
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contingent upon the type of deviant behavior and an institutional emphasis on personal conduct
as represented by the implementation of a more stringent PCP.
Looking at Hypothesis 1 regarding executive deviance, measured by fines levied by the
league against the head coach and members of his staff (CFINEAMT), I found an increase chance
of dismissal. In Table 3.2, I calculate the hazard rates for each variable. The interpretation of
the hazard ratio is an increase/decrease of the chance of getting dismissed relative to the baseline
hazard rate (1.000). Thus, a one standard deviation increase in coaching fines for a given season
increases the risk of head coach dismissal by 43.3%. This finding is consistent with prior
research regarding the role of executive deviance committed directly by the CEO or top
management team in CEO dismissals (Daboub et al., 1995; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ferrell &
Ferrell, 2011; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013).
Examining Hypothesis 5 and the corresponding statistically insignificant relationship
after the policy modification in regards to executive deviance, the result could be explained by
the increased regulatory rules satisfying the organization in terms of adequate punishment being
taken against the coaching staff. Thus, the decision-makers responsible for dismissing the coach
may be satisfied in terms of the actions already taken by the league. In other words, teams may
feel that the punishment received by coaches after modification of the policy is sufficient.
Therefore, Goodell’s policy may have some unintended consequences which may be allowing
head coaches and their staffs to engage in deviant acts without the head coach being held
accountable beyond a coaching staff fine which is only a small fraction of the head coach’s
salary.
As an example, Mike Tice, who was the head coach for the Minnesota Vikings in 2005
won nine out of 16 games, following a season in which the Vikings only won half their games,
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but was dismissed at the end of the season after the coaching staff accrued $120,000 in fines
($145,633 adjusted for inflation). The fines accrued by the 2005 Vikings coaching staff were
over 5.48 standard deviations above the mean in 2005 which increases dismissal risk by 618%,
whereas winning nine out of 16 games only decreases dismissal risk by 80%. However, if the
coaching fines were accrued after the PCP modification, there would be no additional
statistically significant increase or decrease in head coach dismissal risk.
The second type of deviance I look at is deviance in the workplace. Recall, the prior
literature separates workplace deviance into minor and serious (Litzky et al., 2006; Robinson &
Bennett, 1995). In the present study, I examined serious workplace deviance in two ways: player
fines and player suspensions. Contrasting results show head coach dismissal risk decreased with
player fines, contrary to Hypothesis 3a, but increased when those fines are incurred during the
Goodell era, confirming Hypothesis 7a. A head coach’s risk of dismissal reduces 53.6%
following a one standard deviation increase in player fines accrued by the team. However, when
the player fines are accrued after the PCP modification, head coaches are less protected against
dismissal. Under Goodell’s PCP modification, the head coach of a team with player fines one
standard deviations above the mean only experiences a 11.4% reduction in dismissal risk.
Contrary to the effect of serious workplace deviance measured in the form of purely
individual punishments, suspended players increase the risk of head coach dismissal by 87.3%
for a one standard deviation increase in player suspensions, but decrease head coach dismissal
risk by 8.7% after the PCP modification. These results affirm Hypothesis 3b, but are contrary to
Hypothesis 7b. A possible explanation for the increased job retention of head coaches of teams
with suspended players following the PCP modification is that suspensions may have been used
as an excuse for poor on-field performance during the Goodell era (Palmer et al., 2015). In
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essence, the coaches were not able to use all their resources. Given suspensions after the PCP
modification in 2007 were more prevalent, team owners and GMs may view suspensions under
the policy modification as being excessive, unavoidable, or forgivable, thereby excusing poor
organizational performance resulting from suspensions. Similar to coaching fines, the potential
ability of head coaches to forestall their dismissal by having deviant players on their teams may
be indicative of an unintended consequence of a PCP modification that allows for more player
suspensions.
The second type of workplace deviance, minor deviance, is measured by the total team
penalty yards. Similar to player fines, penalty yards increase head coach dismissal risk following
the PCP modification, thus confirming Hypothesis 6. However, prior to the PCP modification,
penalty yards are not a statistically significant determinant of head coach dismissals, and
therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported in the present study. Deviant behavior associated with
on-field penalties is similar to deviant behavior which would result in player fines. This
similarity is because both forms of punishment were used to decrease the perception of the NFL
as being dangerous, thus creating a more marketable product. With recent concerns regarding
injuries to players, more rules have been implemented, and with the rise in media coverage, there
is likely increased pressure on teams and their head coaches to decrease penalties associated with
deviant behavior in the form of injury-causing actions or undesirable attitudes.
The final area of deviance is actions that occur outside the workplace. Here, I examined
the number of off-field incidents of players. The results from Table 3.2 show both variable
coefficients for incidents and incidents under the modified policy to not impact coaching
dismissals, thus Hypotheses 4 and 8 are unsupported in the present study. This finding is
surprising given one of the main reasons for the modification of the policy was to curb off-field
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behavior (Mahone, 2008). While the policy provided more power to the commissioner to punish
employees of the league and its member clubs, one would have anticipated that incidents would
reflect back on the head coach and potentially lead to his dismissal. However, the results show
that player misconduct outside of the workplace does not impact dismissal decisions. The lack
of significance may also be a result of the type of legal incidents in which the players were
involved and potentially the action taken by league or team executives in regards to that
behavior.
Looking at the variables operationalizing the socio-political forces outlined by
Fredrickson et al. (1988), there are several interesting results. First, meeting or exceeding
expectations (as measured by wins against the final point spread) led to a significant decline in
the likelihood of being dismissed. This finding as it relates to expectations playing a prominent
role in coaching decisions is consistent with prior work examining coaching related activities
such as dismissals (e.g., Humphreys et al., 2016) and compensation (e.g., Soebbing et al., 2016).
I find stronger allegiances and values, defined as the number of seasons the GM and head
coach have worked together, has a significant and negative impact on dismissals. Specifically, a
single season increase in cohesion between the GM and the head coach decreases head coach
dismissal risk by 21.4%. This finding supports previous findings by both Holmes (2011) and
Foreman and Soebbing (2015). Contrary to Foreman and Soebbing (2015), whom found a
negative relationship between being a first-year head coach for a team and head coach
dismissals, I find a strong positive relationship that increases dismissal risk by 229.5%, ceteris
paribus. Because Foreman and Soebbing (2015) used a sample period extending from 1978
through 2012, this contradictory result may be indicative of an increased willingness to dismiss
head coaches within their first year of tenure within the present study’s sample period of 2000
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through 2015. The trend of an increasing willingness to dismiss executives is consistent with
previous management literature (e.g., Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991).
I find that both the pool of qualified and available coaching candidates along with
incumbent power have no significant effect on head coach dismissal risk. While the insignificant
relationship regarding candidate pools is consistent with earlier findings by Foreman and
Soebbing (2015), it is surprising that power is insignificant. While there are many sources of
power including access to resources, leadership characteristics, and external status (Fredrickson
et al., 1988), it was expected that head coaching experience would encompass some of these
sources. In the end, the insignificant variable coefficient may signal that power in the
organization may be with the owner or through the entire front office.
Though some researchers found no evidence of age affecting head coach dismissal (e.g.,
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015; Volz, 2009), results from the present study are consistent with
previous studies that found positive relationships between head coach age and dismissal (e.g.,
Allen & Chadwick, 2012). More specifically, a one year increase in age increases dismissal risk
by 5.1%, ceteris paribus. Dissimilar to Madden and Ruther (2010) and Holmes (2011) but
consistent with Foreman and Soebbing (2015), the present study found no statistically significant
evidence of racial discrimination in the head coach dismissal decision.
Conclusion
The present study examined the effects of different levels and types of deviance on the
risk of dismissal faced by the head coach before and after a policy change emphasizing personal
conduct. The evidence from this study indicates deviance may have both positive and negative
effects on dismissals depending on the type and timing of deviant behavior. Direct deviant
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actions committed by the coaching staff increase head coach dismissal likelihood, as does minor
workplace deviance, measured by penalty yards, committed after the PCP modification.
The effect of serious workplace deviance on head coach dismissals depends on both the
punishment type and whether the PCP was modified to be more stringent. When punishments
for serious workplace deviance only adversely affected the individual responsible for the deviant
behavior, the deviance appears to have been welcomed, as evidenced by the probability of job
retention for the head coach. However, following an emphasis on personal conduct represented
by the PCP modification in 2007, serious workplace deviance with punishments affecting only
the deviant player increased the likelihood of head coach dismissal. In contrast, when
punishments for serious workplace deviance affected organizational performance in the form of
player suspensions following the PCP modification, the policy may be used as a viable excuse
for poor organizational performance, thus resulting in lower dismissal probabilities for head
coaches of deviant teams. Therefore, the modified PCP may have some unintended
consequences that can promote deviant behavior if suspensions are used as punishments or deter
deviant behavior by using player fines and penalty yards as punishments.
The present study provides a number of theoretical and practical implications. While
dismissals have been of interest to many academic scholars both inside and outside of sport,
empirical challenges exist to fully understanding the dismissal decisions. Though data
limitations have hindered many scholars from empirically testing the Fredrickson et al. (1988)
dismissal model and introducing concerns regarding the validity of those studies, the present
study examines all four socio-political forces together with various deviance variables. The
inclusion of deviance variables within the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model is important given the
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interplay between deviant behavior and the socio-political forces of dismissal (Khanna et al.,
2015).
Another important reason to examine a comprehensive model of deviance and
Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) four socio-political forces is to separate the effects of each due to the
similarities in determinants of deviance (Daboub et al., 1995) and the four socio-political forces
(Fredrickson et al., 1988). For example, studies in the corporate setting have used firm size,
which is a determinant of deviance (Daboub et al., 1995), to operationalize the availability of
candidates to replace an executive, as proposed by Fredrickson et al. (1988). The present study
separates the deviance variables from the socio-political forces for a better understanding of both
issues.
Though retention resulting from deviant behavior of subordinates prior to the PCP
modification may seem counterintuitive, it makes sense within the empirical context. Prior to the
PCP modification, coaches and owners benefited from, and therefore wanted, excessively violent
and aggressive players whom commit deviant acts (Ambrose, 2007; Coakley, 2015, Harary,
2002; Statz et al., 2007). However, as public awareness of deviance increased with media
attention and various platforms (e.g., websites, talk radio, and television shows) dedicated to
topics related to professional football, NFL administrators placed increasing value on deterring
conduct deemed detrimental to the league (Ambrose, 2007; Rose et al., 2007). Furthermore,
there may be higher expectations of head coaches to instill an organizational culture conducive to
the new emphasis on personal conduct (Ambrose, 2007; Rose et al., 2007; Seifried, 2008; Statz
et al., 2007). Therefore, head coaches of deviant players whom were punished as individuals
could forestall their dismissal prior to the PCP modification, but experience less protection since
the modification.
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More specifically with respect to understanding the role of deviant behavior within
organizations on the dismissal of organizational leaders, the present study develops an empirical
test of the deviance-dismissal relationship. Similar to attempts of scholars to empirically test the
full Fredrickson et al. (1988) dismissal model, scholars face data limitations when trying to
understand the deviance-dismissal relationship (Lyons et al., 2016). However, the present study
analyzes multiple levels of deviant behavior within an organization, namely, (a) deviance by
management, (b) serious workplace deviance whereby only the perpetrator is punished, (c)
serious workplace deviance whereby the organization is punished, (d) minor workplace
deviance, and (e) deviance external to the organization. Knowing the causes of dismissal is the
first step in understanding how successions effect organizations (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson et
al., 1988; Maxcy, 2013) and knowing the causes and effects of institutional policies, such as the
NFL PCP, can assist institutions in implementing and modifying their policies to create the most
beneficial situation for the institutions.
The findings from the present study may be useful for league administrators, GMs,
coaches, current and prospective athletes, and scholars of executive dismissals and successions.
As it relates specifically to the NFL policy, the insignificant findings related to off-field deviance
are potentially concerning to the league. While the league developed the policy to punish
employees for their conduct off-the-field, the belief that a team with numerous players running
into issues off-the-field would reflect on the coach was tested. The findings do not suggest that
team owners and GMs take players’ off-field personal conduct into account when deciding to fire
the head coach. For a policy that league executives brand as looking out for the league, they may
have to adjust the policy in penalizing head coaches and teams for players’ misconduct.
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The visibility of professional sports may affect the relationship between executive
deviance and dismissals. However, I believe results of executive deviance increasing dismissal
likelihood within the NFL to be especially robust due to deviance-specific issues related to
“locker room culture,” the promotion of violence, and the widespread media attention from
numerous stakeholders (Coakley, 2015). Therefore, studies examining the effect of executive
deviance on dismissals outside violent industries (e.g., NFL, military) may be even more likely
to see a positive relationship between deviance and dismissals. A limitation of the present study
was the fact fines were not separated into team fines and league fines, but combined which could
be problematic in this study if teams fine their players in an attempt to establish a non-deviant
culture. Similarly, I do not possess data regarding actions taken after deviant acts, for example,
if a coach or team rehabilitated or released a deviant player or member of the coaching staff.
The present study found player suspensions may be used as an excuse for poor
performance, but that effect may dissipate as teams become more aware of signing players whom
have engaged in misconduct (Palmer et al., 2015). Future research could examine the effect
player deviance has on head coach dismissals when the head coach holds a front office position
and has player personnel responsibilities. Because an understanding of dismissal causes is
required to understand post-succession organizational performance (Fee et al., 2006; Fredrickson
et al., 1988; Maxcy, 2013), future research could also examine how organizational performance
following a succession differs for dismissals based on different types of deviant behavior. Due
to the limitation in this study pertaining to unobserved coach reactions to deviant behavior,
future research could examine how coaches react to deviance within their organizations and how
their reactions mediate the executive deviance-dismissal relationship.
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The present study found the inherently deviant culture of the NFL and the media attention
the NFL receives may be contributing to the dismissal decisions of head coaches whom lead
deviant organizations. Future research could examine the effects of varying types and degrees of
executive deviance in other sports, leagues, or industries which may have less deviant cultures or
different levels of public exposure. Similarly, changing public perceptions of certain legal
incidents may have resulted in insignificant coefficients for the external deviance variables, so
future research could examine head coach dismissals based on the type of legal incidents in
which players are involved.
Lastly, this study examined the effects of various types and levels of negative executive
deviance on head coach dismissals, therefore, future research can focus on how head coach
dismissals are affected by positive forms of executive deviance. Positive deviance includes
behaviors that exceed expected norms (Heckert & Heckert, 2015). Examples of positive
deviance include selfless behaviors and extend to conscientiousness in rule-breaking such as
allowing players to transfer, or missing games to be present for a child birth (Martin, Lopez,
Roscigno, & Hodson, 2013). Such positive deviant behaviors committed by coaches or players
may be instrumental for organizational performance (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990; Shoenberger,
Heckert, & Heckert, 2012), and therefore may affect head coach dismissal decisions.
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CHAPTER 4
EXAMINING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MANAGERIAL CAREER
ADVANCEMENT AND CENTRALITY, RACE, AND THE ROONEY RULE
Chapters 2 and 3 specifically explored dismissals, which prior research identified as an
important area to examine (Crossland & Chen, 2013). Research regarding the determinants and
subsequent performance of the organization is common (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012). Using the
model developed by Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), Chapter 2 operationalized the
qualified pool of available candidates across several dimensions. Across these various
dimensions, the availability of qualified candidates did not statistically impact the likelihood of a
head coaching dismissal.
Chapter 3 expanded the Fredrickson et al. (1988) model to understand the mediating role
that executive deviance plays in the likelihood of a head coach dismissal. Head coaches are
more likely to be dismissed if they engage in deviant behavior themselves or if their players’
deviant behaviors result in team punishments, however, individual player punishments may help
head coaches forestall their dismissal. Furthermore, the chapter explored the potential
moderating influence that the National Football League’s (NFL) modified Personal Conduct
Policy has on the relationship between deviance and dismissal. Following the increased
emphasis on personal conduct, more player fines or penalty yards increase head coach dismissal
probabilities, however, suspensions may be viewed as an excuse for poor performance used by
coaches to forestall their dismissal.
While dismissals are a popular area of research both within and outside of the sport
context, the research on promotions receives limited inquiry (Solow et al., 2011). Promotions
are defined as “…any increases in level and/or any significant increases in job responsibilities or
job scope” either internal or external to the individual’s current organization (Seibert, Kraimer,
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& Crant, 2001, p. 858). Several determinants of promotions are provided in the literature (e.g.,
Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006). One important feature is diversity.
Diversity and discrimination are important topics which have garnered substantial interest
among Sport Management scholars (e.g., Agyemang & DeLorme, 2010; Cunningham, 2014;
Finch, McDowell, & Sagas, 2011). Within the realm of diversity and discrimination in sport,
scholars revealed the presence of discrimination based on demographic characteristics (e.g.,
Braddock, Smith, & Dawkins, 2012; Day, 2015; Finch et al., 2011; Madden, 2004).
Attempting to rectify the disproportionately low number of minority head coaches in the
league, the NFL implemented the Rooney Rule in 2003. The Rooney Rule is a league-level
intervention directive intended to increase racial diversity in the head coaching ranks through
requiring teams without named successors to interview minority candidates for vacancies
(Solow, Solow, & Walker, 2011). The impact of the rule on the diversity of NFL head coaching
hires is mixed (Fee et al., 2006; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Solow et al., 2011).
The current research regarding discrimination in the NFL led several scholars to suggest
racial disparities may be occurring earlier in coaches’ careers, such as, prior to being considered
for a head coach position (Braddock et al., 2012; Rider, Wade, Swaminathan, & Schwab, 2016;
Solow et al., 2011). For instance, racial disparities in the head coaching ranks may be a product
of central position coaches, whom are predominantly White, being preferred head coach
candidates (Braddock et al., 2012; Day, 2015). While numerous studies examined racial
discrimination among NFL head coaches and the effects of the NFL’s diversity initiative, the
conflicting results and lack of research examining racial discrimination earlier in coaches’
careers demonstrate the need for further research.
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The purpose of the present study is to examine the relationships between race, centrality,
and an institutional diversity initiative on coach promotions and demotions throughout the NFL
coaching ranks. The present study examines the NFL from the 1984-1985 season through the
2015-2016 season. During the sample period, the NFL implemented its Rooney Rule diversity
initiative in 2003 to increase diversity among NFL head coaches (Solow et al., 2011).
Estimating logistic regression models examining coach promotions and demotions,
empirical support of both racial disparities and preferences for central position coaches is found
in the NFL during the sample period. Additionally, no empirical support is found for the Rooney
Rule increasing promotions of Black coaches in the NFL during the sample period. The findings
within the present study yield insights into how and when discrimination is occurring and the
effectiveness of institutional policies intended to increase diversity among organizational leaders.
The present study builds upon previous literature examining racial disparities in coach career
advancement and practitioners can use the results of the present study when attempting to
implement diversity initiatives.
Literature Review
For over 50 years, issues of racial disparities and central position preferences in the sport
industry have been examined (e.g., Day, 2015; Grusky, 1963; Massengale & Farrington, 1977;
Scully, 1989; Singell, 1991). Earlier literature focused on central positions in baseball (e.g.,
Grusky, 1963; Scully, 1989), however, later research examined football, racial disparities in
coaching labor markets, and the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule in increasing diversity (e.g.,
Braddock et al., 2012; Solow et al., 2011). Though many studies have examined coach labor
market issues related to race, centrality (i.e., central position preferences), and the Rooney Rule,
findings have been mixed.
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Centrality Preferences in Coach Promotions
Early research pertaining to managerial promotions in sport originated around the idea of
position centrality. Centrality is defined in terms of interactions, whereby persons occupying
more central positions within an organization interact more with peripheral members of that
organization (Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 1951). Due to increased interactions resulting from
position centrality, central position occupants receive benefits from their positions such as
increased communication skills, leadership skills, and access to information (Grusky, 1963).
Grusky (1963) applied the idea of centrality to baseball players who became team
managers and found position centrality to increase the likelihood of players becoming managers.
More specifically, players in central positions requiring more interactions with other players on
the baseball field, such as second basemen and catchers, were more likely to become managers
following their playing careers (Grusky, 1963). Similar to Grusky’s (1963) findings in
professional baseball, Scully (1989) found a disproportionate number of infielders from states in
the northern United States to be hired as professional baseball managers. Interestingly, Black
professional baseball players were often from southern states and occupied non-central positions,
such as outfielder (Scully, 1989). Confirming the findings of Grusky (1963) and Scully (1989),
Singell (1991) found centrality to increase the likelihood of players becoming managers.
Additionally, consistent with Scully (1989), Singell (1991) found evidence of Black players
being less likely to become baseball managers.
Race, Centrality, and Promotions in Football
Though the early literature regarding centrality and race as determinants of managerial
promotions in sport has its origins in professional baseball, recent research explores the football
context (e.g., professional and college). Massengale and Farrington (1977) examined which
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players became college football coaches in 1975 and found most head and assistant coaches to
have previously played central positions such as quarterback, interior offensive lineman, or
linebacker, suggesting centrality to be a determinant of the coach hiring or promotion decision in
college football. A similar study by Anderson (1993) focusing on college football coaches and
athletic directors found centrality to be a determinant of who becomes coaches as well as
evidence that Blacks are much more likely to play peripheral (i.e., non-central) positions in
college–indicating a potential relationship between centrality and access to coaching positions
for Blacks. Anderson (1993) stated the lack of diversity among football coaches, which may be
a result of Blacks not playing central positions in college, “is likely to continue in the absence of
meaningful interventions” (p. 61).
As Anderson (1993) provided an update to Massengale and Farrington’s (1977) study, ,
Finch et al. (2010) provided an update to Anderson’s (1993) research by examining college
football 15 years later using 2005 data. As predicted by Anderson (1993), Finch et al. (2010)
confirmed a continuation of diversity lacking in the college football coaching ranks, likely due to
centrality and a lack of meaningful interventions. However, one potentially meaningful
intervention which was proposed for college football is modelled after the NFL’s Rooney Rule
(Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011).
Race and the Rooney Rule in NFL Coach Career Advancement
Descriptive statistics contrasting the stark differences between the low percentage of
minority head coaches and high percentage of minority players in the NFL are well documented
(Lapchick, n.d.). Furthermore, some scholars found additional evidence of racial discrimination
in the NFL coaching labor market (Braddock et al., 2012; Finch et al., 2011; Madden, 2004);
however, the broader scholarly research focused on uncovering preferential hiring and exit
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discrimination among NFL coaches has presented mixed conclusions (Fee et al., 2006; Madden,
2004; Malone, Coach, & Barrett, 2008; Braddock et al., 2012). The Rooney Rule was designed
and ultimately established based on the work of scholars (Solow et al., 2011). For example,
Madden (2004) examined NFL head coaches from the 1990-1991 season through the 2002-2003
season and found evidence that Black coaches outperformed White coaches in their first year of
tenure, throughout their tenures based on average performance in that period, and in their final
year of tenure. Based on the aforementioned findings, Madden (2004) concluded Blacks must
work harder to secure and retain their head coaching positions. Using information from
Madden’s (2004) study, the Rooney Rule was implemented in 2003.
Since Madden’s (2004) study, many scholars studied the role of race in NFL coaching
career advancement as well as the effectiveness of the Rooney Rule (e.g., Braddock et al., 2012;
Fee et al., 2006; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011). Malone et al.
(2008) presented a contrary view of Madden’s (2004) data. Though not intending to study race
as a factor in NFL promotions, Fee et al. (2006) included race as a control variable and found no
statistically significant evidence of bias against Black coaches in the NFL labor market between
1970 and 2001. However, in two of the eight logistic regression models estimated by Fee et al.
(2006), evidence of Blacks having a higher likelihood of promotion along with a lower
likelihood of demotion emerged.
Several other studies criticized Madden’s (2004) methods for examining racial bias in the
coaching labor market without controlling for several pertinent factors or including partial
seasons in the model (e.g., Fort et al., 2008; Malone et al., 2008). Improving upon Madden’s
model, Malone et al. (2008) included partial seasons in their logistic regression models to study
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racial bias in the decisions to hire or fire NFL head coaches. They found no statistically
significant effect of race on head coach dismissals.
Continuing work on potential racial bias in the NFL coaching labor market, Madden and
Ruther (2010) analyzed the effectiveness of the NFL’s Rooney Rule. Examining the NFL before
and after the Rooney Rule, Madden and Ruther (2010) found first year performance, average
performance throughout tenure, and likelihood of being fired are similar for Black and White
coaches after the Rooney Rule, however, not before. Based on these findings, Madden and
Ruther (2010) concluded the Rooney Rule was effective in rectifying the racial disparities in
NFL coach hiring and firing decisions.
Taking a different approach, Goff and Tollison (2009) examined determinants of teams
hiring a Black head coach from 1987 through 2007. They found city characteristics such as the
population, per capita income, and percentage of Blacks in the city to be significant determinants
of whether a Black head coach is hired. Furthermore, longer tenured team owners are less like to
appoint a Black coach to the head coach position. However, Goff and Tollison (2009) did not
examine the effects of the Rooney Rule in their study.
Solow et al. (2011) examined the NFL from 1970 through 2009 and found that
“conditional on a coach reaching coordinator status, there is no evidence that race influences
head coach hiring decisions” (p. 332). Furthermore, Solow et al. (2011) found no evidence of
the Rooney Rule increasing diversity in the head coach ranks. Despite insignificant findings of
relationships between race and promotions to head coach, as well as insignificant findings of the
Rooney Rule increasing head coach diversity in the NFL, Solow et al. (2011) agreed with
Malone et al. (2008) that other discrimination or bias may be occurring at lower levels of the
coaching ranks.
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Complimenting Solow et al.’s (2011) examination of the NFL head coach pipeline,
Braddock et al. (2012) analyzed the NFL from 2000 through 2006. Braddock et al. (2012)
found, relative to their White counterparts, Black coaches to be 60% less likely to be head
coaches, 63% less likely to be offensive or defensive coordinators, and 56% less likely to hold
central coaching positions. Furthermore, Braddock et al. (2012) found central position coaches
more likely to be offensive or defensive coordinators, however, no significant effect was found
for Black or White position coaches when separated by race. Despite selecting a sample in
which the Rooney Rule was implemented in the middle of the sample period, Braddock et al.
(2012) did not attempt to examine the effects of the Rooney Rule.
More recently, Rider et al. (2016) examined the NFL from 1985 through 2011 and did
examine the effects of the Rooney Rule on increasing coach diversity. Though Rider et al.
(2016) found no significant evidence of the Rooney Rule increasing racial diversity among NFL
coaches, significant evidence of racial disparities in coach hiring decisions was found. More
specifically, Rider et al. (2016) found Whites to be more likely to secure coaching positions than
minorities. In addition, Rider et al. (2016) provided no indication of central positions being an
important factor in securing coaching positions.
Given the contradictory results found in the studies discussed herein, the present study
seeks to shed light on the relationship between Black coaches and promotions and demotions
before and after the implementation of the Rooney Rule. Additionally, the present study seeks to
determine whether central position coaching experience is related to promotions and demotions,
and whether this relationship is contingent upon the coach being Black. Previous literature
which accounts for race, centrality, and the Rooney Rule is scarce and much of the previous
literature related to the aforementioned topics have not analyzed more than seven years
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following the implementation of the Rooney Rule. The present research is intended to address
these concerns.
Method
To examine coach promotions and demotions, data from NFL seasons spanning from the
1984-1985 season through the 2015-2016 season are used. Though data were collected for the
2016-2017 season, it is used to determine whether coaches were promoted or demoted in the
season prior. Consistent with Deephouse and Suchman (2008) and Seifried and Katz (2015) who
recommended the use of media publications to understand organizational activities and decisionmaking processes, NFL Record and Fact Books from 1984 through 2016 are utilized to classify
promotions and demotions. These NFL Record and Fact Books are official publications of the
NFL and present brief biographies of each team’s coaching staff prior to the beginning of the
season. The biographical information includes coaching position titles, birth dates and places,
and previous teams coached by year. The unit of analysis is a coach-season, whereby each coach
is observed for the duration of a season and characteristics of the team for the season are
attributed to the coach who began the season with the team, according to the NFL Record and
Fact Books.
The binary dependent variables indicate whether the coach was promoted (PROM) or
demoted (DEMO) from their current NFL position to a new NFL position. Therefore, only
observations in which the coach was coaching in the NFL in the observed season, as well as the
following season, are included in the sample. The dependent variable PROM is coded with the
value of 1 to represent a promotion and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dependent variable DEMO is
coded with the value of -1 to represent a demotion and 0 otherwise. The coding of PROM and
DEMO allow for an ordinal third dependent variable to be incorporated into the present study
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which indicates whether a coach was promoted, demoted, or neither (PRODEM). The ordinal
dependent variable PRODEM is calculated as the sum of PROM and DEMO, and is, therefore,
coded 1 for a promotion, -1 for a demotion, and 0 otherwise.
To determine if a head coach was promoted or demoted, changes in coaches’ job titles
from the observed season to the following season are identified as consistent with the definition
of Seibert et al. (2001). Each job title is divided into a category: Level 1 (i.e., head coaches),
Level 2 (i.e., assistant head coaches and offensive/defensive coordinators), Level 3 (e.g., position
coaches, special teams coordinators), and Level 4 (e.g., assistant position coaches,
offensive/defensive assistants, and quality control coaches). Based on the aforementioned levels,
coaching changes to higher levels (i.e., moves from Level 4 to Levels 3, 2, or 1; Level 3 to
Levels 2 or 1; and Level 2 to Level 1) are considered promotions and PROM is coded with the
value of 1. Similarly, coaching changes to lower levels (i.e., moves from Level 1 to Levels 2, 3,
or 4; Level 2 to Levels 3 or 4; and Level 3 to Level 4) are considered demotions and DEMO is
coded with the value of -1. Finally, lateral moves or no changes in coaching positions are coded
with the value of 0 for PROM, DEMO, and PRODEM.
Independent Variables
To examine the effects of potential racial disparities, central position preferences, and the
Rooney Rule on coach promotions and demotions in the NFL, three independent variables are
used and interacted with the race variable. To analyze potential racial discrimination against in
NFL coach promotions and demotions, a binary variable indicating whether a coach appears to
be Black is included in the model (BLCK). The indicator variable BLCK assumes a value of 1 if
the coach appears to be Black and 0 otherwise. Consistent with Fort et al. (2008), race was
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verified from popular sources and the variation in race among NFL coaches is not so great where
there exists a large portion of, for example, dark-skinned Hispanics.
To examine the effects of the Rooney Rule on promotions and demotions in the NFL, a
binary indicator variable is used to indicate whether the Rooney Rule is in effect during the
observed season (ROON). Therefore, the indicator variable ROON takes a value of 1 if the
Rooney Rule is in effect (i.e., from the 2003-2004 season through the end of the sample period)
and 0 otherwise. To analyze possible central position preferences, a binary variable indicating
whether a position or assistant position coach is primarily responsible for the performance of a
central position (CENT). The binary variable CENT is coded with the value of 1 if the coach is
an assistant position or position coach for quarterbacks or linebackers and 0 otherwise. To assess
the effect of the Rooney Rule and preferential hiring for central position coaches on Black
coaches, BLCK is interacted with ROON (BLCK*ROON) and CENT (BLCK*CENT).
Control Variables
Consistent with previous empirical research regarding coaching promotions, several
control variables are included in the present study to control for human capital. Current and
previous coaching experience is controlled for by with variables numerically describing the
amount of coaching experience in college football, other non-NFL professional football leagues,
lower-level NFL coaching positions, the coach’s current coaching level, and higher-level NFL
coaching positions. Previous college football coaching experience is calculated using the sum of
football seasons spent coaching college football at any level (e.g., head coach or assistant
position coach) prior to the observed season (COLL). Similarly, previous football coaching
experience in other professional football leagues (e.g., arena football, Canadian Football League,
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United States Football League) is calculated using the sum of seasons spent coaching non-NFL
professional football at any level prior to the observed season (OTHR).
Higher-level NFL coaching experience is measured using the sum of seasons spent in
NFL coaching positions deemed higher than the current position (HLVL). For example, if a
coach currently holds a Level 3 coaching position as a wide receivers coach, but previously spent
three seasons as a head coach and seven seasons as an offensive coordinator, the value of HLVL
for this coach in the observed season would be 10. Current-level NFL coaching experience is
measured using the sum of seasons spent in NFL coaching positions deemed to be the same level
of the current position (CLVL). For example, the hypothetical wide receivers coach in the
previous example may be in his ninth season as a wide receivers coach, and therefore, his CLVL
for the observed season would be 9. Consistent with HLVL and CLVL, lower-level NFL
coaching experience is measured using the sum of NFL seasons the coach spent coaching as a
lower-level assistant coach relative to the current coaching position (LLVL). For example, LLVL
is the sum of seasons as an assistant position coach for position coaches, as an assistant position
coach and position coach for coordinators/assistant head coaches, and in non-head coach
coaching positions in the NFL for head coaches.
Also accounted for within the present study are the performance of the organization and
the performance of the individual in the observed season. To measure organizational
performance, regular season winning percentage in the observed season (ORGP) is used. To
measure individual performance, the standardized performance metrics for a given coaching
position are used (INDP). For head coaches, individual performance is the same as
organizational performance; however, the variable is expressed in standard deviations. More
specifically, to calculate the standardized winning percentages, the mean winning percentage for
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the league in a given season is subtracted from each observed team’s winning percentage. Then,
the difference between the league mean and the observed winning percentage is divided by the
standard deviation of the winning percentage for the observed season.
The INDP variable for non-head coaches is calculated in a manner consistent with the
aforementioned method, however, using different performance metrics based on coaching
responsibility. For offensive coordinators, the amount of points scored by the team in the
observed season is used and standardized by season. Similarly, for defensive coordinators, the
amount of points scored by the teams’ opponents in the observed season is multiplied by -1 and
standardized by season. For assistant coaches at all levels without specified offensive/defensive
responsibilities in their position title (e.g., assistant head coach or coaching assistant),
standardized winning percentages are used. Likewise, for assistant coaches only with offensive
or defensive designations (i.e., not specific position coach primary responsibilities), standardized
points scored and points allowed variables are used, respectively, consistent with coordinator
individual performance measures.
The INDP variable for position coaches and assistant position coaches varies by position
coached. Table 4.1 provides a description of individual performance measures used; separated
by coach position title and the level that the title is associated with from the above discussion.
As examples, for quarterback and wide receiver coaches, individual performance is measured by
net yards per pass attempt, which is calculated as the difference of passing yards and sack yards
divided by the sum of pass attempts and sacks. For defensive backs coaches, individual
performance is measured by opponents’ net yards per pass attempt multiplied by -1. Consistent
with the head coach and coordinator variables, each of these performances measured are
aggregated at the season level to allow for cross-position comparisons.
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Related to organizational performance is penalty yards. Because coaches are responsible
for the conduct of their players, especially on-field conduct and discipline (Seifried, 2008; Statz
et al., 2007), penalty yards are controlled for in the present study and standardized by season to
account for rule changes and other seasonal differences (PNYD). When head coach turnover
occurs, newly hired or promoted head coaches often assemble new coaching staffs, thus creating
an environment in which entire coaching staffs lose their positions and are more likely to be
Table 4.1
Individual Performance Measures by Position Title
Level
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

Position Title
Head Coach
Assistant Head Coach
Defensive Coordinator
Offensive Coordinator
Quarterbacks
Wide Receivers
Running Backs
Tight Ends
Offensive Line
Defensive Line
Linebackers
Secondary
Special Teams
Assistant Quarterbacks
Assistant Wide Receivers
Assistant Running Backs
Assistant Tight Ends
Assistant Offensive Line
Assistant Defensive Line
Assistant Linebackers
Assistant Secondary
Assistant Special Teams
Coaching Assistant
Defensive Assistant
Defensive Quality Control
Offensive Assistant
Offensive Quality Control

Individual Performance Measure
Winning percentage
Winning percentage
Points allowed
Points scored
Net yards per pass attempt
Net yards per pass attempt
Rushing yards per attempt
Offensive yards per play
Offensive yards per play
Opponents' rushing yards per play (negative)
Opponents' offensive yards per play (negative)
Opponents' net passing yards per play (negative)
Yards per punt return
Net yards per pass attempt
Net yards per pass attempt
Rushing yards per attempt
Offensive yards per play
Offensive yards per play
Opponents' rushing yards per play (negative)
Opponents' offensive yards per play (negative)
Opponents' net passing yards per play (negative)
Yards per punt return
Winning percentage
Points allowed
Points allowed
Points scored
Points scored
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demoted, a variable for head coach turnover (HCTO) is included in the model. Additionally,
coach age, which is calculated by subtracting the coach’s birth year from the year of the first
regular season game for the given observation (AGE) is included in the model. Lastly, season
fixed effects are included in the model to account for changes internal and external to the NFL
which may impact promotions and demotions in the NFL.
Empirical Specification
To examine potential racial disparities and central position preferences as well as effects
of an institutional policy regarding preferential hiring and promotion practices has on promotions
and demotions, the present study follows previous coach promotion models (e.g., Braddock et
al., 2012; Madden & Ruther, 2010; Malone et al., 2008; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) in
using logistic regression models to analyze the NFL from the 1984-1985 season through the
2015-2016 season. The unit of observation is a coach-season in which each coach has no more
than one observation per season. Within the 32-season sample period, 12,548 team-season
observations exist in which an NFL coach remained in the NFL the following season.
From the above sample, 12 team-season observations spanning four coaches were
removed due to limitations identifying birth years or pictures. Three of the four coaches
removed from the sample never experienced an NFL promotion or demotion, based on the
criteria within this study, and remained Level 4 coaches for the duration of their NFL careers.
The other coach removed from the sample spent three years in the NFL and was a Level 4 coach
promoted to a Level 3 tight ends coach. Therefore, the final number of team-season observations
within the sample is 12,536.
The logistic regression model takes the following form:
L=log(P/1-P)=βXit
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where L is the log odds ratio, P is the probability of promotion or demotion, and Xit is a vector of
independent and control variables indexed by coach (i) and seasons (t). To address and
potentially correct for multicollinearity, correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors
were examined. With the exception of interaction terms and their components, an examination
of the correlation coefficients between each of the variables in the model were found to not
exceed 0.6, indicating there is no need to omit variables to correct for multicollinearity
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Moreover, none of the variance inflation factors for the noninteracted independent and control variables exceeded a value of eight. This result further
indicates multicollinearity is not an issue of concern among non-interacted independent and
control variables in this model (Menard, 2002).
Results
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the models. In this
sample, an average of 8.9% of coach-season observations included a promotion, whereas 3.8%
of coach-season observations resulted in demotion within the NFL during the sample period.
Among the observations, 26.2% represented coaches identified as Black and approximately half
(i.e., 50.4%) of the observations occurred while the Rooney Rule was in effect. Central position
coaches compose 12.5% of the observations in the sample. The average amount of college
coaching experience is 8.7 seasons with a maximum of 40 seasons. Other professional football
league coaching experience is less common with a mean of 0.4 seasons and a maximum of 17
seasons.
Most coaches have no coaching experience at ranks above their current position with a
median of zero and a mean of 0.6 seasons. Coaching experience at the coach’s current level
extends to a maximum of 29 seasons, but has a mean of 5.5 seasons. Coaching experience at
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Table 4.2
Summary Statistics (n=12,536)
Variable
PROM
DEMO
BLCK
ROON
COLL
OTHR
CENT
HLVL
CLVL
LLVL
ORGP
INDP
PNYD
HCTO
AGE

Description
Coach is promoted for the following season (1=promoted)
Coach is demoted for the following season (-1=demoted)
Coach appears to be Black or African-American (1=Black)
Rooney Rule is active in the observed season (1=Rooney Rule)
Sum of seasons spent coaching college football at any level
Sum of seasons spent coaching other football leagues
Coached central position (QB or LB) as primary responsibility
in observed season (1=central position coach)
Sum of NFL seasons spent in a higher-level coaching position
Sum of NFL seasons spent in the current coaching level
Sum of NFL seasons spent in a lower-level coaching position
Team performance measured by observed season win percentage
Individual performance measured in standard deviations
Sum of yards accrued against a team in the observed season
Head coach did not retain position the following season
(1=turnover)
Coach age calculated as year of first game less birth year

88

Mean
0.089
-0.038
0.262
0.504
8.723
0.422
0.125

Std. Dev.
0.284
0.191
0.440
0.500
7.481
1.332
0.331

Min
0
-1
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
0
1
1
40
17
1

Median
0
0
0
1
8
0
0

0.569
5.452
1.957
0.512
0.063
-0.019
0.174

1.956
4.726
3.555
0.186
0.973
0.995
0.379

0
1
0
0
-2.944
-3.424
0

28
29
29
1
3.441
3.343
1

0
4
0
0.500
0.094
-0.056
0

46

10

19

79

46

lower levels is also possessed by less than half of the coach-season observations with a median
of zero seasons and a mean of 2 seasons. Head coach turnover occurred following 17.4% of the
observations and the average age of coaches within the coach-season observations is 45.9, which
spans from 19 to 79 years old.
Table 4.3 presents the ordered logistic regression results for (a) all the observations, (b)
all Level 2 and 3 coaches, (c) only Level 2 coaches, and (d) only Level 3 coaches. The coach
level is presented for the coach during the observed year (i.e., not the level the coach was
promoted/demoted to). For the full model with all observations included, the variable for Black
coaches is negative and marginally significant, central position coaches is positive and
statistically significant, and Black central position coaches is negative and marginally significant.
Because the central coach variable is positive (i.e., 0.637) and the Black central coach
variable is negative (i.e., -0.408), the joint effect of the two central coach variables, irrespective
of the Black coach variable, is the sum of the two effects (StataCorp, 2013), which is positive
(i.e., 0.229). To examine the statistical significance of the effect of the central coach variable
irrespective of the Black coach variable, a joint significance test of the joint coefficient was
conducted and found to be statistically insignificant (i.e., p=0.307). Similarly, the joint
significance of the Black coach variable, irrespective of the central coach variable, was examined
and the joint coefficient of -0.607 is statistically significant (i.e., p=0.012). Thus, being a Black
coach, irrespective of being a central coach, has a negative and statistically significant effect on
the upward career mobility of coaches.
Regarding the control variables in the full ordered logistic regression model, higher level
coaching experience, organizational performance, and individual experience are positive and
statistically significant. In contrast, lower level coaching experience, head coach turnover in the
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Table 4.3
Ordered Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: PRODEM)
Variable
BLCK
ROON
BLCK*ROON
CENT
BLCK*CENT
COLL
OTHR
HLVL
CLVL
LLVL
ORGP
INDP
PNYD
HCTO
AGE
Cut1
Cut2
Observations
McFadden’s R2

Full
-0.200*
(0.102)
0.120
(0.254)
0.160
(0.129)
0.637***
(0.083)
-0.408*
(0.239)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.019
(0.022)
0.162***
(0.013)
0.009
(0.008)
-0.143***
(0.009)
1.243***
(0.168)
0.102***
(0.029)
-0.046*
(0.028)
-0.525***
(0.083)
-0.0345***
(0.005)
-4.619
(0.300)
1.577
(0.292)
12,536
0.085
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Level 2
-0.487*
(0.264)
0.019
(0.552)
0.460
(0.341)
---0.024**
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.044)
0.097**
(0.043)
0.022
(0.021)
-0.032*
(0.018)
2.800***
(0.350)
0.020
(0.057)
-0.018
(0.061)
-1.150***
(0.159)
-0.026**
(0.010)
-2.465
(0.649)
2.784
(0.652)
2,021
0.104

Level 3
-0.177
(0.148)
-0.998***
(0.379)
0.145
(0.195)
0.991***
(0.108)
-0.486
(0.303)
0.016**
(0.007)
0.002
(0.031)
0.155***
(0.018)
0.049***
(0.012)
-0.064**
(0.027)
0.741***
(0.268)
0.243***
(0.047)
-0.095**
(0.043)
0.152
(0.120)
-0.026***
(0.008)
-4.718
(0.451)
2.216
(0.440)
7,113
0.058

(Table 4.3 continued)
Full
Level 2
Level 3
Log Likelihood
-5241.007
-1099.023
-2306.138
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT)
-0.607**
--0.663**
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT)
0.229
-0.505*
Season FE P-value
0.006
0.955
0.085
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1%
level denoted by ***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below
coefficients.
following season, and age are negative and statistically significant. Penalty yards are also
negative, but only marginally significant.
For the model limited to Level 2 coaches, only 2,021 observations are used and the only
variable of the independent variables of focus in this study which is even marginally significant
is the Black coaches variable, which is negative and marginally significant. Variables
representing higher level coaching experience and organizational performance are positive and
statistically significant, whereas college coaching experience, head coach turnover, and coach
age are negative and statistically significant in this model. Lower level coaching experience is
also negative in this model, but only marginally significant.
The last ordered logistic regression model presented in Table 4.3 isolates Level 3 coach
observations. Within this model, the variable representing the Rooney Rule being active is
negative and statistically significant, whereas the central position coach variable is positive and
statistically significant. The joint effect of the two Black coach variables is negative and
statistically significant and the joint effect of the two central coach variables is positive and
marginally significant. College coaching experience, higher level coaching experience, current
level coaching experience, organizational performance, and individual performance are positive
and statistically significant. In contrast, lower level coaching experience, penalty yards accrued,
and coach age are negative and statistically significant.
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Table 4.4 presents the logistic regression model results for promotions only. Analyzing
all observations in which promotion is possible (i.e., not head coaches), the results of the logistic
Table 4.4
Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: PROM)
Variable
BLCK
ROON
BLCK*ROON
CENT
BLCK*CENT
COLL
OTHR
HLVL
CLVL
LLVL
ORGP
INDP
PNYD
HCTO
AGE
Constant

Full
-0.453***
(0.128)
-0.010
(0.291)
0.247
(0.160)
0.557***
(0.087)
-0.045
(0.248)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.031
(0.029)
0.166***
(0.014)
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.104***
(0.016)
0.965***
(0.198)
0.108***
(0.034)
-0.022
(0.033)
0.572***
(0.086)
-0.035***
(0.006)
-1.359***
(0.334)

Level 2
-0.575
(0.558)
0.897
(0.944)
0.714
(0.674)
---0.026
(0.018)
0.032
(0.075)
0.143**
(0.059)
0.036
(0.037)
-0.087**
(0.035)
3.157***
(0.590)
-0.004
(0.096)
0.226**
(0.101)
1.650***
(0.241)
-0.066***
(0.018)
-1.790
(1.130)
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Level 3
-0.481**
(0.189)
-1.005**
(0.437)
0.243
(0.240)
1.076***
(0.113)
-0.060
(0.300)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.002
(0.036)
0.177***
(0.020)
0.056***
(0.015)
-0.034
(0.033)
0.657**
(0.311)
0.251***
(0.054)
-0.099**
(0.050)
0.642***
(0.125)
-0.047***
(0.009)
-1.349***
(0.494)

Level 4
0.013
(0.208)
-1.180**
(0.586)
0.006
(0.249)
0.463**
(0.216)
0.123
(0.548)
0.018*
(0.010)
-0.147**
(0.067)
0.083***
(0.022)
-0.007
(0.021)
-0.406
(0.303)
0.021
(0.052)
0.013
(0.053)
0.226
(0.146)
0.016*
(0.009)
-1.443**
(0.648)

(Table 4.4 continued)
Full
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Observations
11,674
2,021
7,113
2,541
2
McFadden’s R
0.071
0.140
0.091
0.049
2
Count R
0.905
0.941
0.932
0.802
Log Likelihood
-3408.552
-396.463
-1609.631
-1203.472
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT)
-0.497**
--0.541*
0.136
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT)
0.512**
-1.016***
0.586
Season FE P-value
<0.001
0.992
0.117
0.096
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted by
***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below coefficients.
regression estimation shows the Black variable to be negative and statistically significant and the
central position coach variable to be positive and statistically significant. The joint effects of the
two Black coach variables and the two central coach variables are statistically significant, but the
joint Black coach variable is negative and the joint central coach variable is positive. The
positive and statistically significant variables are those that represent higher level coaching
experience, organizational performance, individual performance, and head coach turnover,
whereas lower level coaching experience and coach age are negative and statistically significant.
Table 4.4 also presents the model for Level 2, 3, and 4 coaches with the dependent
variable of promotions. Within the model for Level 2 coaches, only six variables are statistically
significant. Higher level coaching experience, organizational performance, penalty yards, and
head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant, whereas lower level coaching
experience and coach age are negative and statistically significant. Within the Level 3 coaches
model, the Black and Rooney Rule variables are negative and statistically significant, but the
central position coach variable is positive and statistically significant. The joint effect of the two
Black coach variables is negative and marginally significant and the joint effect of the two
central coach variables is positive and statistically significant.
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Table 4.5
Logistic Regression Model Results (Dependent Variable: DEMO)
Variable
BLCK
ROON
BLCK*ROON
CENT
BLCK*CENT
COLL
OTHR
HLVL
CLVL
LLVL
ORGP
INDP
PNYD
HCTO
AGE
Constant
Observations
McFadden’s R2
Count R2
Log Likelihood

Full
-0.471**
(0.198)
0.355
(0.456)
0.006
(0.260)
-0.782***
(0.213)
1.373***
(0.454)
0.003
(0.009)
-0.008
(0.036)
-0.045
(0.040)
-0.082***
(0.018)
0.138***
(0.014)
-1.889***
(0.327)
-0.083
(0.055)
0.111**
(0.052)
1.933***
(0.118)
0.011
(0.009)
-3.594***
(0.547)
9,995
0.225
0.955
-1481.368

Level 1
-0.284
(1.964)
-0.915
(2.458)
-0.193
(2.342)
--

Level 2
0.513
(0.325)
0.308
(0.690)
-0.401
(0.418)
--

--

--

0.143
(0.090)
-0.092
(0.236)
--

0.029**
(0.013)
0.032
(0.055)
-0.061
(0.057)
-0.023
(0.028)
0.018
(0.023)
-3.020***
(0.453)
-0.021
(0.074)
0.123
(0.078)
1.839***
(0.167)
0.010
(0.013)
-2.081**
(0.824)
2,021
0.222
0.882
-609.691

-0.452*
(0.240)
0.177
(0.135)
55.342
(40.746)
-11.930
(7.983)
0.842
(0.540)
--0.020
(0.083)
-27.317
(20.687)
68
0.439
0.779
-25.859
94

Level 3
-0.635**
(0.316)
0.921
(0.729)
0.168
(0.405)
-0.116
(0.235)
1.022**
(0.482)
-0.032**
(0.015)
-0.008
(0.069)
-0.071
(0.077)
-0.047
(0.029)
0.080**
(0.039)
-0.872
(0.561)
-0.238**
(0.099)
0.122
(0.089)
1.124***
(0.203)
-0.034**
(0.017)
-2.251**
(0.925)
7,113
0.122
0.980
-604.719

(Table 4.5 continued)
Full
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Joint BLCK+(BLCK*CENT)
0.902**
--0.386
Joint CENT+(BLCK*CENT)
0.591
--0.906**
Season FE P-value
0.877
0.979
0.874
0.793
Note. Significance at 10% level denoted by *, 5% level denoted by **, and 1% level denoted by
***. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis below coefficients.

Regarding the control variables for the Level 3 coaches model, higher level coaching
experience, current level coaching experience, organizational performance, individual
performance, and head coach turnover is positive and statistically significant, whereas penalty
yards and coach age are negative and statistically significant. In the Level 4 coach promotion
model, the central position coach and higher level coaching experience variables are positive and
statistically significant, whereas the Rooney Rule and non-NFL professional football coaching
experience variables are negative and statistically significant.
Table 4.5 presents the logistic regression results for the model with demotions as the
dependent variable. In the full model, the Black coach and central position coach variables are
negative and statistically significant, while the Black central position coach variable is positive
and statistically significant. The joint effect of the Black coach variables is positive and
statistically significant and the joint effect of the central coach variables is positive, but
statistically insignificant.
Regarding the control variables in the full demotion model, lower level coaching
experience, penalty yards, and head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant,
whereas current level coaching experience and organizational performance are negative and
statistically significant. When estimating the demotion model with head coaches, no variables
are statistically significant. For the assistant head coaches and coordinators, college coaching
experience and head coach turnover are positive and statistically significant, whereas
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organizational performance is negative and statistically significant. Finally, in the demotion
model for Level 3 coaches, the Black variable is negative and statistically significant, whereas
the Black central position coach variable is positive and statistically significant. Additionally,
college coaching experience, individual performance, and coach age are negative and statistically
significant, while lower level coaching experience and head coach turnover are positive and
statistically significant.
Discussion
The purpose of this study is to examine potential disparities by race, before and after the
Rooney Rule, and position title in NFL coach promotions and demotions. The results of the
logistic regression models indicate the existence of disparities in NFL coach promotions and
demotions based on race and position title. Furthermore, the results of the logistic regressions
also reveal interesting promotion and demotion determinants other than race and position title.
The present study begins the discussion of the logistic regression results with commentary
regarding racial disparities in promotions and demotions, the ineffectiveness of the Rooney Rule
in significantly increasing head coach diversity, and disparities in promotions and demotions by
position title. Then, the present study discusses other findings of interest pertaining to promotion
and demotion determinants such as coach age, penalty yards accrued, head coach turnover in the
following season, organizational and individual performance, football coaching experience
outside the NFL, and NFL coaching experience at various levels relative to the current position
level.
In both the promotion and demotion models for Level 3 coaches, Black coaches appear to
experience more difficulty securing higher ranking NFL coaching positions, as well as retaining
their current coaching positions. More specifically, holding all other variables constant at their
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means, Black coaches are 2.2% less likely to be promoted and 0.7% more likely to be demoted
than their non-Black counterparts during the sample period. Though, perhaps, 2.2% may seem
trivial, the difference in promotion likelihood for Black coaches relative to non-Black coaches is
greater than the difference in promotion likelihood for coaches whom won two out of 16 games
relative to 13 out of 16 games. Therefore, the finding that a significant disparity in promotions
exists between Black and non-Black coaches is consistent with previous research by Rider et al.
(2016).
In addition to finding disparities in promotions and demotions by race, the Rooney Rule
was ineffective in increasing the ability of Black coaches in the NFL to be promoted, even to the
rank of head coach. This finding is consistent with previous research by Solow et al. (2011) and
Rider et al. (2016), but contradicts the conclusions drawn by Madden and Ruther (2010).
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this study and similar studies before the present study
(e.g., Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) indicates similar policies implemented in other
organizations, such as Facebook (Frier, 2015), Uber (Haselton, 2017), or college football
(Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011) may not be an effective means of increasing racial diversity.
Regarding centrality, the findings in the present study indicate central positions coaches
are more likely to be promoted, and consistent with previous research (e.g., Braddock et al.,
2012). Notably, few Blacks in the sample are central position coaches. For instance, Blacks
comprise 31.1% of Level 3 coaches and 27.4% if Level 4 coaches in the sample. However,
among the 1,418 central position coaches and 152 assistant central position coaches in the
sample, only 12.5% of central position coaches and 14.5% of assistant central position coaches
are Black, which may be surprising given 71% of players and 38% of assistant coaches in the
NFL in 2015 were Black (Lapchick, n.d.). Therefore, if central position coaches experience an
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increased rate of promotion relative to non-central position coaches, the disparity in promotions
by race could be due in part to a preference toward central position coaches or pigeonholing
minorities into non-central positions.
Central position coaches (i.e., quarterback and linebacker coaches) in the sample
experienced a 7.4% increased promotion likelihood and assistant central position coaches
experienced an 8.8% increased promotion likelihood. Though Black position coaches are less
likely to be promoted and central position coaches are more likely to be promoted, ceteris
paribus, the present study found no significant increased or decreased likelihood of promotion
for Black central position coaches. However, Black central position coaches are less likely to be
demoted by 1.9%. Though Braddock et al. (2012) found central position coaches to have an
advantage in promotions, examinations of Black central position coach promotion prospects have
been limited, and studies examining demotions of non-head coaches are even more scarce.
Therefore, the present study supports previous research findings of increased promotion
probabilities for central position coaches (Braddock et al., 2012), and adds to the literature by
finding no statistically significant difference in promotion opportunities for Black position
coaches, but a decreased probability of demotion for Black central position coaches.
In addition to disparities in promotion and demotion by race and organizational role, the
present study found older coaches are less likely to be promoted relative to their younger
counterparts, even after controlling for years of football coaching experience in the NFL, college,
and other professional leagues. Previous research also concluded older coaches have diminished
career prospects (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011). The age ranges of
Level 2 coaches in the sample span from 27 to 78 and a 78 year old coach experiences a 14.2%
lower likelihood of promotion to head coach than a 27 year old coach. For Level 3 coaches, ages
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range from 21 to 79 and, similar to Level 2 coaches, a 79 year old Level 3 coach experiences a
14.8% decreased likelihood of promotion relative to a 21 year old Level 3 coach. Additionally,
older Level 3 coaches in the sample were more likely to be demoted, however, a 79 year old
Level 3 coach only faced a 2.4% increased likelihood of demotion relative to a 21 year old Level
3 coach.
Penalty yards have varying effects on promotions and demotions among NFL coaches.
For Level 3 coaches, too many penalty yards accrued by a team could decrease the likelihood of
promotion by up to 3.4%. However, for Level 2 coaches, more penalty yards accrued by a team
could increase promotion likelihood by 5.8%. This substantial difference in promotion
probabilities between Level 3 and 2 coaches could be a result of Level 3 coaches being more
closely associated with the primary perpetrators of the penalties, and therefore, if the penalties
are not reduced by the players, more direct blame could be attributed to the Level 3 coaches.
Moreover, Level 2 coaches may be able to use penalty yards as an excuse for poor
performance to increase their likelihood of promotion by also placing blame on position coaches
whom are closer to the penalty perpetrators, or placing the blame on the organizational leader–
the head coach–whom is responsible for the overall culture and discipline of the team (Seifried,
2008; Statz, Cordell, Ham, Karcher, & Shukie, 2007). Similarly, the excuse for poor
performance could also be used as a means to prevent demotion, which is consistent with the
results from the full demotion model, whereby penalties may decrease the probability of
demotion by up to 1.5%.
Interestingly, head coach turnover the following season is actually beneficial for
promotions and helps protect against demotions after controlling for performance-related factors
such as winning percentage. More specifically, Level 2 coaches in the sample experienced a
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10% increase in promotion likelihood while Level 3 coaches experienced a 3.9% increase in
promotion likelihood. Additionally, Level 2 coaches were 23.4% less likely to be demoted while
Level 3 coaches were 1.9% less likely to be demoted following head coach turnover. Though
head coach turnover may be thought to increase the likelihood of demotions and decrease the
likelihood of promotions, Fee et al. (2006) found internal promotions to be more prevalent when
head coach turnover occurs within successful organizations. Therefore, the effect presented in
the present study of head coach turnover increasing promotion probabilities and decreasing
demotion probabilities may be due to head coaches being replaced by internal candidates.
Consistent with previous research, higher organizational performance increases the
likelihood of promotion (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Goff & Tollison, 2009; Malone et al., 2008; Rider
et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011). However, increases in organizational performance may not
increase promotion probabilities for Level 4 coaches. For Level 2 coaches, organizational
performance could increase promotion likelihood by up to 14.3%, whereas Level 3 coaches can
experience a 3.3% increase in promotion likelihood attributable to organizational performance.
Interestingly, organizational performance also increases Level 2 coach demotion
probabilities by up to 28.5%. Similarly, Level 3 coaches experience an increased likelihood of
promotion when individual performance is high, but also an increased likelihood of demotion.
More specifically, high individual performance could increase the probability of promotion by
up to 8.8%, but could increase the probability of demotion by up to 1.8%.
Collegiate and non-NFL professional football coaching experience also influences
promotion and demotion probabilities for NFL coaches. Though, like Rider et al. (2016), the
present study did not find statistically significant evidence of college coaching experience
increasing the likelihood of promotion, an effect was found for demotions. College coaching
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experience assists Level 2 coaches in preventing their own demotion, however, Level 3 coaches
with more college coaching experience are more susceptible to demotion.
The aforementioned contradictory finding may be a result of the level of college coaching
experience, which was not examined in the present study, but could be assumed based on the
position level within the NFL. For example, Level 2 NFL coaches likely held higher level
college coaching positions than Level 3 NFL coaches. Therefore, the higher level of experience
in college may be what is assisting Level 2 NFL coaches in preventing demotion, and lower level
college coaching experience accrued by Level 3 NFL coaches may be viewed as less meaningful
and contribute to increased demotion probabilities.
Similarly, Level 4 NFL coaches with professional football coaching experience outside
the NFL are less likely to be promoted. During the sample period, non-NFL professional
football league coaching experience decreased Level 4 coach promotion probabilities by up to
17.8%. The negative relationship between non-NFL professional football coaching experience
and promotions for Level 4 coaches may be more profound for Level 4 coaches than other NFL
coach ranks due to expanding coaching staffs allowing for more Level 4 coaches to secure NFL
positions later in the sample period (Mielke, 2007). The rise of Level 4 coaches later in the
sample period coincides with the rise of less competitive non-NFL professional football leagues
to rival the NFL (e.g., the United States Football League), thus devaluing non-NFL professional
football league coaching experience.
Similarly, too much coaching experience at lower levels within the NFL can also
adversely impact a coach’s career advancement. Level 2 coaches may experience a decrease in
promotion likelihood of up to 52.1% for 29 years of coaching experience as a Level 3 or 4 coach.
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However, for Level 3 coaches, having 19 years of coaching experience as a Level 4 coach could
reduce the probability of demotion by 3.7%.
Though the two aforementioned findings may seem contrary, they could be product of the
level of advancement team owners, general managers, and head coaches are comfortable with
pertaining to amount of experience at various levels of an organization. For example, team
owners and general managers may not feel comfortable relying on a head coach with little
experience in the higher coaching ranks (i.e., Levels 1 and 2), however, position coaches with
many years of experience as assistant position coaches may be valuable right where they are.
This finding of more experience decreasing career advancement opportunities may be why some
previous studies (e.g., Fee et al., 2006; Rider et al., 2016) found statistically insignificant results
when not differentiating between the levels of previous NFL coaching experience.
Position coaches with too much experience as assistant position coaches may not be too
desirable for promotion to assistant head coach or coordinator, unless they secure more
experience at their current level. More experience in current coaching levels is advantageous for
Level 3 coaches seeking promotion and could increase their chance of promotion by up to
12.6%. This finding is consistent with previous studies which used years of experience as a
measure of human capital accumulated on the job (e.g., Braddock et al., 2012; Malone et al.,
2008; Rider et al., 2016).
As lower levels of coaching experience may be devalued, higher levels of coaching
experience may be highly valued. In fact, for all three levels of NFL coaches eligible for
promotion (i.e., non-head coaches), experience at the next higher level is a significant
determinant of promotion. Within the sample, Level 2 coaches increased their probability of
promotion by up to 19.7% for 15 years of head coach experience. Level 3 coaches increased
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their probability of promotion by up to 66.6% for 22 years of assistant head coach or coordinator
experience.
Level 4 coaches increased their probability of promotion by up to 52.3% for 28 years of
Level 3 coaching experience. Therefore, it appears if the coach was trusted to perform a higher
level job in the past, and may have secured additional human capital relative to his peers, he is
more likely to be trusted with the job again in the future. This finding is consistent with previous
findings related to both human capital accumulation (Braddock et al., 2012; Malone et al., 2008;
Rider et al., 2016) and the positive relationship between previous promotions with future
promotions (Acosta, 2010; Malone et al., 2008).
Though many interesting, confirmatory, and contradictory results were found in the
present study, the predictive abilities of the promotion models, as evidenced by the pseudo-R2 of
each promotion model was not high. The low predictive abilities of the models are indicative of
the difficulty of determining, not only who would be a good candidate for promotion (Longley &
Wong, 2011), but also who good candidates for promotion are. Therefore, studies which
examine candidate pools as determinants of dismissals (e.g., Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) may
experience difficulty when estimating qualified candidates for promotions. Finally, based on the
decreasing pseudo R2 values of the promotion models from Level 2 coaches to Level 4 coaches,
there appears to be more difficulty in determining promotions further down the organizational
hierarchy.
Conclusion
The present study was designed to contribute to the present literature regarding the
statistical relationships between managerial career advancement in the NFL and race, centrality,
and the Rooney Rule. It found no evidence of racial disparities in the head coach or
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coordinator/assistant head coach ranks as well as no evidence of the Rooney Rule increasing
racial diversity, even among head coaches. However, the findings in the present research
indicate Black Level 3 coaches may experience more career advancement and job retention
difficulty than their non-Black counterparts.
Additionally, central position coaches, who are predominantly White, are more likely to
be promoted; however, the findings in the present study do not support the conclusion that Black
central position coaches experience more career advancement difficulty than their White central
position counterparts. The present study also found older coaches to be more likely to be
promoted and penalty yards accrued by a team help the career advancement of Level 2 coaches
but simultaneously harm the careers of Level 3 coaches. Next, head coach turnover the
following season helped coaches get promoted and decreased the likelihood of demotion and too
much lower-level coaching experience adversely impacted career advancement.
The present study has implications for organizational practitioners and scholars. With
other organizations, inside (Gordon, 2008; Pike, 2011) and outside (Frier, 2015; Haselton, 2017)
sport, looking to the NFL’s Rooney Rule to increase diversity among their employees, the
present study concurs with previous literature (e.g., Rider et al., 2016; Solow et al., 2011) that
indicates the Rooney Rule is an ineffective policy for increasing diversity. Therefore,
organizations seeking to adopt a policy similar to the Rooney Rule should not implement a
policy such as the NFL’s with the expectations that it will increase diversity.
Though many interesting findings resulted from the present study, the promotion models
within the study demonstrated the difficulty of determining how promotion decisions are made
by practitioners. Therefore, studies attempting to examine candidates for promotion (e.g.,
Foreman & Soebbing, 2015) may experience substantial difficulty in determining which
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candidates are being considered for promotion. To increase the ability of promotion models to
identify actual candidates, future studies can incorporate socio-political forces (Foreman &
Soebbing) as well as social ties (Brandes, Brechot, & Franck, 2015; Fast & Jensen, 2006) into
the model. Additionally, future promotion models can incorporate efficiency by examining
inputs, such as player ability, into the model (Fort et al., 2008). Another determinant to consider
concerns the level of coaching success and responsibility in college and other professional
leagues.
Pertaining to issues of race, future research could examine if racial disparities exist based
on the promotability of the position or the difficulty level of retaining a position within a certain
organization (Cook & Glass, 2014). Future research could also examine whether minority head
coaches are more likely to hire or promote minority assistant coaches relative to their White
counterparts. Finally, research could examine the probability of coaches securing subsequent
head coaching positions after being dismissed from a head coaching position in the past, and
whether factors such as race or age affect those subsequent head coaching opportunities.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Executive dismissals and successions can be difficult to accurately examine for several
reasons. The sport industry provided important data to assist in examining executive dismissals
and successions; however, difficulties still exist in identifying factors related to dismissals, and
subsequently, successions. Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a framework to better understand
executive dismissals, which, in turn, provides for a better understanding of successions but this
model of CEO dismissals is not perfect. As an example, research based on their four sociopolitical forces of CEO dismissals often resulted in inconsistent or contradictory results.
Inconsistent or contradictory results may be due to misinterpretations of the model, difficulties
operationalizing the four socio-political forces, errors in accurately measuring organizational
performance or any of the four socio-political forces, or an incomplete model proposed by
Fredrickson et al. (1988).
Executive dismissals and successions are also contingent upon successors, candidate
pools, and determinants of promotions. Though executive successions require an understanding
of executive dismissals, executive dismissals require an understanding of candidate pools, and
candidate pools require an understanding of promotions from the lowest rung of the career
ladder, they are often disjoined in the literature. Executive dismissal research typically identifies
candidate pools based on firm and industry size proxies, which are often based on sales figures,
number of employees in a firm, or number of firms in an industry (e.g., Crossland & Chen, 2013;
Parrino, 1997). These proxies do not consider how tall or wide organizational structures are or
how qualified candidates to replace executives are.
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A large body of previous literature examines issues such as executive successions,
executive dismissals, and career trajectories (Fee et al., 2006; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Foreman
& Soebbing, 2015; Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 1995), however, without understanding the
antecedents of executive successions, fully understanding executive successions themselves may
not be possible (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals
remained a leading theory for understanding executive dismissals for almost three decades and
has been influential in molding research questions and empirical examinations. Yet, minimal
revisions or additions to the dismissal model have been proposed in that time.
The present dissertation improved upon empirical studies using the Fredrickson et al.
(1988) model of CEO dismissals by establishing a proxy for actual candidates to replace an
executive rather than proxies based on industry and firm characteristics. Using the proxy for
candidates provided statistically insignificant results that question the theoretical relationship
between candidate availability and executive dismissals. Additionally, the present dissertation
proposed and found empirical justification for incorporating a fifth socio-political force within
the Fredrickson et al. (1988) CEO dismissal model. Interestingly, within the deviant culture of
the NFL (Coakley, 2015; Statz et al., 2007), deviant behavior may increase or decrease executive
dismissal likelihood depending on the type of deviant behavior, punishments received for deviant
behavior, and implementation of institutional policies regarding deviant behavior.
Finally, the present dissertation emphasized the relationship between executive dismissals
and candidates available to succeed executives, and therefore, examined determinants of
managerial promotions within the empirical setting examined (i.e., the NFL). Specifically
focusing on race and centrality as promotion and demotion determinants, the present dissertation
found race and centrality to be statistically significant factors in promotions and demotions,
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though the influence of these variables depends on whether the manager is being considered for
promotion or demotion as well as their current rank within the organization (i.e., upper- or lowerlevel management).
Generalizability of Findings and Limitations
Though the findings within this dissertation were conducted within the context of sport,
they can largely be generalized to broader corporate contexts for several reasons (Day et al.,
2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al., 2005). Studies using NFL data are beneficial due to amount of
accurately measured data available (Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).
More specifically, findings such as deviance increasing the likelihood of executive dismissal are
especially robust given the increased acceptance of deviant behavior within the culture of the
NFL (Coakley, 2015). Furthermore, the specific NFL policies examined in the dissertation (i.e.,
Rooney Rule and personal conduct policy) are relevant to non-sport industries (Frier, 2015;
Haselton, 2017; Lyons et al., 2016; Pike, 2011), though, due to data limitations, pose difficulties
with empirical examinations (Day et al., 2012; Lyons et al., 2016; Wolfe et al., 2005).
Therefore, the NFL has provided an ideal setting to examine organizational phenomena
regarding managerial labor mobility and policies affecting managerial labor mobility. Still, the
empirical setting of the NFL is not without generalizability concerns.
Though numerous benefits emerge from using sport as an empirical setting for
organization and management studies, the setting of sport is not flawless. In particular, many
scholars identified key differences between sport and non-sport industries which may pose
problems when attempting to generalize results. As identified above, though they generate
millions of dollars annually, sport teams are not large multi-faceted organizations in terms of
personnel or operating divisions (Brown, 1982; Maxcy, 2013), therefore, Wright, Smart, and
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McMahan (1995) advised caution when attempting to apply sport-related organization studies to
these larger organizations.
Another warning came from Wolfe et al. (2005) regarding results of diversity research
within the sport context being generalized outside of sport, stating that social norms and
regulations are especially unique in sport. However, because sport is a less progressive social
world (Nelson, 1994), results which indicate a lack of discrimination become more robust.
Cannella and Rowe (1995) also noted some generalizability differences based on the unique
sport context by expressing how sports teams, confined by tight regulations and more difficulties
associated with changing organizational performance, yield conservative, rigorous inferences
when investigating the effects of new executives. Cannella and Rowe (1995) also stated sport
teams are very similar organizations within the same industry and “inferences about the
relationship between independent and dependent variables are stronger than may be the case with
some other types of organizations” (p. 73).
Sport teams are also unique based on various elements affecting entry-level employees
(i.e., players) which may pose problems for generalizing results outside of the sport context.
Entry-level employees in sport are unique because their salaries are substantially higher than
salaries of entry-level employees in other industries and greater than their executives (Harder,
1992). Further, the performance of employees (i.e., players) could be affected by the wealth of
public information available about them (Harder, 1992).
Another unique characteristic of entry-level employees in sport involves the high degrees
of loyalty to their work groups relative to the loyalty of work groups in most non-sport industries
(Adler & Adler, 1988). Yet, Adler and Adler (1988) identified other work groups may exhibit
high degrees of loyalty, but also share other characteristics of professional athletes such as high

109

initial compensation (e.g., surgical teams) or a substantial degree of media attention (e.g.,
astronaut work groups). Therefore, results may be more generalizable to the aforementioned
work groups with similar characteristics to professional sport teams. Performance teams are also
unique in structure (Wolfe et al., 2005). Wolfe et al. (2005) explained that members of
performance teams are the primary drivers of organizational performance. As the primary
drivers of organizational performance, it is the responsibility of others in the organization to
shield performance teams from external disturbances so the performance team can perform their
duties free of distraction to achieve higher levels of organizational success (Wolfe et al., 2005).
Wolfe et al. (2005) identified the differences in time among various types of teams (i.e.,
performance teams and non-performance teams) as being either temporary task forces or at least
somewhat permanent teams or crews. Wolfe et al. (2005) stated crews, such as airline cockpit
crews, use members for short periods of time to conduct specific tasks and inferred that the high
prevalence of player mobility indicates that sports teams are most similar to crews. However,
this seems like a quite subjective choice to classify a sport team as a crew due to player mobility.
One could argue that cohesion within an elite, highly talented and competitive performance team
would require more time together in order to remain or become competitive in their sport than an
airline cockpit crew which does not have to compete against rival airline cockpit crews in order
to produce a quality product. Most non-sport work teams are also accustomed to a relatively
stable work pace; however, performance teams expend much of their effort during their training
and performances which typically deviate from the consistent pace of work experienced in most
occupations (Wolfe et al., 2005).
Additionally, Wolfe et al. (2005) described how sport teams differ from other nonperformance teams in terms of boundaries. Boundaries are much different for sport teams and
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their members than teams in other industries for two reasons: they (a) perform in the public eye
and (b) are often exposed to the public, usually through the media, even when not performing
(Wolfe et al., 2005). Issues revolving around attention outside the field of play may be
compounded due to the size of the team’s metropolitan area or fan base as well as the fact that
members of sport performance teams are also often responsible for off-field public relations,
merchandise sales, and advertising, rather than simply producing a scripted performance product.
Though Wolfe et al. (2005) identified multiple potential problems with the
generalizability of sport studies to non-sport industries, they also stated sport research remains an
attractive and beneficial empirical setting despite these issues. In many instances, there still
exists sufficient contextual overlap for results to generalize outside of sport. Though there are
peculiarities associated with any industry, and generalizability is never perfect for all
organizations, sport research, similar to research in other industries, is useful for providing
insight into similar industries and positions being examined (Brown, 1982; Humphreys et al.,
2011).
Lastly, though data are available in sport for examining social networks (e.g., Brandes,
Brechot, & Franck, 2015; Fast & Jensen, 2006), the studies within this dissertation did not
incorporate social networks with the models. However, opportunities for coaches to be among a
pool of candidates for a given position may be stronger when a social connection exists between
the potential candidate and the employer. Furthermore, within minority coaching communities,
networks may be even more useful for securing higher ranking positions in the NFL, which is
likely the motivation behind the Rooney Rule.
Therefore, limitations studies in Chapters 2 and 4 may face limitations when examining
the role of candidate availability on head coach dismissals, or determinants of external
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promotions, respectively, when excluding analyses of social networks. Therefore, future
research opportunities exist for analyzing social networks in conjunction with candidate pools
and visible minority status when examining managerial labor mobility in the NFL. However,
several other future research opportunities stemming from the present dissertation also exist.
Future Research Opportunities
There are several opportunities for future research stemming from the research contained
in this dissertation. Regarding the influence of candidate availability on executive dismissal
decisions, future research could explore candidate quality rather than quantity, candidate-firm fit,
and which candidates decide to secure employment at certain firms. Regarding the relationship
between deviance and executive dismissals, future research could examine other empirical
settings with varying levels of deviance and perceptions of deviance, media exposure related to
deviance, whether executives with personnel decision responsibilities are held to higher
standards, and what type of leaders are more likely to lead deviant organizations.
Furthermore, future research regarding dismissals and successions could examine
whether dismissal decisions based on different socio-political forces may affect post-succession
organizational performance. Regarding managerial promotions and demotions, future research
could examine if minority or non-central position coaches are disproportionately assigned to
more precarious managerial positions, whether minority head coaches are more likely to hire or
promote minority assistant coaches, or if demographics influence the ability of previously
dismissed head coaches to secure future head coach positions. Lastly, future research could
examine the dynamic between internal employees being more likely to be promoted when
organizational performance is high (Fee et al., 2006), more internal promotions positively
influencing future promotions within the same organization (Acosta, 2010), and interim CEOs
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being more likely to leave their organization after not being selected as CEO (Cannella & Shen,
2001).
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APPENDIX A
CANDIDACY MATERIALS
The two areas of executive dismissal literature consist of understanding why executives
are dismissed and determining the effect of dismissals on organizational performance (Holmes,
2011). However, to truly understand the effects of dismissals, an understanding of why
executives are dismissed is also required (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988). In an
attempt to better understand executive dismissals and successions, researchers have utilized the
context of sport (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Wolfe et al., 2005). This
literature review begins with a review of sport as an empirical setting, followed by a brief
overview of leadership, which includes leadership styles and leadership as an activity.
Following the review of leadership, I present a review of the literature regarding top executive
dismissals and successions. This literature review concludes with some brief insight into
elements which are currently missing from the literature and a few avenues for future research.
Sport as an Empirical Setting for Executive Dismissal and Succession Research
A number of studies examined various issues of importance related to management,
economics, organizations, and leadership using sport (Day et al., 2012; Kahn, 2000; Wolfe et al.,
2005). Sport has been used to examining non-sport-related phenomena for either its data or
unique context (Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). Sociologists often opine that sport reflects
the greater society in which it exists, indicating sport behaviors and practices seen can also be
observed in society (Coakley, 2015; Eitzen & Sage, 1997). For example, the implementation of
the Rooney Rule in the NFL, which was established to provide minorities with more equal access
to upper management positions, has been likened to affirmative action policies throughout
society (Pike, 2011). Furthermore, scholars identified several ways in which sports parallel
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work, especially with regard to performance, adhering to rules, organizational structures (Keidel,
1987).
Data from the sport industry are particularly advantageous because sport provides an
ample amount of observable and accurately measured individual and organizational performance
data spanning extended time periods (Borland & Lye 1996; Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005).
Moreover, data from sport comes from a setting which often uses highly incentivized and
motivated participants which is a limitation faced by many researchers conducting traditional
laboratory research (Goff & Tollison, 1990). The data advantages available in sport may be
particularly useful for studying events and environments where information may be hard to
obtain or often inaccurate such as sensitive executive dismissals and successions.
Research on executive dismissals and successions in the corporate world is hindered due
to access to information often being limited or poorly measured (Finkelstein, Hambrick, &
Cannella, 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi,
2000; Solow, Solow, & Walker, 2011). One factor limiting data collection in this field is that
obtrusive instruments (e.g., surveys) for examining executive dismissals would cause too much
measurement error and response bias to be useful (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Furthermore,
Fredrickson et al. (1988) noted the difficulties associated with obtaining enough board members
as research participants needed to conduct legitimate research. Even more specific to the
executive dismissal data issue is the difficulty in determining the types of dismissals (e.g.,
retirement, firing) as well as the reasons of the decision makers (Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Haynes, Josephy, & Hitt, 2015; Koning, 2003; Weisbach, 1988). These data limitations led
numerous researchers to advocate for better proxies in evaluating executive dismissal decisions
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et al., 2000). Sport data provide

127

clarity regarding overall measures of organizational performance (Borland & Lye, 1996; Day et
al., 2012; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986), expectations for that organizational performance (Allen
& Chadwick, 2012; Humphreys, Paul, & Weinbach, 2011), and the circumstances of the
executive turnover (Borland & Lye, 1996; Holmes, 2011; Koning, 2003). Scholars using sport
data to gain insight into non-sport settings often viewed team head coaches as executives (e.g.,
Cannella & Rowe, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Giambatista, 2004; Holmes, 2011)
Head Coaches as Executives
In many of the contexts in which sport managers are used to examine managerial and
organizational theories, head coaches of team sports are often viewed as non-sport industry
executives due to the many similarities between the two positions (Day et al., 2012; Frick,
Barros, & Prinz, 2010; Wolfe et al., 2005). Both head coaches and non-sport executives analyze
competition and industry changes (Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, & Guermat, 2010), implement
competitive strategies (Brown, 1982; Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Maxcy, 2013;
Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, & Gorman, 2005) and devise tactics (Brown, 1982; Hughes et al.,
2010; Humphreys et al., 2011) to gain a competitive advantage in their respective industries.
Head coaches and non-sport executives are also often responsible for acquiring (Brown, 1982;
Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011; Maxcy, 2013; Rowe et al., 2005; Soebbing &
Washington, 2011) and developing (Hughes et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2005) personnel.
Head coaches and non-sport executives are also similar in the way they are viewed by the
public. Part of the responsibilities of the head coach and the corporate executive is to manage
public relations (Hughes et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2011). Given their public relations
responsibilities and position atop their organization, head coaches and executives often receive
media attention akin to pop culture celebrities (Hall, Blass, Ferris, & Massengale, 2004).
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Furthermore, many corporate executives believe head coaches are similar occupations to
corporate executives and studying head coaches through various media outlets can provide
information generalizable to the corporate world (Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005).
Specific to dismissals and successions, head coaches and corporate executives are also
similar in several capacities. Both head coaches and executives must operate within hierarchical
organizational structures (Brown, 1982; Keidel, 1987; Maxcy, 2013) where they are responsible
for optimizing performance while being constrained by resources and rules (Cannella & Rowe,
1995; Rowe, et al., 2005). However, if organizational performance declines, head coaches and
non-sport executives may be held responsible and subsequently dismissed (Cannella & Rowe,
1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Rowe, et al., 2005). The frequency of successions in both sport
and the corporate world are also similar (Bennett, Phillips, Drane, & Sagas, 2003; Fredrickson et
al., 1988) along with the tools for increasing organizational performance (Cannella & Lubatkin,
1993). Therefore, to acquire future positions, both head coaches and non-sport executives rely
on their reputations which vary based on their abilities, previous experiences, and performance
of their organizations (Cannella & Rowe, 1995).
Multiple scholars also advocated head coaches are not just similar to non-sport
executives, but actually positioned them as chief executive officers (CEOs) (e.g., Frick et al.,
2010; Maxcy, 2013). Though Hughes et al. (2010) pointed out English Premier League (EPL)
managers are involved with external and strategic activities analogous to CEOs, they also
suggested EPL managers could be more akin to chief operating officers (COOs) due to the focus
on internal duties (e.g., solving workplace problems and nurturing talent) shared by both
positions. Similarly, Day and Lord (1988) claimed head coaches are more comparable to
middle-level managers than top executives because head coaches are not solely responsible for
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long-term strategies regarding personnel and the quality of players is the primary determinant of
on-field success. Further, Day and Lord (1988) suggested changes in team ownership would
constitute a more comparable top executive for succession literature. However, Giambatista
(2004) specifically addressed Day and Lord’s (1988) suggestion that team owners are more like
executives than head coaches by finding that leader life cycles and team performance are
stronger fits with head coaches than team owners in professional basketball.
Generalizability of Sport Research
Though numerous benefits emerge from using sport as an empirical setting for
organization and management studies, the setting of sport is not flawless. In particular, many
scholars identified key differences between sport and non-sport industries which may pose
problems when attempting to generalize results. As identified above, though they generate
millions of dollars annually, sport teams are not large multi-faceted organizations in terms of
personnel or operating divisions (Brown, 1982; Maxcy, 2013), therefore, Wright, Smart, and
McMahan (1995) advised caution when attempting to apply sport-related organization studies to
these larger organizations.
Another warning came from Wolfe et al. (2005) regarding results of diversity research
within the sport context being generalized outside of sport, stating that social norms and
regulations are especially unique in sport. This unique social environment in sport can be both
advantageous and disadvantageous. As mentioned earlier in this section, the Rooney Rule which
is an NFL-specific regulation does not exist in most industries, however, it is useful to study for
a better understanding of bias and discrimination within society. Some differences in sport, such
as in discrimination research may be especially useful for generalizing outside of sport. Since
sport is a less progressive social world (Nelson, 1994), results which indicate a lack of
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discrimination in sport become more robust. Cannella and Rowe (1995) also found some
generalizability based on the unique sport context by expressing how sports teams, confined by
tight regulations and more difficulties associated with changing organizational performance,
yield conservative, rigorous inferences when investigating the effects of new executives.
Cannella and Rowe (1995) also stated since sports teams are very similar organizations within
the same industry, “inferences about the relationship between independent and dependent
variables are stronger than may be the case with some other types of organizations” (p. 73).
Sport teams are also very unique based on various elements affecting entry-level
employees (i.e., players) which may pose problems for generalizing results outside of the sport
context. Entry-level employees in sport are very unique because their salaries are substantially
higher than salaries of entry-level employees in other industries and greater than their executives
(Harder, 1992). Further, the performance of employees (i.e., players) could be affected by the
wealth of public information available about them (Harder, 1992). Another unique characteristic
of entry-level employees in sport involves the high degrees of loyalty to their work groups
relative to the loyalty of work groups in most non-sport industries (Adler & Adler, 1988). Yet,
Adler and Adler (1988) identified other work groups may exhibit high degrees of loyalty, but
also share other characteristics of professional athletes such as high initial compensation (e.g.,
surgical teams) or a substantial degree of media attention (e.g., astronaut work groups).
Wolfe et al. (2005) explained sport teams are performance teams which produce the
organization’s primary product of entertainment similar to a concert or play. Wolfe et al. (2005)
further stated performance teams differ from other types of teams in training and development,
structure, time, and boundary conditions. In terms of training and development, Wolfe et al.
(2005) argued in performance teams, innate abilities are emphasized more than effort and their
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time is mostly spent on coordinating rather than strategizing, innovating, or learning. However,
these characteristics were probably more specific to scripted performers as opposed to open-sport
performers whose product promotes uncertain outcomes, such as in professional football.
Performance teams are also unique in structure (Wolfe et al., 2005). Wolfe et al. (2005)
explained that members of performance teams are the primary drivers of organizational
performance. As the primary drivers of organizational performance, it is the responsibility of
others in the organization to shield performance teams from external disturbances so the
performance team can perform their duties free of distraction to achieve higher levels of
organizational success (Wolfe et al., 2005).
Wolfe et al. (2005) identified the differences in time among various types of teams (i.e.,
performance teams and non-performance teams) as being either temporary task forces or at least
somewhat permanent teams or crews. Wolfe et al. (2005) stated crews, such as airline cockpit
crews, use members for short periods of time to conduct specific tasks and inferred that the high
prevalence of player mobility indicates that sports teams are most similar to crews. However,
this seems like a quite subjective choice to classify a sport team as a crew due to player mobility.
One could argue that cohesion within an elite, highly talented and competitive performance team
would require more time together in order to remain or become competitive in their sport than an
airline cockpit crew which does not have to compete against rival airline cockpit crews in order
to produce a quality product. Most non-sport work teams are also accustomed to a relatively
stable work pace, however, performance teams expend much of their effort during their training
and performances which typically deviate from the consistent pace of work experienced in most
occupations (Wolfe et al., 2005).
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Lastly, Wolfe et al. (2005) described how sport teams differ from other non-performance
teams in terms of boundaries. Boundaries are much different for sport teams and their members
than teams in other industries for two reasons: they (a) perform in the public eye and (b) are
often exposed to the public, usually through the media, even when not performing (Wolfe et al.,
2005). Issues revolving around attention outside the field of play may be compounded due to the
size of the team’s metropolitan area or fanbase as well as the fact that members of sport
performance teams are also often responsible for off-field public relations, merchandise sales,
and advertising, rather than simply producing a scripted performance product. Though Wolfe et
al. (2005) identified multiple potential problems with the generalizability of sport studies to nonsport industries, they also stated sport research remains an attractive and beneficial empirical
setting despite these issues. In many instances, there still exists sufficient contextual overlap for
results to generalize outside of sport. Though there are peculiarities associated with any
industry, and generalizability is never perfect for all organizations, sport research, similar to
research in other industries, is useful for providing insight into similar industries and positions
being examined (Brown, 1982; Humphreys et al., 2011).
Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport
Bennett et al. (2003) advocated for an analysis of the work using sport as an empirical
setting. Shortly after, Wolfe et al. (2005) published an examination of research related to Sport
Management from five leading non-sport journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy
of Management Review, Journal of Management, Organization Science, and Strategic
Management Journal. Day et al. (2012) later examined studies published from 1963 through
2011, without limiting the search to specific journals. In their examination, they identified three
themes which the articles reviewed were associated with: (a) manager/leader successions, (b)
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motivation (e.g., pay dispersion and goal-setting), and (c) analyses of performance over time (for
individuals and/or teams). Though Day et al. (2012) also encountered studies outside of these
three themes, they limited their review and analyses to the studies associated with these themes.
As an update to these two studies (i.e., Day et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005), I searched 60
journals ranked as an A* and A by the Australian Business Dean’s Council. The five journals
identified by Wolfe et al. (2005) were included within the list (i.e., Academy of Management
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Journal of Management, Organization Science, and
Strategic Management Journal). The 60 journals were selected based on the relevance of their
topic areas to typical sport-related studies. The sample period began with 2012 to continue from
where Day et al.’s (2012) study finished and extended through 2015. Only published journal
issues were examined and no online first (i.e., in press) articles due to not all journals providing
access to in press articles. Of the 60 journals, 38 published sport-related articles. In total, the 38
highly ranked non-sport specific journals published 177 sport-related articles in the four-year
sample period.
The majority (n=101) of the sport-related articles were published in journals with the
word Economic in the title. Thirty-six of the 101 sport-related articles in specifically economic
journals were from Applied Economics, followed by 17 in Economic Inquiry, 15 in Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 10 in Economics Letters, and the remaining 23 dispersed
among 10 other Economics journals. The only other journal with at least eight sport-related
articles published in the four-year sample period is European Journal of Operational Research
(n=15). The complete breakdown of articles, ordered alphabetically by journal, can be found in
Appendix B.
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Similar to Day et al. (2012), I divided the 177 articles into broad categories. To devise
article categories, I build on Day et al.’s (2012) four primary categories of (a) Manager
Succession and Organizational Performance; (b) Rewards, Motivation, and Performance; (c)
Performance Over Time; and (d) Sport Science. However, since Day et al. (2012) reviewed a
narrower scope of articles that fit nicely in these four categories, I broaden the scope of each
category to be more inclusive of the 177 articles I am categorizing. Therefore, instead of
limiting successions to managers, I use a broader category of Labor and Personnel Issues, which
includes turnover of both managers and employees, as well as related issues regarding
recruitment, staffing, discrimination, diversity, training, scheduling, health insurance, and wellbeing.
Day et al.’s (2012) category Rewards, Motivation, and Performance included studies
about goal-setting, incentives, and pay equity. Due to the many articles dedicated to the related
issues of competitive balance and uncertainty of outcomes which can affect performance
incentives and pay dispersion, the revised category I use includes articles about competitive
balance and uncertainty of outcomes. Day et al.’s (2012) Performance Over Time category was
used to classify articles that predict and model performance and changes in performance. I use
the same category, however, I broadly identify performance as sport, financial, or betting market
performance. Additionally, a few studies examine sport or Sport Management changes through
history which I include in Day et al.’s (2012) Performance Over Time category that I re-label as
Modeling Change/Performance.
Day et al.’s (2012) final category Sport Science was dedicated to psychology-based
studies on topics such as choking under pressure, momentum, loyalty, passion, and careertransitions. Therefore, I re-label the Sport Science category as Psychology and include the same
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types of studies in the category, as well as one other study regarding athletes engaging in
violence after competitions. Finally, I add a fifth category which is not considered by Day et al.
(2012) that I label as Venues which includes articles related to facilities, mega events, and other
sport and recreation sites. Though many articles contain elements of multiple categories, I
categorized each article into its most contextually appropriate category so no article is in more
than one category.
Of the 177 articles, 44% (n=78) fit into the Modeling Change/Performance category.
Within this category, the topics most frequently studied revolved around gambling markets
(n=11), bias in officiating and judging sports contests (n=8), predicting or improving rankings in
sports (n=7). An interesting and emerging area of scholarly interest within this category is
related to deviant behavior (n=6) where issues of such as penalties, criminal behavior, and
sabotage are central themes.
Following the Modeling Change/Performance category, the Labor and Personnel Issues
category has the second most articles with 29% (n=51) of the 177 articles. Though a broader
category than Day et al.’s (2012) Managerial Successions and Organizational Performance is
used, it is important to note 8% (n=14) of the 177 articles specifically addressed leadership (e.g.,
top managers, coaches) and several others discussed implications for leaders and managers.
Other issues frequently discussed among the articles in the Labor and Personnel Issues category
include labor movement and personnel decisions (n=17), racial or gender issues in the labor
market (n=14), human or social capital accumulation or benefits (n=9), and employee
compensation (n=6).
Twelve percent (n=22) of the articles belong to the Rewards and Motivation category and
11% of the articles are in the Psychology category. Among the articles in the Rewards and
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Motivation category, uncertainty of outcomes (n=8) and competitive balance (n=7) are the most
discussed topics and are typically in reference to attendance (n=6). Venues is the category with
the least amount of articles with the remaining 4% (n=7) articles. Within this category, publicly
funded spaces are discussed in three articles and mega events in two of the articles. Also, three
of the four articles from journals that have the term urban in the title are in this Venues category.
Conclusions from Examination of Recent Sport Studies
With at least 177 sport-related articles being published in top-tier non-sport-specific
management-related journals in the past four years, several opportunities exist for sport
management scholars. Sport management scholars can use the information produced by Wolfe
et al. (2005), Day et al. (2012), and within this literature review to gauge areas of interest to the
greater management community as well as identify sport-related studies which may not receive
attention in sport-specific journals. By analyzing sport studies published in non-sport journals,
sport management scholars may also identify journals in which their studies may fit. These
journals outside sport management may offer a broader audience for applied and theoretical
contributions. Furthermore, sport management scholars who publish both within and outside of
sport-specific journals may be able to increase the attention and legitimacy of both sport-specific
journals as well as sport-related research overall.
Though the authors of these 177 articles have been able to contribute to the body of
scholarly literature within the sport management and general management fields, they also
provide numerous opportunities for future research. Due to the substantial breadth of subjects
discussed in these 177 articles, I will limit the discussion of future research opportunities from
these articles to a couple topics which are relevant to this literature review: the effect of status on
performance and human capital accumulation following employee mobility.
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Status is often associated with job mobility and performance in several ways (e.g.,
Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2015; Fralich,
2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Westphal & Khanna, 2003). Within the 177 articles examined in
this section, Bothner, Kim, and Smith (2012) examined the effect of status on individual
performance in professional golf and stock car racing and Marr and Thau (2014) examined
performance following declines in status among professional baseball players. Their results
indicate high status individuals perform below their maximum ability (Bothner et al., 2012),
especially following a decline in status (Marr & Thau, 2014). While these results may have
substantial implications for management and sport management scholars and practitioners, many
questions arise from these studies. Future research regarding the nature of status and its effects
on performance could examine (a) individuals occupying various levels within an organization
(e.g., supervisory, middle, and top managers), (b) how status is distributed among groups (e.g.,
normal, flat, bimodal, zero-sum), (c) whether status loss generally occurs abruptly or slowly over
time, (d) if status and the effects of states are affected differently by different behaviors (e.g., onfield performance, off-field deviance), or (e) if individual status behaves in a similar manner as
organizational status with respect to all of the aforementioned considerations.
In a study of EPL teams, Pazzaglia, Flynn, and Sonpar (2012) found firms can capitalize
on employee mobility due to human capital accumulated in a given firm and used against another
firm. Kahane, Longley, and Simmons (2013) also examined the effects of employee mobility on
human capital accumulation and subsequent organizational performance improvements, but this
time in professional hockey. Kahane et al. (2013) concluded teams that hire multiple European
players from the same country are able to increase their human capital without causing too much
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disruptions from language and cultural differences which may occur on teams with European
players from different countries.
In the 2014 special issue of the Journal of Management on the topic of strategic human
capital, two articles use sport to delve deeper into human capital theory. Crocker and Eckardt
(2014) discovered that the relationship between individual human capital and individual
performance is dependent on unit-level human capital. Specifically, they found the ability of
MLB pitchers to convert their knowledge and skills to lower earned run averages (ERAs) was
dependent on the human capital of the coaching staff. Campbell, Saxton, and Banerjee (2014)
examined the effects of employee mobility on the human capital of movers and incumbents in an
organization. Similar to Kahane et al. (2013), Campbell et al. (2014) concluded that, though
mobility causes initial performance to decrease, when mobility occurs with colleagues, the
performance declines diminish.
Most recently, among the 177 aforementioned articles, those published in 2015 related to
mobility and human capital build on the works of Kahane et al. (2013) and Campbell et al.
(2014) by emphasizing the importance of heterogeneity in work teams. Smith and Hou (2015)
noted performance benefits from diversity can decrease over time as groups become more
homogenous and diverse groups experience more difficulties due to communication and culture
barriers. Additionally, Smith and Hou (2015) used evidence from the NBA to propose the use of
redundant heterogeneity for improving diversity benefits in organizations. They found that when
team members move up a hierarchical structure and experience similar levels of diversity, at both
the lower and higher hierarchical level, the impacts of diversity are improved. Similarly,
Brandes, Brechot, and Franck (2015) examined mobility which occurred in conjunction with
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social ties and found trades among managers with social ties were detrimental to team
performance, which may be a result of increasing homogeneity within a group.
These studies regarding the relationships between human capital, mobility, and
organizational performance provide several opportunities for future research. For example,
future studies could examine various forms of heterogeneity and the human capital derived from
these diverse organizations. More specifically, how do differences in demographics (e.g., age,
race, sex, hometown, education, family status), deviant behavior, types of work experiences, or
organizations affect future performance? Furthermore, can employees with similar
characteristics come together to be more cohesive and which characteristics would make them
less cohesive? Do networks affect cohesion or human capital benefits from heterogeneity?
Additionally, examining how human capital, mobility, and organizational performance interact
with each other at various organizational levels would be interesting, especially in executive
positions where industry knowledge is especially important and could be obtained through
interviews with candidates.
Not only does this literature review provide sport management scholars with a list of
potential outlets to submit research and viable areas of future research relevant to sport
management and general management scholars, but sport management could also benefit from
the theoretical and empirical contributions of the greater management community. Reciprocally,
the greater management community may be able to benefit from the theoretical and empirical
contributions of sport management scholars, as evidenced by the large number of sport studies in
the management literature. Additionally, early work by Grusky (1963) using baseball data to
examine managerial successions has established a foundation for much of the empirical
managerial succession research conducted today. Furthermore, sport studies which have been
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widely cited within top management journals (e.g., Giambatista, 2004; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin,
& Gorman, 2005) demonstrate the continued applicability of sport research to the greater
management community. The literature reviewed in the Sport as an Empirical Setting for
Executive Dismissal and Succession Research section has highlighted the contributions sport can
provide non-sport scholars and practitioners and the following sections of this literature review
will continue to demonstrate the mutually beneficial research which has, or can be, established
between sport and non-sport scholars, particularly with respect to leadership, dismissals, and
promotions.
Leadership
Managers are responsible for the performance of others (Fletcher & Arnold, 2011;
Kippenberger, 2002), whereas, leaders influence groups toward common goals (Fletcher &
Arnold, 2011; Hall et al., 2004; Kippenberger, 2002). Though many subtle distinctions have
been drawn between the two terms, they are very similar. Both leadership and management
typically involve influence, interpersonal relations, and goal accomplishment and both leaders
and managers often operate in the capacity of the other (i.e., managers often perform leadership
tasks and leaders often perform management tasks) (Fletcher & Arnold, 2011). Therefore, an
examination of managers would not be complete without a discussion of leadership.
Two overarching approaches to examining leadership exist: focusing on the downward
influence of leaders on followers and leadership as an activity (Hall et al., 2004). The leadership
literature in the last century has primarily focused on how leaders influence followers (Hall et al.,
2004), however, leadership as an activity is an important area of research which can inform and
provide context to research regarding leaders influencing followers (Selznick, 1957).
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The Influence of Leaders on Followers
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) described three types of leadership styles: autocratic,
democratic, and laissez-faire. Using the aforementioned leadership styles, Lewin et al. (1939)
categorized groups based on behaviors such as dominance and control asserted by the leaders.
These basic styles of leadership lead to the emergence of behavior-based leadership styles which
dominated the leadership styles literature until the 1960s (Kippenberger, 2002).
Building upon the work of Lewin et al. (1939), various researchers developed more
complex versions of leadership styles. For instance, Stogdill and Shartle (1955) used Lewin et
al.’s (1939) leadership styles to theorize a continuum of leadership styles based on leaders’
consideration of followers where more considerate leaders were similar to Lewin et al.’s (1939)
democratic leaders and less considerate leaders were similar to autocratic leaders. Blake and
Mouton (1964) contributed to both Lewin et al.’s (1939) behavior-based leadership styles and
Stogdill and Shartle’s (1955) leadership style continuum by devising a nine-by-nine grid. Within
this two dimensional continuum, leadership styles can be classified based on concern for people
and results. Additionally, Blake and Mouton (1964) stated leaders are able to use different
leadership styles depending on the situation.
Likert (1967) dichotomized Lewin et al.’s (1939) autocratic leadership style into
benevolent authoritative and exploitative authoritative while providing more clarification into
two other styles: democratic and participative. Likert’s research showed participative and
democratic styles to be more successful than the authoritative styles, however, it received
criticism for not accounting for situational factors (e.g., crisis situations where autocratic styles
are often viewed as essential). Based on the criticism of Likert’s (1967) research and Blake and
Mouton’s (1964) idea that leaders may use different leadership styles depending on the situation,
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a new era of leadership styles research evolved which was situation-based rather than solely
behavior based.
Though studies concerning behavior-based leadership styles were still prevalent through
the 1960s, situation-based leadership styles research began to emerge around the late 1950s when
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) proposed managers can employ various leadership styles based
on the situation. To Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), situational factors included aspects such
as the leader’s personality, followers’ personalities, and culture of the organization. However,
Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s (1958) model was still largely behavior-based with the leader
positioned as the sole controller of power in the group.
Building on the situation-based ideas of followers’ personalities influencing leader
decisions proposed by Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958), Fiedler (1967) developed a model of
leadership effectiveness that examined leader power, relationships between leaders and
followers, and characteristics of tasks undertaken by the group. Dependent on these various
situational factors, Fiedler (1967) determined there is an optimal leadership style–either taskoriented leadership or people-oriented leadership.
Adding to Fiedler’s (1967) leadership style framework, Hersey and Blanchard (1969)
examined the competence and commitment of followers and ultimately found there to be optimal
leadership styles for certain characteristics of followers which involved leadership styles with
varying degrees of direction and support provided to followers. Vroom and Yetton (1973)
advanced Hersey and Blanchard’s (1969) research by developing a decision-making model based
on five choices of leadership styles (i.e., autocratic I and II, consultative I and II, and group
consensus). Similar to Hersey and Blanchard (1969), these five leadership styles were based on
optimal ways of leading followers depending on follower competence and commitment.
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Following Vroom and Yetton (1973), Chelladurai and Haggerty (1978) developed a
decision-making model for leadership styles among sport coaches which was later updated (see
Chelladurai, 1990). As previous researchers outside of sport did in this field, Chelladurai’s
(1990) model is based on athletes’ preferred leadership styles among coaches as well as the
leadership styles which are most conducive for task completion–two outcomes which are highly
correlated according to Chelladurai (1990). Also consistent with Vroom and Yetton (1973) as
well as numerous other scholars of leadership styles, Chelladurai (1990) based the leadership
style preferences around autocratic, consultative, and participative themes.
More recently than the situation-based leadership models, various other types of
leadership styles have been proposed such as charismatic and transforming leadership
(Kippenberger, 2002). Charismatic leadership is characterized by a confident and assertive
personality, powerful vision, and strong conviction (Kippenberger, 2002). Charismatic leaders
are especially effective in periods of crisis or change, however, their charisma also has the power
to be dangerous if their powerful vision is not an optimal one (Kippenberger, 2002). A key
distinction between charismatic leadership and previous leadership styles presented is that
charismatic leadership is not a leadership style which can be selected from a range of leadership
style options because only leaders with charisma can be charismatic leaders (Kippenberger,
2002).
Burns (1978) paved the way for research addressing transforming leadership, as opposed
to transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is based on reciprocal relationships between
leaders and followers in which leaders reward followers for their production by compensating
them with external rewards such as bonuses, promotions, or praise (Burns, 1978). However,
Burns (1978) argued transactional leadership alone was insufficient since people need to be
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empowered instead of controlled by hierarchical organizational structures. In contrast to
transactional leadership, Burns (1978) described transforming leadership as leadership based on
mutual support rather than leaders as an authority with resources to bestow upon compliant
followers without seeking followers’ motivations. Burns (1978) further argued transforming
leadership, which is based on characteristics such as trust, understanding, and commitment,
attempts to merge organizational members’ motivations with the mission of the organization,
thereby creating a more ethical and moral environment.
Although leaders may come from several occupations and organizational levels (e.g.,
coaches, managers, work team leaders), Farkas and De Backer (1996) identified five leadership
styles adopted by specifically by CEOs. Farkas and De Backer (1996) call these five styles the
strategic, human assets, expertise, box, and change approaches. CEOs who use the strategic
approach are often concerned with the overall organization as a whole, the direction the
organization is going, and how the organization can compete against industry rivals. CEOs using
the strategic approach spend the vast majority of their time obtaining and analyzing information
while delegating day-to-day operations to others (Farkas & De Backer, 1996). Though most
CEOs view many of the characteristics associated with the strategic approach as part of their
duties, only about 20% of CEOs in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample of CEOs in large
companies viewed this strategic approach as the defining role of their position.
The human assets approach revolves around personnel. CEOs who adopt the human
assets approach place emphasis on hiring strategies, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of
their personnel, developing skills and traits in their personnel, empowering personnel, and
rewarding personnel. Human assets CEOs typically spend the majority of their time talking to
their employees and ensuring company objectives, standards, and values are being upheld.
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About 22% of CEO’s in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample primarily used the human assets
approach.
About 15% of Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample was composed of CEOs whom
favor the expertise approach. Expertise CEOs believe a specific, proprietary expertise should
provide focus to the organization, and therefore, these CEOs spend most of their time
investigating new technologies and advancing the technical knowledge of employees. CEOs
using the expertise approach often increase research and development budgets and rely heavily
on the recruitment and feedback of engineers, scientists, and other technical experts.
The most prevalent approach CEOs in Farkas and De Backer’s (1996) sample used was
the box approach, which included about 25% of the sample. CEOs that employ the box approach
place emphasis on controlling the organization and ensure compliance with procedures,
organizational culture and values, and numerical goals and targets. CEOs using the box
approach spend their time ensuring the right boundaries are set for the organization and
following up on instances when boundaries were crossed (e.g., missed deadlines or financial
goals). Though the box approach is practiced by CEOs in numerous industries, this approach is
most prevalent in highly regulated industries.
The final approach identified by Farkas and De Backer (1996) is the change approach
which is the predominant approach of about 18% of the sample of CEOs. CEOs using the
change approach view organizational transformation as central to the organizations mission.
Change can occur in operating procedures, compensation programs, or even water cooler
conversations. CEOs employing the change approach spend most of their time inspiring change
by communicating with and motivating personnel at all organizational levels. Though CEOs
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often use elements of each of more than one approach, Farkas and De Backer (1996) found most
CEOs to focus on one, or sometimes two, approaches.
Similarly, Hanin (2007) described four types of head coaches which are the player
developer, emergency leader, national team head coach, and international-level coaches working
abroad. Similar to the CEO using the human assets approach (Farkas & De Backer, 1996), the
player developer is often very analytical and creative, but also very skilled in interpersonal
relations with their players, team leaders, and team management (Hanin, 2007). The emergency
leader is often more task oriented and skilled in inspiring change within the team, however, the
emergency leader is often motivated by challenge and may experience difficulties forging
relationships with players and team management (Hanin, 2007). Successful national team head
coaches need strong communication skills as well as the ability to forge strong interpersonal
relationships with both internal and external stakeholders (Hanin, 2007). Additionally, national
team head coaches need sensitivity to lead key players (Hanin, 2007). Finally, internationallevel coaches working abroad require, in addition to professional skills and coaching
experiences, cross-cultural competence, an appreciation for diversity, and a strong understanding
of management practices in the host country.
Hanin (2007) described the four types of head coaches, in part to acknowledge the unique
skillsets required for certain types of coaches to influence their followers, but also to characterize
the context in which different types of coaches lead. Hanin (2007) stated the player developer,
whom is skillful in developing relationships as well as players, experience success over longer
durations and typically stay with a team for longer than most coaches (i.e., five to six years). In
contrast, the emergency leader is a short-term answer to a crisis situation (Hanin, 2007). The
emergency leader, inept at forging long-term relationships and motivated by excitement and
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challenges, must regularly transfer from team to team in order to achieve success and fulfill
internal desires (Hanin, 2007). More unique in terms of tenure and mobility are the national
team head coaches and the international-level coaches working abroad. National team head
coaches and international-level coaches working abroad can be especially vulnerable to dismissal
based on their abilities to communicate with and understand various internal and external
stakeholders (Hanin, 2007).
Leadership as an Activity
Often the lines between leadership styles and leadership as an activity can be blurred due
to the substantial overlap that exists between the two areas of leadership research. For example,
the behaviors, human capital, and social/political abilities of leaders contribute to both leadership
styles and activity (Hall et al., 2004; Soucie, 1994). These various aspects of both leadership
styles and activities can contribute to interactions between leaders and followers, organizational
outcomes, and even the promotion or retention of leaders (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et
al., 1988; Hall et al., 2004; Olafson & Hasting, 1988; Selznick, 1957; Soucie, 1994;
Thoroughgood & Padilla, 2013).
Though the bulk of leadership research in the past century focused extensively on leader
qualities and how leaders interact with followers, some scholars argued that an understanding of
the context and role of leadership must first be understood (Hall et al., 2004; Selznick, 1957).
Largely neglected due to the greater research attention on leadership styles were “factors like the
analytic and perceptual ability of leaders, their intelligence and experience, or their capacity to
differentiate good from bad decisions are not incorporated into frameworks that focus only on
style” (Day & Lord, 1988, p. 459). Early literature by Selznick (1957) provided a framework for
much of the recent research examining these aforementioned neglected leadership factors,
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especially in the field of strategic management and executive turnover (e.g., Chen, Luo, Tang, &
Tong, 2014; Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gomulya & Boeker, 2015).
In forging the framework for leadership in strategic management, Selznick (1957)
defined leadership as an activity which revolves around critical decision-making intended to
address the needs of social situations. Selznick’s (1957) definition of leadership differs from
definitions based on routine interactions between leaders and followers due to the emphasis on
critical decision-making as opposed to routine decision-making. Therefore, Selznick (1957)
proposed the “executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative
management to institutional leadership” (p. 4, 154).
Selznick (1957) used the notion of an executive as a statesman to demonstrate the
political nature of leadership activities. He described how political power struggles between
organizational units and personnel form within organizations. Often these political contests are
among personnel vying for top management team promotions. Moreover, promotions, and the
dismissals that pave the way for others’ promotions, are decided, in part, by the
institutionalization of rules and values within the organization as a result of current and past
leaders whom have infused their values within the organization (Selznick, 1957). Selznick’s
(1957) ideas of political competitions for promotions and dismissals being determined by
organizations embodying the values of their leaders have led many scholars to the connection
between politics and executive dismissals and promotions (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Daily & Johnson,
1997; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Frederickson et al., 1988; Gomulya & Boeker,
2015; Ocasio, 1999).
Following Selznick (1957), research regarding executive departures has been identified
as an important area of research (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). The
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importance of executive departures stems from the CEO being viewed as the most powerful
member of an organization (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Farkas & De Backer, 1996) and responsible
for organizational results (Farkas & De Backer, 1996; Soebbing & Washington, 2011). Despite
research findings to the contrary by some scholars, it is widely believed powerful CEOs have a
substantial impact on organizational performance (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Daily &
Johnson, 1997; Day & Lord, 1988; Hambrick & Quigley, 2014).
Executive Departures
A substantial portion of the extant literature examining executive successions failed to
identify the whether the predecessors’ departures were voluntary prior to examining the causes
of those departures or subsequent organizational performance following the departure (Bennett et
al., 2003; Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop,
1991). Voluntary and involuntary executive departures occur as a result of retirements,
resignations, deaths, or dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado &
Kuran, 1990). More specifically, Weisbach (1988) identified 13 reasons CEOs voluntarily
resign according to an examination of Wall Street Journal reports. Some of these reasons
include departing due to compulsory retirement policies, poor performance, disagreements with
boards of directors, and personal reasons. However, during the process of a succession, the true
reasons for the succession are often not revealed (Brown, 1982; Haynes et al., 2015; Maxcy,
2013; Weisbach, 1988).
Executive retirements, specifically, have received a marginal amount of attention from
scholars. Weisbach (1988) found a high correlation between the likelihood of a planned
resignation and CEO age, which he attributed to being largely due to a substantial amount of
resignations occurring on CEOs’ 65th birthdays. Weisbach (1988) found about 38% of CEO
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turnover from 1974 through 1983 to be a result of retirement. Similarly, in Maxcy’s (2013)
study of college football coaches from 2002 through 2011, 25% of head coach turnover was a
result of retirements. Though all successions can have organizational performance implications
(Cannella & Rowe, 1995), there is little mystery in many retirement decisions, therefore,
retirement decisions are of less theoretical interest than dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Fredrickson et al., 1988).
CEO Dismissals
Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined a CEO dismissal as a “situation in which the CEO’s
departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against his or her will”
(p. 255). Frick et al. (2010) defined a dismissal as “the result of a premature termination of a
contract of employment. It can be by mutual consent or without the explicit approval of both
parties to the contract” (p. 151). Between Fredrickson et al. (1988) and Frick et al. (2010), there
seems to be a difference of opinion with regard to the consent of the dismissed party. This
difference of opinion may be cleared up understanding the individual(s) who make dismissal
decisions. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) stated boards of directors are responsible for making
CEO turnover decisions. For the similar position of head coaches in college football, it is the
athletic director (Marburger, 2015).
Dismissals are a tool used to hold CEOs accountable (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993;
Crossland & Chen, 2013). In making the decision to dismiss a CEO, a board of directors must
evaluate the ability of that CEO and sometimes compare that CEOs ability to that CEO’s
compensation in order to decide if the CEO is still valuable to the firm. Ertgrul and Krishnan
(2011) stated boards of directors assess the ability of their CEOs by examining various facets of
their work (e.g., investment proposals, strategy initiatives, short and long-term decisions).

151

Borland and Lye (1996) argued boards of directors will acquire private information on the
CEO’s ability. Since those stakeholders outside the firm typically do not have access to this
private information, the market for CEOs will assume that CEOs retained by a firm are highability CEOs, which causes the CEOs wages to increase until the board of directors deems it
unprofitable to retain the CEO relative to that CEO’s ability (Borland & Lye, 1996).
Boards of directors appoint CEOs as leaders of their organizations to control and manage
the outcomes of their organization (Soebbing & Washington, 2011). However, these
organizational outcomes are often multidimensional which can be measured a variety of ways
(e.g., stock price, sales growth, return on assets, profit; Day & Lord, 1988; Donoher, Reed, &
Storrud-Barnes, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
As a result of particular organizational performance criteria, the overall consensus among
scholars is poor performance results in higher dismissal probabilities (Allen, Panian & Lotz,
1979; Boeker, 1992; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Eitzen & Yetman, 1972; Farrell & Whidbee,
2003; Fizel & D’Itri, 1997, 1999; Frick et al., 2010; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Gamson & Scotch,
1964; Grusky, 1963; Pieper, Nüesch, & Franck, 2014; Puffer & Weintrop 1991; Warner, Watts,
& Wruck, 1988; Zhang, 2006). Though organizational performance is a significant factor, it has
only been moderately effective in predicting dismissals (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein et
al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000). For instance, Ertugrul
and Krishnan (2011) found 49% of CEO dismissals occurred without evidence of poor stock
performance in their industry which is one of many measures of organizational performance.
Similarly, other scholars concluded organizational performance accounts for less than half of the
variance in the dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Pitcher et
al., 2000; Warner et al., 1988). One potential confounding factor reducing the effect of
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organizational performance on CEO dismissal could be the relationship between financial fraud
and organizational performance (Black, 2005). Other factors could be explained by Fredrickson
et al.’s (1988) CEO dismissal model which incorporates four key socio-political factors (i.e., the
allegiances and values of the board of directors, incumbent CEO’s power, expectations and
attributions of the CEO, and availability of alternative candidates to replace the CEO) to explain
the non-performance based portion of the CEO dismissal decision.
Socio-Political Dismissal Forces
The dismissal process is an informal, sociopolitical process, more than it is a formal
process (Hall et al., 2004) and dismissals can be best explained by social and political forces
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Selznick, 1957). Fredrickson et al. (1988)
modelled CEO dismissals using four socio-political forces. The four sociopolitical forces
identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) are the (a) allegiances and values of the board of directors,
(b) incumbent CEO’s power, (c) expectations and attributions of the CEO, and (d) availability of
alternative candidates to replace the CEO. Fredrickson et al. (1988) defined these socio-political
forces as pertaining to interpersonal relationships, coalitions, and power. Interpersonal
relationships, coalitions, and power are key factors in dismissals because board members are
self-interested actors with concerns for wealth, reputation, and friendships–all of which are often
considered in a CEO dismissal decision (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Therefore, several factors
associated with the board or directors, the CEO, the former CEO, the firm, and the industry all
interact to play a role in the dismissal decision (Flickinger et al., 2015; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Fredrickson et al. (1988) further explained these four socio-political forces, in conjunction with
organizational performance, affect the likelihood of CEO dismissals in a ceteris paribus fashion.
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Boards of Directors’ Allegiances and Values
Since the board of directors decides whether to dismiss or retain a CEO (Puffer &
Weintrop, 1991), and may be motivated by self-interest (Fredrickson et al., 1988), they may
choose to retain (dismiss) a poor (high) performing or low (high) ability CEO based on their
individual interests or pressures they may face to make a particular decision (Mintzberg, 1983).
These biases, both conscious and unconscious, affect the perspectives of board members as they
seek information regarding the CEO’s performance and ability (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993;
Dahl, 1994; Fredrickson et al., 1988). These self-interest directed CEO dismissal decisions may
be based on how the CEO will affect directors’ fees, the overall personal wealth of the director,
the status and reputation of the director, or directors’ various relationships (including the
relationship with the CEO) (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Additionally, board members who are involved in governance changes that may be
detrimental to the interests of executives are more likely to become increasingly socially isolated,
both in the firm experiencing governance changes and in external firms (Westphal & Khanna,
2003). The increased isolation experienced by board members is especially evident for those
board members whom do not already possess a high social status (Westphal & Khanna, 2003).
Furthermore, board members who previously experienced social distancing are less likely to
engage in governance changes that are incongruent with the interest of the firm’s executives
(Westphal & Khanna, 2003).
Acknowledging the difficulty in directly measuring the allegiances and values of the
board of directors, Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified several possible determinants of boards of
directors’ allegiances and values. Additionally, through examining head coaches in college and
professional football using the Fredrickson et al. (1988) CEO dismissal model, a few additional
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insights can be provided based on the wealth of accurately measured and available data in sport.
Further, examining the sport industry and non-sport industry perspectives of allegiances and
values in dismissal decisions may be helpful in providing a more complete picture of the effect
of allegiances and values in executive dismissal decisions.
Interpretations of allegiances and values from sport. In Holmes’ (2011) examination
of college football head coach dismissals, Holmes stated the college’s allegiances and values are
based on the coach’s win-loss record in rivalry and bowl games. With this interpretation of
allegiances and values in college football dismissal decisions, Holmes (2011) found a negative
relationship between team performance in rivalry games and dismissals, however, a bowl game
win was no more significant than a regular season win. Therefore, Holmes (2011) concluded
that allegiances and values (measured by success against rival teams) was a significant factor that
was negatively related to executive dismissals, as hypothesized. Though not specifically
identified by Holmes (2011) as allegiances and values for dismissal decision makers, race and
alumnus variables for the head coaches are included within the dismissal models and could affect
network, status, and reputation building for athletic directors.
Personal connections. Holmes (2011) found alumni hired as head coaches are less
likely to be dismissed within their first three years of tenure at their alma mater. He explained
universities may benefit from hiring an alumnus coach as a result of favorable media attention or
improved alumni relations–each having a potential financial benefit. Additionally, Holmes
(2011) noted an alumnus head coach may enjoy personal connections to university decision
makers which could decrease the head coach’s dismissal probability. He suggested alumni head
coaches may be better at their positions because they are more willing to give up opportunities to
coach at more prestigious schools so they could coach at their alma mater.
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Cohesion among boards of directors. The more cohesive a board of directors is, the
less likely dissenting opinions will arise regarding the CEOs lack of ability or low performance
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). This cohesion could be measured by the size
of the board of directors, the average tenure of board members, or the variation in tenure among
board members (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Larger boards of directors
(i.e., more board members) are less manageable because they become more factionalized, and
therefore, less cohesive (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Thus, as the size of a
board of directors increases, so does the rate of CEO dismissals at that firm (Finkelstein et al.
2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Board member tenure can represent cohesion among board members in a similar way as
the size of the board of directors (Fredrickson et al., 1988). A board of directors’ average tenure
represents board member cohesion based on board members who have shared a long period of
service together (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Boards of
directors with too much variation in or too short of an average tenure will be too diverse and
factionalized to agree on retaining a CEO (Daboub et al., 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Fredrickson et al. (1988) elaborated on this phenomenon stating that board members evaluate
executives on various potentially conflicting factors, causing CEO dismissal probabilities to
increase.
Donoher et al. (2007) noted firms with boards of directors possessing longer tenures, as
well as substantial business experience, are less likely to produce misleading financial
disclosures, which could be a confounding factor which also decreases the likelihood of CEO
dismissal. Additionally, board members’ tenure which is shorter than that of the CEO can
represent allegiances to the CEO based on being appointed by the CEO (Cannella & Lubatkin,
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1993; Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 2007; Fredrickson et al., 1988) or simply having
closer ties to the CEO due to being socially integrated in an environment with that CEO
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Therefore, shorter tenures of board members
are likely associated with greater allegiances to the CEO.
Board of directors’ ownership interests. Another characteristic of boards of directors
that may influence CEO dismissal decisions through the socio-political force of allegiances and
values are boards of directors’ ownership interests (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988). However, contrary to common intuition that large shareholder boards of directors are
more motivated to be discriminant of and dismiss CEOs (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011;
Fredrickson et al., 1988), greater share ownership among board members does not have an
adverse effect on CEO tenure (Allen, 1981). Allen and Panian (1982) found that CEOs who
were not members of the firm’s controlling family had shorter tenures than CEOs who were
family members suggesting that some firms (e.g., family controlled) have goals which extend
beyond bottom-line performance measures such as profitability. Huson, Parrino, and Starks
(2001) elaborated that the large amounts of stock controlled by founding families allow family
member CEOs to remain in their positions longer than non-family member CEOs. Therefore,
members of exclusive controlling groups (e.g., families) represented on the board of directors
may be motivated to protect CEOs from their same groups (Allen & Panian, 1982; Finkelstein et
al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). These allegiances and values are often based on motivations
to preserve power, however, predecessor CEOs who maintain relationships within their former
organizations may also preserve some of their power within that organization.
Predecessor’s characteristics. The predecessor of a CEO may be able to affect the
incumbent CEO’s dismissal probability in a variety through allegiances and values (Fredrickson
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et al., 1988; Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995). Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified four determinants of
allegiances and values which involve the predecessor: (a) the predecessor’s tenure, (b) the
predecessor’s departure conditions, (c) the predecessor’s connectedness, and (d) whether the
predecessor founded the organization. As CEO tenure increases, the board of directors will feel
more allegiance for that CEO. Additionally, the performance of a CEO is often evaluated
relative to the predecessor CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Gilmore &
Ronchi, 1995). Therefore, when a predecessor CEOs had a long tenure with the organization and
board of directors, and subsequently accrued a substantial degree of allegiance from the board of
directors, new CEOs will experience more difficulties when their actions or organization’s
performance deviates from that of the predecessor (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988).
CEO dismissal probabilities may also be affected by the predecessor’s departure
conditions. CEOs who voluntarily depart from a firm cause the perceived judgment of their
former position to be deemed as inferior which may result in a smaller pool of available
candidates, a rush to secure any CEO without being too discriminant, and ultimately even
reduced expectations for the new CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988). In contrast, a predecessor
CEO who has been fired may have already created factions within the board of directors,
uncertainty among employees, or a reluctance show allegiance to a new CEO, which could result
in a higher likelihood of dismissal for that new CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988). That departed predecessor may also affect CEO dismissal through continued associations
and connections with the firm (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). The
predecessor CEO can maintain an official role with the firm by becoming chairman of the board
of directors, a board member, or a consultant (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988;
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Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 1995). A predecessor CEO taking one of these positions
indicates that there is not only an experienced former CEO closely monitoring the new CEO, but
there is also a highly qualified replacement for the CEO readily available (Fredrickson et al.,
1988). Under these conditions, the new CEO may find it difficult to earn the support of the
board of directors, thus increasing dismissal likelihood (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et
al., 1988). Predecessors who take these roles associated with the organization they once led are
often major stockholders or founding CEOs.
The predecessor CEO also being a founder of the organization could further increase the
dismissal rates of new CEOs due, in part, to additional disruptions which are caused when a
founding CEO departs an organization or the possibility of a new CEO taking the organization in
a new direction (Carroll, 1984; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Additionally, board members will be
cognizant of the high abilities and performance of the founding CEO as well as all of the
disadvantages to losing a founding CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Subsequently, the board
members may exaggerate the contributions and ability of the founding predecessor leading to a
higher likelihood of dismissal for the new CEO (Fredrickson et al., 1988). All of these
predecessor characteristics are early vulnerability factors and, for quantitative analyses, need to
include interactions between these variables and the CEO’s tenure which has been identified by
Fredrickson et al. (1988) as a determinant of two socio-political constructs: boards of directors’
allegiances and values as well as incumbent CEO’s power.
Incumbent CEO’s Power
As a result of their power, some CEOs are better situated to prevent their dismissal than
others (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Thus, numerous studies have examined the effects of CEO
power on turnover (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Furtado & Karan, 1990; Lausten,

159

2002; Pi & Lowe, 2011; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; Zhang, 2006).
This power may be derived from various sources including access to resources (e.g., clients,
regulatory contacts, proprietary technology) (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pi & Lowe, 2011),
ownership/voting control (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pi & Lowe, 2011), personal characteristics
(e.g., charisma, expertise) (Finkelstein, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 1988), and prestige or external
status (Finkelstein, 1992; Fralich, 2012; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Some of the effect CEO power has on CEO dismissals may be based on the strength of
the firm. Though a CEO’s perception of a possible relationship between his/her own reputation
and his/her firm’s wealth may not influence profitability (Zajac, 1990), firm performance and
CEO power are interrelated and have positive effects on each other (Daily & Johnson, 1997).
Additionally, Haynes et al. (2015) stated that even without stock options, CEOs are often
motivated to increase the current success of their companies for the sake of their own
reputations. Though power may also be viewed as authoritativeness in regard to subordinates,
most studies regarding the effect of CEO power on turnover do not address this form of power.
However, some insights may be drawn from related literature.
Power over subordinates. Several scholars suggested that managers who attempt to
control their environments through excessive use of power may incite counterproductive
workplace deviance (Griffin & Lopez, 2013; Sims, 2010). These acts of deviance may reduce an
executive’s power and their ability to retain their positions (Holmes, 2011). Though power may
indirectly increase dismissal probability as a result of deviance, power itself directly corresponds
to a lower probability of dismissal which would override the deviance effects. Therefore, a
separate measure of deviance may need to be incorporated as a sociopolitical factor in the ceteris
paribus model of CEO dismissals to separate the effects of power and deviance. Additionally,
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this deviance may be reflected in an executives’ reputation which also can diminish power, and
therefore, increase the probability of dismissal.
Personal characteristics. In the market for elite executive talent, the perception of the
executive is as important as any actual skills or attributes (Ward et al., 1995). Farquhar (1995)
echoed this sentiment, stating CEO’s relationships with their constituents and other top
executives may be more important than proven traits or skills. Furthermore, search committees
do not only look for the right CEO in terms of qualifications, but also anticipate how
stakeholders' relationships will vary over time based on the CEO selected (Farquhar, 1995). Hall
et al. (2004) noted stakeholders are influenced by leader reputations which include human
capital, social capital, and leadership style. Some of these stakeholders are board members who
make dismissal decisions (Hall et al., 2004). Therefore, when CEOs improve their reputations,
they also decrease their chance of dismissal (Hall et al., 2004).
Fredrickson et al. (1988) cited personal characteristics such as charisma as sources of
CEO power used to avoid dismissal. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) added the “[c]reation of a
personal mystique or patriarchy…may induce unquestioned deference or loyalty” (p. 124).
However, not all CEOs can communicate and network at the same level as these leaders with
special personal characteristics (e.g., charismatic leaders). Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011)
suggested early dismissals result from personality clashes or strategic disagreements, but they
did not find any statistically significant evidence that this was occurring in their dataset. It is
important to note their results were based on career prospects of early fired CEOs relative to late
fired CEOs as well as operating performance around the time of dismissal. However, if
personality clashes were really the reason for early dismissal, which Ertugrul and Krishnan
(2011) admit the data would be hard to collect since dismissals based on personality clashes are
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not often reported, the dismissed CEOs are likely less desirable candidates for their next jobs as
well. The desirability of dismissed CEOs following personality clashes with the board of
directors may be further diminished because boards of directors are often looking for likable
CEOs with communication skills and charisma (Hall et al., 2004), as well as prospective CEOs
within their network (Ward et al., 1995).
Personal connections were previously discussed in reference to boards of directors’
allegiances and values, however, networks can also provide a CEO with additional power which
can prevent dismissal, or at least provide opportunities for CEOs after dismissal (Fredrickson et
al., 1988; Ward et al., 1995). There exists a relatively closed network of executives and board
members who serve on interconnected boards of directors who protect the interest of one another
(Ward et al., 1995). These networks may also overlap with religious, school alumni, or other
club or organization networks (Ward et al., 1995) and reflect the social capital of the upper
echelon of society (Flickinger et al., 2015). These networks are capable of providing access to
additional resources, including human and social capital, for executives and board members
(Flickinger et al., 2015). In addition to the social and human capital benefits which can be
reaped from elite networks, the networks and outside directorships can positively affect
executives’ social status (Westphal & Khanna, 2003), prestige (D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein,
1992), and power (Palmer & Barber, 2001).
Prestige power and external status. CEO power derived from prestige operates
differently than those sources of power derived through other means (Buchholtz & Ribbens,
1994; Fralich, 2012). Unlike other sources of CEO power, prestige power does not necessarily
increase with tenure (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994). This is partly due to the fact that prestige
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power comes from social relationships (D’Aveni, 1990) which promote loyalty and cooptation
(Finkelstein, 1992).
CEOs with different levels of prestige also behave differently from one another based on
these prestige levels (Fralich, 2012). CEOs with low levels of prestige often elect not to deviate
too much from the central industry tendency, whereas high levels of prestige allow CEOs to be
shielded by external pressure so they may differentiate themselves from industry competitors as
they seek a competitive advantage and increased levels performance for their organization
(Fralich, 2012). Similarly, when CEOs enjoy a higher status than the chairman of the board of
directors, the CEO is more protected from dismissal, even in times of poor organizational
performance (Flickinger et al., 2015). Flickinger et al. (2015) inferred a high status chairman of
the board of directors may be less willing to accept extended periods of inferior performance due
to the associated risks of diminishing their own status and reputation. Therefore, research
examining relative statuses of CEOs and board of directors’ chairmen may need to include
interaction variables between the status of the chairman of the board of directors and the duration
of poor firm performance. In addition to prestige, networks provide access to valuable resources
(Flickinger et al., 2015).
Access to resources. Related to the socio-political force of the board of directors’
allegiances and values, and more specifically, the founding CEO, is the idea of certain CEOs
having additional power due to access to resources. These resources may be personal skills,
contacts with major clients or regulatory agents, proprietary information, or other external
resources (Fredrickson et al., 1988). When a CEO has control over these assets, he/she is able to
reduce his/her probability of dismissal due to the power he/she have over the future of his/her
organization. Similarly, in sport, coaches may also possess some forms of contacts and
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information which may be desirable to certain teams. For example, coaches from college or who
possess college connections may enjoy specific knowledge about prospective draft picks;
professional coaches may own knowledge of division rival teams, or connections to those who
do; coaches with family relatives coaching on different teams may be able to obtain specific
information; and former players who worked with current players/coaches may have knowledge
of their tendencies/tactics which could yield additional power for the coach.
CEO’s tenure. Also related to the board of directors’ allegiances and values is the
CEO’s tenure (Fredrickson et al., 1988). As CEO tenure increases, so does the cooptation of the
board of directors, as well as the ability for a CEO to appoint more board members (Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1989; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). However, CEO tenure also
contributes to CEO power, which seems to be more prevalent in the literature than the effect of
CEO tenure on the board of directors’ allegiances and values (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989;
Holmes, 2011; Lausten, 2002; Pi & Lowe, 2011). Other researchers concluded a negative
relationship exists between executive tenure and dismissals (Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995;
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Frick et al., 2010; Lausten, 2002; Pi &
Lowe, 2011; Parrino, 1997). However, it should be noted a few studies identified a positive
relationship between executive tenure and dismissals (Holmes, 2011).
Interestingly, some scholars linked managerial youth with better performance. Child
(1974) found younger managers are more likely to increase income, net assets, and sales for their
firm. The relationship between managerial youth and organizational performance may be due to
the aforementioned tendencies of younger and older workers, such as older workers’ preferences
for maintaining the status quo or younger workers’ energy and motivation (Child, 1974).

164

Moreover, some researchers found the ability of CEOs to have an effect on their organizations
may decrease over time (Miller, 1991; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).
Another idea regarding the effect of tenure on dismissals is based on the personal
characteristics of the executive. Holmes (2011) found tenure effected dismissals differently for
executives whom had prior connections to the organization prior to securing their position, Black
executives, and executives whom engaged in organizational deviance. The relationship between
tenure and dismissal probabilities for Black executives was more linear, deviant executives could
be characterized by an inverted-U shape, and all other executives peaked around the fourth year
of tenure and stayed around that level (Holmes, 2011).
Non-linear relationships between executive tenure and dismissals are not new to the
dismissal literature. Eitzen and Yetman (1972) found a curvilinear relationship between head
basketball coach tenure and organizational performance. More specifically, tenure had a positive
relationship with organizational performance until approximately 13 years of tenure when
organizational performance began to decline (Eitzen & Yetman, 1972). Similarly, Katz (1982)
found the average tenure of a group working on a research and development project effected
group performance in a curvilinear fashion, peaking between two to four years of average group
tenure, which was consistent with previous studies identified by Katz (e.g., Pelz & Andrews,
1966). Based on these studies of basketball coaches and research and development project
groups, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed that CEOs who accumulate enough time in
office will experience a peak in performance at some midway point, but performance will be
lower very early and very late in their tenure.
Additionally, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed tenure would have to span five
seasons, which they termed: (a) response to mandate, (b) experimentation, (c) selection of an
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enduring theme, (d) convergence, and (e) dysfunction. These seasons of CEO tenure are what
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed lead to this curvilinear relationship between tenure and
performance. A related concept was presented by Miller (1992) called the Icarus paradox in
which success may lead to failure due to forces such as routine, complacency, over-confidence,
and trying to repeat success in new and different contexts. The Icarus paradox may also occur in
sport, increasing the difficulty associated with winning back-to-back championships (Wolfe et
al., 2005). However, dynasties, such as the 1970s Pittsburgh Steelers, may use a special form of
competence termed “small wins” which allow these organizations to negate the effects of the
Icarus paradox (Wolfe et al., 2005). With the exception of dynasties, this research indicates that
executive tenure and firm performance may have an inverted U-shaped relationship. This
relationship may lead to the dismissal of low performing executives.
Dismissal (or turnover for those studies that do not differentiate between the two) may
not be based on incumbent power as much as choice of alternatives for both the firm as well as
the executive (Borland & Lye, 1996). As information regarding executive-firm matches
increase, boards of directors may realize the expected future output of the executive may
decrease below a threshold where an alternative match would yield higher expected future
output, thus increasing the rate of separation (Borland & Lye, 1996). Additionally, Borland and
Lye (1996) explained after a certain amount of years in which tenure and experience
accumulated, turnover will become less likely, due in part to the fact that executives are often
only willing to pursue matches with higher expected output, but these opportunities tend to occur
less frequently with tenure. These reasons are some insights from Borland and Lye (1996) which
indicate why tenure may have an inverted U-shaped relationship with turnover. Also for those
studies that do not differentiate between dismissals and turnover, the relationship may be due in
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part to retirement since tenure is a significant predictor of voluntary exits (Fizel & D’itri, 1997,
1999).
Farquhar (1995) noted executives are often assumed to remain with their organization
until retirement and CEO departures which occur prior to the age of 65 are often classified by
researchers as early exits. The objective of CEOs often does not include remaining with a firm
until they retire at the age of 65 (Farquhar, 1995). Despite this observation by Farquhar (1995),
Parrino (1997) suggested CEOs with less tenure may be more vulnerable than CEOs with higher
tenure because retaining a poor CEO who is further from retirement may be substantially costlier
to retain a CEO who is likely to retire in the following few years. However, Parrino (1997) also
provided another explanation for why there seems to be a negative linear relationship between
executive tenure and dismissals. Less tenure may also be indicative of less human capital which
is another explanation of why CEOs with less tenure may be more susceptible to dismissal
(Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010; Parrino, 1997).
CEOs with less tenure are likely to have accumulated less human capital, which makes
them more susceptible to dismissal (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al.,
2010; Parrino, 1997). Due to shorter tenures allowing for less human capital accumulation, there
is a corresponding period of early vulnerability for CEOs (Berlew & Hall, 1966; Fredrickson et
al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010; Parrino, 1997). An executive’s initial year in an organization is a
critical learning period and challenges exhibited in this first year are strongly correlated with
future performance and success (Berlew & Hall, 1966). With this period of learning for less
experienced executives, firms usually ease the level of position authority slowly from the
chairman of the board of directors to the new CEO (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Similarly, it
may be unusual for a team to give head coaches responsibilities such as those associated with
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being the general manager or director of player personnel. These dual roles and increased
responsibilities often take time to earn and team owners and general managers may be weary of
giving the added responsibilities to an unproven first-year head coach who may not even be the
head coach the following year according to the increased vulnerability to dismissals that new
CEOs and head coaches face (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Even though Berlew and Hall (1966)
provided theoretical evidence in support of grooming new executives in order to reap future
benefits, there seems to be increasing tendencies over time to dismiss executives in search of
short-term results (Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995). Or, perhaps, throughout time, information
continues to be accumulated at a quicker rate to enable faster determinations of these executives’
future expected outputs (e.g., Borland & Lye, 1996).
Time is an important factor in dismissals for a few different reasons. Many scholars
found that executives are dismissed earlier in their tenures than in previous years (Cannella,
1995; Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Huson et al., 2001). If these early dismissals are
proactive, they may benefit organizations by limiting reductions in firm value caused by low
ability CEOs (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). Fredrickson et al. (1988) compared NFL head
coaches to CEOs and explained similarities in their tenures. Fredrickson et al. (1988) noted even
though the mean tenure for NFL head coaches from 1970 through 1982 was about four years, the
mode was one year of tenure. Fredrickson et al. (1988) concluded that these descriptive statistics
revealed the early vulnerability among executives in the professional football industry which has
also been exhibited among CEOs in the food processing industry. Cannella (1995) identified a
couple potential detrimental outcomes could occur as a result of this shift toward earlier
dismissals: executives being reluctant to engage in risky strategies and executives experiencing
difficulties building long-term relationships with stakeholders.
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Contrary to earlier research regarding executives being highly susceptibility to dismissal
within their first year (e.g., Cannella, 1995; Farquhar, 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988), Holmes
(2011) stated head coaches are often given leeway early in their tenures to establish themselves,
however, this leeway diminishes as tenure increases. He also suggested coaches whose
performance starts strong then deteriorates may be more susceptible to dismissal than coaches
whose performance begins poorly but improves. However, Wowak, Hambrick, and Henderson
(2011) observed CEOs whom exhibit strong performance early in their tenures receive an
especially high degree of job security, ceteris paribus.
Recent literature provides contradictory evidence to the idea CEOs are getting dismissed
earlier over time. As an example, Haynes et al. (2015) discovered CEO tenure decreased from
about 10 years on average in the 1990s to about 5.5 years in 2011; however, since 2011,
dismissal frequencies decreased causing CEOs of S&P 500 companies to again enjoy tenures of
closer to 10 years. Therefore, even though the past few decades have shown that CEO tenures
may have been decreasing, there may be a recent trend within the past few years which has
begun to counter the effects of previous decades. Perhaps boards of directors became aware of
the negative outcomes associated with earlier and more frequent dismissals identified by scholars
such as Cannella (1995).
Time also effects dismissals in terms of the timing of performance levels. Several
researchers concluded recent short-term performance is a more significant factor in the dismissal
decision than the executive’s career performance or future potential (Donoher et al., 2007;
Farquhar, 1995; Haynes et al., 2015; Holmes, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011). Wowak et al. (2011)
found marginally significant evidence that recent, though not current, poor performance increase
dismissal probabilities even more when an executive has been highly overpaid previously. This
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recent performance is often measured in terms of the most recent two to three years (Fredrickson
et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011; Wowak et al., 2011). However, organizations characterized as high
performers within their industries may look to the more distant past (e.g., five years)
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011). Identifying the downside to more frequent dismissals
and boards of directors’ focus on recent, short-term performance, Farquhar (1995) stated that
chronic occurrences of short-term leadership within an organization that emphasizes quick
results with limited emphasis on the long-term future of the organization could be detrimental to
the organization. These short-term expectations are often tied to stock prices which CEOs often
try to inflate for personal gain due to their stockholdings.
CEO’s stockholdings. Similar to ownership in family-owned firms affecting the
likelihood of dismissal for family member CEOs (Allen & Panian, 1982; Furtado & Karan, 1990;
Huson et al., 2001), ownership in the form of stockholdings may also affect the likelihood of
CEO dismissal. Larger percentages of firm ownership through stockholdings possessed by the
CEO decrease the probability of that CEOs dismissal because CEOs are able to increase their
power through voting control (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Furtado & Karan, 1990; Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1980; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). Major stockholders can influence decisions regarding
board of director membership, and subsequently the actions of those board members (Finkelstein
et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Therefore, if a CEO is also a major stockholder, he/she is
able to decrease his/her own likelihood of dismissal (Fama, 1980; Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), especially among poor performing firms (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein
et al., 2009). Rather than merely voting for board members, the CEO often serves on the board
of directors, typically as the chairman of the board of directors which provides a similar form of
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insulation from dismissal (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Rechner & Dalton, 1991;
Wiersema & Zhang, 2011, 2013).
CEO duality. CEO duality is the term used to describe a CEO who also holds the
position of chairman of the board of directors (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Rechner & Dalton,
1991). Though this duality may decrease the probability of dismissal from a voting control and
board of directors influence standpoint (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Wiersema
& Zhang, 2011, 2013), it may also affect dismissal through strategic risk taking. Fralich (2012)
defined strategic risk taking as engaging in risky behavior for strategic change, such as
substantially increasing expenditures and incurring large financial debts. Fralich (2012) found a
CEO who also serves as the firm’s chairman of the board of directors is less likely to take
strategic risks. Therefore, these CEOs may not greatly increase firm growth, however, they may
also avoid decreasing firm performance, and subsequently avoid dismissal as firm performance
closely aligns with the rest of the industry.
Additionally, being a CEO as well as an outside director at another firm increases a
CEO’s knowledge and experience (i.e., human capital) as well as network (i.e., social capital),
which both operate to further increase the prestige of a CEO (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012).
In sport, it is uncommon to observe an individual performing duties for two competing
organizations; however, dual roles are very common. In college sport, many head coaches
simultaneously held the role of athletic director; however, the trend of head coaches operating as
athletic directors is a decreasing trend. Whether examining a coaches with administrative
responsibilities or a CEO with chairman of the board of directors responsibilities, this duality
increases the executive’s power, largely because the executive has greater influence over their
own dismissal decision (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Wiersema & Zhang, 2011,
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2013). This situation (i.e., CEO duality) could be detrimental to shareholders because directors
are supposed to hold executives accountable, which may not be occurring when the executive is
an influential director (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Fredrickson
et al., 1988). By whatever means executives derive their power, more powerful CEOs are more
likely to cast shadows which linger around their respective organizations long after they are gone
(Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). These shadows can affect the expectations of the successor
(Gilmore & Ronchi 1995; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012).
Expectations and Attributions
Several scholars concluded higher expectations of executives increase those executives’
dismissal probabilities (Bennett et al., 2003; Farquhar, 1995; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003;
Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011; Pieper et al., 2014; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). However,
board members may view executives’ abilities to affect performance in vastly different ways, if
they believe the executive has much of an effect at all (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Lieberson &
O’Connor, 1972; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Referring to the various cognitions in
which board members draw upon when evaluating CEOs, Fredrickson et al. (1988) identified
that board members may vary in their criteria for evaluating performance, awareness of industry
performance, and attributions of the ability of executives to change firm performance.
Evaluating performance. Organizational performance can be measured in a number of
ways (Donoher et al., 2007). A few of these ways include: bottom-line figures (e.g., profit, stock
price, rankings, win percentage in sport; Donoher et al., 2007; Farquhar, 1995; Koning, 2003),
degree of improvement based on past organizational performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Holmes, 2011), or efficiency based on resources available to the organization (Fizel & D’Itri
1997, 1999; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006; Maxcy, 2013; Scully, 1994). Decision makers
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charged with the responsibility of holding executives accountable do not all look at one measure
of performance. With various board members using different criteria to evaluate organizational
performance, the criteria for evaluating what constitutes good performance may become unclear.
Additionally, third parties may assist in creating performance expectations for board members
(Farrell & Whidbee 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011).
External monitors of organizational performance may affect boards of directors’
expectations of the CEO (Farrell & Whidbee 2003; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Wiersema &
Zhang, 2011). These external monitors provide forecasts of key performance indicators and
“mediate information flows between companies and other market participants who may invest in
or do business with these firms” (Pollock & Gulati, 2007, p. 347). In some instances, these
external monitors are third-party investment analysts who provide legitimate evaluations of the
organization and its executives (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Boards of directors respond to
investment analysts’ forecasts and recommendations because the analysts influence investors
whom are the boards of directors’ constituents (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Thus, when
analysts’ forecasts (e.g., reported annual earnings per share [EPS]) exceed actual firm
performance, CEO turnover becomes more likely (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Puffer & Weintrop,
1991; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). The probability of CEO turnover further increases when the
firm does not meet expectations based on analysts’ forecasts and either there (a) is a general
consensus among analysts or (b) are many analysts devoting attention to that firm (Farrell &
Whidbee, 2003). Still, board members are not the only ones who are concerned about analysts’
perspectives, but executives are as well – and not only because of the effect analysts have on
executive dismissals, but also due to their concern for establishing and preserving their own
legitimacy among stockholders and analysts (Donoher et al., 2007). This struggle to achieve and
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maintain legitimacy is also important to board members who will also make decisions to replace
executives in an attempt to repair damage to the firm and its leaders’ legitimacy (Wiersema &
Zhang, 2013). The strong influence analysts have over executive dismissal decisions
incentivizes executives to manipulate analysts’ recommendations and forecasts.
Firms that manipulate analyst appraisals may do so via financial statements (Chen,
Cumming, Hou, & Lee, 2014) or the media (Cotter, Tuna, & Wysocki, 2006; Farrell & Whidbee,
2003; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Attempting to analyze the effects of expectations which are
free of noise created by executives whom manipulate analyst appraisals, some scholars have
argued head coaches as executives in sport do not actively manage expectations which are
measured in the form of point spreads (Humphreys et al., 2011). Similar to analysts’ forecasts,
point spreads are measures of organizational performance which can be compared to a relatively
efficient market-based expectation of performance (Humphreys et al., 2011).
However, betting market measures such as point spreads and odds to win sports contests
are determined by gamblers who may be influenced by media statements made by internal
organizational members such as head coaches. Koning (2003) stated that external influences
(e.g., fans and media) are likely to be strong determinants of coach dismissals. Likewise, stock
returns are a measure of firm performance that may also be influenced by stakeholder sentiment,
however, in this case, instead of sports gamblers or fans, investors are the influential
stakeholders (Chen et al., 2014). Since this measure can also be influenced by external
stakeholders, it is another example of a firm performance measure which is not entirely reliable
for evaluating the performance of a firm or its CEO (Chen et al., 2014), though some board
members may still opt to rely on it.
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Awareness of industry performance. Intra-industry comparisons are another area
where board members may vary when developing their expectations and attributions of CEOs.
Both analysts (Donoher et al., 2007) and boards of directors (Greve, 1998) compare firm
performance to the performance of industry competitors to gauge that firm’s performance. If a
firm’s performance is considerably lower than a given portion of competitor firms, the board of
directors will be more likely to dismiss the CEO (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988). A board of directors’ awareness of industry performance may also contribute to another
socio-political factor of CEO dismissals: alternatives to the incumbent CEO. A board of
directors’ awareness of industry performance may increase the potential candidate pool to
replace the incumbent CEO because these competitor industries may have talented top managers
that possess a proven track record of success and industry knowledge.
Analogous to an industry within a given economy might be a division or a conference in
sports leagues which are often characterized by certain styles of play (e.g., “ground and pound,”
“West-Coast offense”) or resources (e.g., financial, human). A few studies examined head
coaches performance relative to their conference or division and found that better performance
against geographically close competitors reduced the probability of executive dismissal (Holmes,
2011). Additionally, Holmes (2011) examined the relative effect of industry competitors (i.e.,
strength of schedule) on head coach dismissals, but did not find the variable to be statistically
significant, even though variations in college football team abilities are great. However, these
studies did not account for the stronger attribution to top management when performance in a
given industry varies more (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Meindl et al., 1985).
Therefore, when there is wider variation in an industry, low performing CEOs are even more
likely to be replaced (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). However, anecdotally in
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sport, Major League Baseball (MLB), which is structured for teams to be less competitively
balanced than in the NFL (Vrooman, 2009), has head coaches with longer mean tenures than the
NFL (Mielke, 2007).
Attributions of top management’s influence. Coinciding with Fredrickson et al.’s
(1988) theory of dismissals and the influence of industry variation representing management’s
ability to affect performance is the idea that leaders of organizations may have little effect on
organizational performance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993a; Smart, Winfree, &
Wolfe, 2008). The typical explanations for the ineffectiveness of leaders indicate that leaders are
often constrained by various internal and external factors such as resources, pressures to
conform, and regulations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993a; Smart et al., 2008).
Some scholars argued leader ineffectiveness only occurs in certain situations and referred to the
idea of managerial discretion as affecting the impact leaders have on organizations (Hambrick &
Quigley, 2014). Scholars further concluded the environment and circumstances surrounding
leaders might produce varying effects across organizations and industries causing leader effects
on organizational outcomes to range from minimal to substantial (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Hambrick & Quigley, 2014).
In addition to the various constraints faced by leaders attempting to influence
organizational performance, boards of directors may feel specific managers are less able to affect
organizational performance. Fredrickson et al. (1988) explained one situation where certain
CEOs may be viewed as more responsible for organizational performance:
If an outsider is hired, the board has concluded either that the firm does not possess the
necessary talent or that its intention to implement changes must be signaled to the outside
world. As a result, the board may have higher expectations of this outsider than they
would have of an insider, which in turn will produce unusually strong attributions of
organizational performance to the CEO. (p. 265)
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Outsider expectations and attributions are likely to be stronger in the early years of a CEO’s
tenure because as tenure increases, boards of directors will view outsider CEOs more as insiders
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Therefore, being an outsider CEO presents an
additional early vulnerability to dismissal and may best be modeled quantitatively with an
interaction between CEO outsiderness and tenure (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Holmes, 2011).
Furthermore, Huson et al. (2001) found that rates of both outside successions and dismissals both
increased over time and, thus, outsiderness, tenure, and the interaction between the two variables
may vary over time. When boards of directors seek outsiders to fill CEO vacancies, they signal
firm weaknesses to the market (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Fredrickson et al., 1988). These
weaknesses, in combination with the high average level of experience among outsiders (because
insiders replacing their CEOs would likely not have previously been a CEO, whereas an outsider
may already have CEO experience), may lead boards of directors to more generously
compensate an outsider. This higher compensation used to incentivize outsiders to take the top
position within a firm with certain weaknesses may also contribute to the expectations and
attributions associated with higher CEO dismissals rates (Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Star compensation. Star compensation is another variable which may contribute to
boards of directors’ expectations and attributions of specific executives (Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Wowak et al., 2011). Star compensation may refer to extremely high initial pay packages
compared to the predecessor (Fredrickson et al., 1988), other firm executives (Shen, Gentry, &
Tosi, 2010), industry norms (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Frick et al., 2010), or past performance
(Wowak et al., 2011). These pay packages are intended to lure candidates with strong
reputations whom are believed, by the board of directors, to possess unique talents which will
produce benefits in excess of the compensation (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988).
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When board members decide to pay CEOs with star compensation, they are indicating their
beliefs that the executive lured to the firm by the compensation will be able to directly influence
firm performance (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Therefore, when boards of
directors are more inclined to attributed organizational performance to the CEO and compensate
that CEO with extremely high pay packages, expectations for that CEO increase (Fredrickson et
al., 1988; Wowak et al., 2011). With these higher expectations and stronger causal attributions
of the CEO come higher dismissal probabilities for CEOs (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Allen &
Chadwick, 2012).
Some studies found no evidence to suggest that executive overpayment alone increases
the likelihood of dismissal (Frick et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2010; Wowak et al., 2011), but when
CEOs are overpaid and the firm’s current performance is poor, CEO dismissal probabilities
increase (Wowak et al., 2011). Wowak et al. (2011) concluded boards of directors avoid
dismissing CEOs whom are worth substantially more than they are compensated until current
performance substantially decreases, which is when dismissal probabilities for these CEOs
substantially increase. Among head coaches in German soccer, Frick et al. (2010) found a
positive relationship between head coach compensation and probability of head coach dismissal,
as well as probability of head coach resignation.
Overpaid CEOs, as measured by actual pay exceeding estimated pay based on wellestablished determinants of CEO pay, whose firm performance decreased below expectations in
a previous year may elicit a retaliatory response from the board of directors which leads to CEO
dismissal (Wowak et al., 2011). Fredrickson et al. (1988) proposed the relationship between
executive compensation and dismissal probabilities would weaken over time as the CEO forges
more personalized relationships with the board of directors and gains more power within the
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firm. Though boards of directors may form expectations by comparing executive compensation
of current leaders to the compensation of predecessors, comparisons to predecessors are not
strictly limited to compensation.
Comparisons to predecessors. As new leaders are appointed to high posts within
organizations, comparisons to predecessors are inevitable (Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995). These
comparisons may be caused by leader transference – “a cognitive process whereby mental
representations of previous leaders are activated and used for evaluation when new, similar
leaders are encountered” (Ritter & Lord, 2007, p. 1683). Though these comparisons often
dwindle over time, these new leaders face much adversity early in their tenures due to these
comparisons, and some leaders even face comparisons long into their tenures (Fredrickson et al.,
1988; Gilmore & Ronchi, 1995). Memories of a former leader are not the only way past leaders
may have an effect, but also through a continued presence within the organization (e.g., former
CEO becomes the chairman of the board of directors or an influential outside advisor). In sport,
it is not unheard of for former coaches to secure front office positions (e.g., Mike Holmgren,
John Idzik, Don Shula, Bill Walsh). Similar to comparing current leaders with past leaders,
boards of directors may also make comparisons between current and past organizational
performance to form expectations.
Previous organizational performance. Boards of directors often look to past
performance for expectations of current and future performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Greve,
1998; Holmes, 2011). Past performance is important for evaluating CEOs, regardless of the
track record of the firm (Fredrickson et al., 1988). As examples, historically high performing
firms will be less likely to tolerate industry-average performance levels; historically low
performing firms may see industry-average performance levels as a reason worthy of increasing
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executive compensation; and recently struggling firms may not be able to tolerate a slight
decrease in performance as high performing firms might be able to (Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Therefore, Fredrickson et al. (1988) argued that firms are more likely to dismiss their CEOs if
previous firm performance was either very high or very low.
In U.S. college football, Holmes (2011) found prior performance in the two years prior to
the observed year led to a negative relationship between prior performance and dismissals. This
result is consistent with the idea that better performance should reduce probabilities of dismissal.
However, Holmes (2011) suggested performance beyond those two previous years would form
the organizations’ expectations, which were positively related to dismissals. This finding from
college football emphasizes Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) idea that industries with more variation in
firm performance will behave in differently than industries with more similarly performing firms
when dismissing executives for expectations based on past firm performance.
Dissenting opinions. With all of these various ways of forming expectations and
attributions of leaders (e.g., comparisons of other firms in the industry, past leaders, and past
performance in terms of generating profits, exceeding analysts’ forecasts, and efficiency), it is
not unlikely for board members to have differing perspectives regarding the performance of the
firm and the executive. However, more dissent among board members about expectations and
attributions of firm and executive performance may also increase probabilities of executive
dismissal (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). In these
situations of dissenting opinions of board members, negative information is more likely to be
discussed and brought to the attention of other board members, to the detriment of the executive
(Finkelstein et al. 2009; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). These dissenting
opinions may be caused or enhanced within emergent industries where there is a general lack of
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information regarding what constitutes good performance in those industries and comparisons
are more difficult to make (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Additionally, due to the uncertainty, lack
of industry-related data for comparisons, and often extreme or highly varied performance levels
among firms in these emergent industries, boards of directors are likely to attribute firm variation
to the CEO, subsequently increasing dismissal likelihood (Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Alternatives to the Incumbent
The final socio-political factor affecting CEO dismissals presented by Fredrickson et al.
(1988) is the availability of alternatives to the incumbent. Though identified as an important
element in the executive dismissal decision by several scholars (Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Holmes, 2011; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980) and a major consideration (whether implicit or explicit)
among boards of directors (Fredrickson et al., 1988), this fourth socio-political factor may be the
most neglected in the extant literature. The reason for the lack of attention given to the effects of
available and qualified candidates is likely due mostly to data limitations which stem from the
secretive nature of executive hiring processes among firms and lead to some researchers electing
to omit the crucial variable from their studies (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Holmes, 2011).
However, most researchers utilize proxies for candidate availability which have little to do with
the actual candidates, such as various industry and firm characteristics (e.g., Crossland & Chen,
2013; Parrino, 1997).
Candidate pool proxies. Early research examining the effects of qualified candidate
availability on leader succession argued that larger organizations would have more potential
replacements for incumbents (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). The rationale
behind this claim was that larger organizations would, internally, have more top managers to
choose as successors (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980).
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Additionally, firm size could represent firm prestige (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Westphal &
Khanna, 2003) which may draw more or better external candidates. Since these early studies,
many researchers included firm size as a variable to represent candidate availability in their
managerial dismissal models (e.g., Agrawal, Knoeber, & Tsoulouhas, 2006; Farrell & Whidbee,
2003; Huson et al., 2001). However, rather than examining firm size in terms of the number of
top managers within a firm whom may possess the requisite human capital to succeed the
incumbent, researchers use measures of firm size such as the number of employees in a firm
(Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003) or even sales figures (Huson et al., 2001).
Since sales figures are used an imperfect proxy for firm size, and firm size is used as an
imperfect proxy for internal candidate availability, what may occur is a diluted representation of
candidate availability which may not accurately reflect the effects of candidate availability on
executive dismissals.
Though the empirical evidence predominantly shows that larger organizations experience
more leader turnover than smaller organizations (Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003;
Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Grusky, 1961; Huson et al., 2001; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Wiersema &
Zhang, 2013), the evidence is not clear exactly why this is occurring. The relationship between
firm size and executive turnover may be due in part to the availability of alternative candidates to
replace the incumbent (Fredrickson et al., 1988); however, it may also be due to larger firms
being more bureaucratized and complex (Grusky, 1961; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980), resistant to
change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Fralich, 2012), scrutinized by stakeholders (e.g., media,
analysts, public) (Daboub et al., 1995; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013), or likely to engage in deviant
behavior (Baucus, 1990; Baucus & Near, 1991; Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 2007).
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Another proxy identified by Fredrickson et al. (1988) as useful for estimating the
availability of qualified candidates was the number of firms in an industry. The idea behind the
number of firms in an industry as a proxy for qualified candidate availability is simple: CEOs
often come from within the same industry as the hiring firm, and therefore, more firms in the
industry is indicative of more available and qualified candidates (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Jalal
& Prezas, 2012). However, since the labor market for CEOs is often a national one, Crossland
and Chen (2013) specified the criteria for the number of intra-industry firms representing
candidate availability must be country-specific. In North American sport leagues, the number of
teams gradually increased throughout time, as did the number of coaches per team.
The final proxy for available alternatives to the incumbent CEO which was identified by
Fredrickson et al. (1988) is the predecessor’s subsequent connectedness. As previously
mentioned, former CEOs may remain connected to an organization after departing as CEO in a
variety of ways, including becoming the chairman of the board of directors, a board member, or
a consultant (Fredrickson et al., 1988). These continued associations between the organizations
and former CEOs may signal to internal and external stakeholders that a strong and able
candidate is available to replace the incumbent (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Furthermore, the mere
presence of the former executive in a position such as chairman of the board of directors may
cause negative and dissenting opinions of the incumbent executive to arise if the incumbent’s
performance is anything less than flawless (Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Additional insights on candidate availability and executive dismissal. Since
Fredrickson et al. (1988), few studies offered additional insight regarding the availability of
qualified candidates to replace the incumbent executive. Parrino (1997) shared Fredrickson et
al.’s (1988) sentiment that a strong external candidate is an important determinant of CEO
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dismissals and elaborated that the potential benefit received by a firm for replacing a CEO grows
with the quality of the candidate pool. Parrino (1997) also confirmed the importance boards of
directors place on industry experience noting that only about 7% of fired CEOs in their sample
were succeeded by new CEOs whom did not clearly possess industry-specific human capital.
Similarly, examinations of sport industries note that head coaching vacancies in elite leagues are
unlikely to come from external leagues (Mielke, 2007; Solow et al., 2011). Mobbs (2013) stated
boards of directors can act quickly when faced with a CEO dismissal decision if they have a
talented replacement whom can immediately replace the incumbent such as a board member or
an internal candidate. However, the frequency of outside successions, as well as CEO turnovers,
have increased throughout time (Huson et al., 2001).
Summary of Socio-Political Dismissal Forces
Fredrickson et al. (1988) established a framework for examining executive dismissals
based on socio-political forces, rather than solely relying on organizational performance as a
determinant. Since its publication, numerous scholars have built upon the foundation
Fredrickson et al. (1988) established, often delving deeper into these four socio-political forces.
Though, overall, the wealth of literature examining these four socio-political forces has
contributed to the increased understanding of executive dismissals among scholars, it has also led
to some confusion. For example, Holmes (2011) used performance variables as measures of the
socio-political force of allegiances and values, stating that dismissal decision-makers value
performance. However, Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) interpretation of values was based on
motives for being on the board of directors rather than valuing high performance.
Complications within the executive dismissal literature have arisen with respect to the
three other socio-political forces as well. Incumbent CEO power is viewed by most scholars as a
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resource that can decrease the likelihood of dismissals, however, depending on the source and
type of power (e.g., excessive control over subordinates), it could have detrimental effects
(Griffin & Lopez, 2013; Sims, 2010). When discussing expectations and attributions,
Fredrickson et al. (1988) identifies differences between industries with respect to executive
dismissals, however, scholars often examine executives from various industries without
addressing the effects different industries may have on dismissal rates. Since Fredrickson et al.
(1988), additional differences in industries which may affect executive dismissals have been
identified such as levels of deviant behavior (Daboub et al., 1995) or executive discretion
(Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Similarly, in sport, some leagues and levels of competition
may be more deviant, allow for more head coach discretion, or have more variation among firms
in terms of performance–all of which would be more likely to lead to dismissals. However,
anecdotal evidence suggests this may not be occurring and further research is required.
Finally, the availability of qualified alternatives to the incumbent executive is an area that
has been substantially lacking in the literature, mostly due to the difficulty in establishing
candidates whom comprise a candidate pool for a given executive position. Firm size is often
used to proxy for candidate availability, however, this method is crude and could be problematic
due to being correlated with several other factors which may affect dismissals (e.g., firm prestige
and attention, the complexity of a firm’s structure, a firm’s ability to change, executive
deviance). Though several scholars have emphasized the importance of candidate availability in
the executive dismissal process, very little is known about candidates who are promoted to
executive positions.
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Promotions
Because the availability of qualified candidates to replace an incumbent executive could
be a consideration of dismissal decision makers (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988), understanding who those potential successors are is critical. Therefore, knowledge of the
promotion process and from where executives may come under various circumstances is
necessary for understanding executive dismissals (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Fredrickson et al.,
1988). However, the process for filling executive vacancies is different than the process for
filling lower level managerial vacancies due to the differences in duties of the higher and lower
level managerial positions (Borman & Brush, 1993; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969; Selznick, 1957).
Executive Successors
Executive successors can come from many different places in terms of the successor’s
association with the executive-seeking firm or industry, former position held and level of success
in that position, certifications or memberships, geographic location, and demographics.
Furthermore, there are various ways the succession may occur in terms of planning, which may
involve unexpected or planned predecessor departures. Each one of these attributes of the
successor and succession event are important in terms of understanding the candidate pool
available when boards of directors make dismissal decisions as well as how the succession event
is going to affect performance.
Successor associations with firm/industry. Successors may be internally or externally
associated with the firm or industry. In the Alternatives to the Incumbent section, the importance
of industry-specific human capital and its relevance to boards of directors seeking candidates
from within the industry (Crossland & Chen, 2013; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Jalal & Prezas,
2012; Parrino, 1997) was reviewed. For those boards of directors considering a successor from
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within their industry, another decision exists: whether to select successors from inside or outside
their own firm. Multiple factors may influence the decision to select an inside or outside
successor such as firm performance and size.
Research examining executive hiring processes concluded when firms are performing
well, promoting internal managers to the top post in the firm is preferred because these internal
promotions are less disruptive to the organizational processes responsible for generating the
increased performance levels (Carroll, 1984; Fredrickson et al., 1988; Grusky, 1961). However,
when firms are not performing well, external candidates are often preferred as successors
because they are viewed as more capable of implementing strategic change to increase firm
performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Fredrickson et al., 1988;
Furtado & Karan, 1990; Hamidullah, Wilkins, & Meier, 2009; Ocasio, 1999). This result,
however, may be contingent upon the existence of an heir apparent to replace the incumbent
executive as well as the incumbent executive’s maintaining a connection with the firm after the
incumbent’s departure and possibly influencing the selection of the incumbent’s successor
(Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Though internal successors are more likely than external
successors in firms experiencing high levels of performance, these firms often offer fewer
internal promotion opportunities since executives are less likely to be dismissed in times of good
performance (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2006; Fredrickson et al., 1988). However, opportunities
for promotion in successful firms may also be dependent on firm size.
There is also a distinction between small and large firms’ preferences for successors,
whereby large firms often appoint insiders and small firms often appoint outsiders to lead their
firms (Fredrickson et al., 1988). The difference in executive hiring practices between large and
small firms may be a result of larger firms having more managerial depth which can be more
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adequately used to select suitable candidates (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Parrino, 1997).
Additionally, the complex and bureaucratic nature of these larger organizations may also
contribute to the willingness to create and ability to withstand more frequent succession events
(Grusky, 1961).
Though there is evidence that firm performance, firm size, and other socio-political
factors influence whether boards of directors will appoint an insider or an outsider to their top
post, firms may increasingly choose outsiders throughout time (Huson et al., 2001). These
outsiders may be viewed as detrimental to potential goals of succession planning (Farquhar,
1995). The increase in outsider successions may be due, in part, to the advantage outsiders have
over internal candidates for high-level managerial positions (Acosta, 2010). Acosta (2010)
found previous promotions within a firm decrease the probability of future promotions within the
firm. Perhaps this finding is due to a lack of diverse experiences, networks, and backgrounds
which may be valued by decision makers charged with making personnel decisions.
Furthermore, Acosta’s (2010) conclusions may assist in explaining why talented top managers
and interim CEOs often leave the firm after not being selected as CEO (Cannella & Shen, 2001).
Additionally, the ability to predict future success in a given position is contingent upon positions
previously held (Longley & Wong, 2011).
Former position held and level of success. Successors to CEOs are either former CEOs
or have been promoted to CEO. Successors with more general management experience typically
have more relevant expertise to CEO positions than executives from more specialized
backgrounds such as marketing (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989). However, consistent with the
idea that better performing firms have fewer opportunities for upward mobility (Fee et al., 2006;
Fredrickson et al., 1988), non-former CEOs typically come from firms with better performance
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than successors with CEO experience (Elsaid, Wang, & Davidson, 2011). Nevertheless, the
stock market reacts more favorably to firms that appoint former CEOs as opposed to successors
with no CEO experience (Elsaid et al., 2011). Additionally, this positive reaction occurs despite
former CEOs being hindered by past experiences which cause decisions to be made based on
past experiences that occurred in different contexts (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015). Since the
contexts have changed, but the CEOs decisions are based on the old context, the new decisions
may be detrimental to firm performance (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015).
Rather than a former CEO making a lateral move to be the CEO of another organization,
boards of directors may choose to promote a non-former CEO internally or externally. Among
organizations which promote internal managers to their top posts, individual performance may
not be valued at all in the selection decision (Fee et al., 2006). In contrast, hiring organizations
tend to promote external managers when those managers exhibit high levels of individual
performance with little regard for the performance of the external managers’ organization (Fee et
al., 2006). However, promotions based on past performance which occurred at a lower level
may not be an accurate indicator of future performance at a higher level (Longley & Wong,
2011), though they may be indicative of future movement along the career ladder (i.e., career
ceilings and floors, promotions and demotions) (Rosenbaum, 1979). Therefore, understanding
managerial mobility at the highest level of organizations requires and understanding of factors
affecting managerial mobility at every level of an organization.
Factors Affecting Promotions
Several studies have examined determinants of promotions at various levels within the
organizational hierarchy, which is important because of the differences in duties and promotion
criteria at each level (Borman & Brush, 1993; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969; Selznick, 1957).
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However, some factors influencing promotions are not unique to organizational levels, such as
education (Tharenou, 1997) or demographic homogeneity (Kanter, 1977; Useem & Karabel,
1986; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Furthermore, factors affecting promotion are not limited to
duties, promotion criteria, or individual attributes, but also macroeconomic, societal, industry,
organizational, and political considerations (Kanter, 1977; Ferris, Buckley, & Allen, 1992; Ng,
Sorensen, Eby, & Feldman, 2007; Raelin, 1997).
Different criteria are used for evaluating prospective executives than for supervisory
managers for several reasons (Selznick, 1957, Ferris et al., 1992). First, duties among executives
and lower-level managers differ, and therefore, those entrusted to make the hiring or promotion
decisions must consider different characteristics of the candidates as well as factors internal and
external to the organization. Hersey and Blanchard (1969) separated managers into three levels:
top managers, middle managers, and supervisory managers. Further, they identified skills
needed for each level manager to be effective which included technical, human, and conceptual
skills. While each level of management mostly needs human skill in Hersey and Blanchard’s
(1969) generic conceptualization of skills each level of management needs, top managers need
more conceptual than technical skill, supervisory managers need more technical than conceptual
skill, and middle managers need an even amount of technical and conceptual skill.
Therefore, when decision makers decide whom to hire or promote, this decision may be
contingent upon the duties of the position and how well candidates display the characteristics
required for those duties. Because top management positions often require more conceptual
skills than technical (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969), and conceptual skill is based more on
interpretation than concrete measures, top managers may rely more on networks and political
behavior (Ferris et al., 1992). However, near the top of the organizational hierarchy, top
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managers cannot solely rely on political behavior and networks without exposing weaknesses in
their abilities, often demonstrated by past performance (Ferris et al., 1992). Therefore, a
combination of political behavior and ability are required for promotion to the highest
organizational ranks (Ferris et al., 1992).
Other studies have examined traits related to career advancement. Some traits are simply
more likely to guide an employee towards promotions, such as ambition, desires to lead, or
desires to excel in the workplace (Tharenou, 1997), whereas other traits are may be more
desirable for personnel managers. Among the traits which may be more desirable to personnel
managers, there are both physical and personality traits. Physical traits include traits such as sex
(Tharenou, 1997) or attractiveness (Morrow, McElroy, Stamper, & Wilson, 1990), whereas
personality traits include traits such as self-confidence (Tharenou, 1997).
Promotions are contingent upon several environmental factors beyond the control of the
promotion candidates and hiring decision makers. Among these environmental factors are
economic conditions, societal characteristics, industry differences, and organizations’ staffing
policies (Ng et al., 2007). Under favorable economic conditions, firms are more likely to create
new positions, vertically and horizontally, which also increases opportunities for external
candidates (Ng et al., 2007). In contrast, under unfavorable economic conditions, firm
downsizing causes layoffs and demotions (Ng et al., 2007). Numerous societal characteristics
could also affect job mobility, such as international and domestic conflicts, technological
advances, civil rights issues, or public policies (Kanter, 1977; Ng et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, 1992).
For example, unionization, and policies which strengthen unions, decrease involuntary exits and
external mobility (Ng et al., 2007).
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Societal characteristics, such as policies aimed at changing levels of diversity within
organizations, may have beneficial effects on mobility for certain populations (e.g., older,
minority, veteran populations), but adverse effects for others (Ng et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, 1992).
Differences between industries and organizations within industries also contribute to job
mobility. Both industries and specific organizations have varying reward mechanisms,
employment goals, and other unique characteristics. Examples of these industry- and
organization-specific characteristics include women being overrepresented in clerical positions,
high-wage industries experience less job mobility due to infrequent firm departures, and
organizational emphases on internal development or acquiring external talent (Ng et al., 2007).
Promotions are contingent upon several factors. Hiring and promotion decision makers
must consider the needs of the organization and the qualifications of the candidates. However,
economic, societal, industry, and organizational factors may also dictate job mobility. Therefore,
similar to the case of executive dismissals, promotions are based on much more than just past
performance. As decision makers search for candidates to replace organizational leaders,
questions arise regarding the effect a succession will have on the organization.
Executive Successions
Executive successions are of great interest to organizations (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Parrino, 1997; Pedace & Smith, 2013), shareholders (Ertugrul &
Krishnan, 2011; Farquhar, 1995; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), and scholars
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Despite this great
interest in executive successions, studies examining the effects of executive succession have,
collectively, provided mixed or inadequate results (Farquhar, 1995; Kesner & Sebora 1994;
Karaevli, 2007; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). Faced with several executive succession studies that
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often provided mixed results, Kesner and Sebora (1994) provided a review of the executive
succession literature from the 1960s to the early 1990s and classified the literature into several
categories. Much of the literature regarding executive successions has revolved around the
categories of (a) successor origin, (b) succession rates, and (c) post-succession organizational
performance.
Successor Origin
Early research by Grusky (1963) utilized a unique data set to empirically examine the
effects of successor origin on post-succession performance. The data Grusky (1963) used were
professional baseball league mid-season manager changes. Grusky (1963) compared baseball
teams that promoted internally with those that acquired new managers from outside the team to
see which teams performed better following a succession and found insider successions to be
more beneficial to team performance than outsider successions. The finding that insider
successions are better for firm performance have been duplicated by several studies since Grusky
(1963), such as Allen, Panian, and Lotz’s (1979) similar study of professional baseball manager
successions and Zajac’s (1990) study of corporate CEOs.
Contrary to the aforementioned evidence of outsider successions being disruptive to
organizations, Warner et al. (1988) examined executive successions reported in the Wall Street
Journal and found outside successions to have a positive effect on post-succession firm stock
prices. Kesner and Sebora (1994) noted several researchers using various performance measures
as dependent variables (e.g., sales, profits, return on investment) found contradictory evidence
regarding the effects of insiders and post-succession organizational performance, further
contributing to the mixed results attributable to successor origin.
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Succession Rate
The literature examining succession rates includes two main streams of research:
determinants of succession rates and consequences of high succession rates. Grusky (1961) was
one of the first researchers to empirical examine succession rates. Grusky (1961) contrasted
larger and smaller revenue-generating Fortune 500 companies and found succession rates to be
higher among larger companies. Grusky (1961) attributed to the increased bureaucratic nature of
larger organizations. Though the finding of increased succession rates among larger firms has
been supported by many studies following Grusky (1961) (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Farrell &
Whidbee, 2003; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Huson et al., 2001; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Wiersema
& Zhang, 2013), the rationale provided by Grusky (1961) based on organization bureaucracy
levels has been challenged (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
Other scholars added to the succession rate literature by finding an inverse relationship
between firm performance and frequency of succession (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Kesner &
Sebora, 1994; Warner et al., 1988). Additionally, Pfeffer and Moore (1980) found dissenting
opinions about the executive to lead to higher succession rates, Salancik and Pfeffer (1980)
discovered the executive’s ownership of the firm to be inversely related to succession rates, and
Allen (1981) uncovered CEO power to be inversely related to succession rates. Examinations of
the determinants of succession rates in the 1960s led to examinations of the effects of succession
rates on organizational performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
Post-Succession Organizational Performance
Similar to other succession-related studies (e.g., the successor origin debate), scholars
again found mixed results regarding post-succession organizational performance. These mixed
results led to three theories of executive successions: (a) the Common Sense Theory, (b) the
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Vicious Circle Theory (also commonly referred to as the Vicious Cycle Theory), and (c) the
Ritual Scapegoating Theory. Furthermore, the ambiguous results regarding the effects of
executive successions led many researchers to examine the circumstances affecting the effects of
executive successions.
Circumstances affecting post-succession organizational performance. Several
circumstances may affect the effect successions have on organizational performance. Many of
these circumstances have been being empirically tested for almost half a century, however,
statistical tests continue to become more sophisticated. Among these circumstances are (a)
executive-firm fit, (b) the ability of the executive and the organization, (c) the timing of the
succession, and (d) the time span in which the organizational performance is measured following
the succession event.
Research in the 1970s began emphasizing the importance of examining more factors
related to post-succession organizational performance than a mere succession event (Kesner &
Sebora, 1994). Much of the post-succession organizational performance research in the 1970s
was devoted to examining the effects of executive-firm fit on post-succession organizational
performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Overall, the results of the studies examining the effect of
executive-firm fit on post-succession organizational performance indicate post-succession
organizational performance increases more in cases of better executive-firm fit relative to those
cases of sub-optimal executive-firm matches (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
Studies regarding the moderating effects of the executive’s and organization’s abilities on
post-succession organizational performance have used several methods of capturing this
relationship. Probably the most studied circumstance affecting post-succession organizational
performance is the ability of the team prior to a succession event. Several scholars throughout
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the decades of succession research have agreed post-succession organizational performance is, at
least in part, determined by the performance of the organization prior to the succession event
(Allen et al., 1979; Brown, 1982; Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Friedman & Singh 1989; Karaevli,
2007; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986).
Common Sense Theory. The Common Sense Theory is simple: boards of directors
replace poor performing CEOs to improve firm performance, thus creating a positive relationship
between executive successions and organizational performance (Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson &
Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Soebbing, Wicker, & Weimar,
2015). Evidence of the Common Sense Theory has been found in both the context of head
coaches in sport (Maxcy, 2013) as well as CEOs in non-sport settings (Huson et al., 2004;
Weisbach, 1988).
Vicious Circle Theory. Contrary to the Common Sense Theory, the Vicious Circle
Theory states that executive successions are disruptive processes that decrease organizational
performance (Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner &
Sebora, 1994; Soebbing et al., 2015). Similar to the Common Sense Theory, evidence
supporting the Vicious Circle Theory has been found in both sport (Fizel & D’Itri, 1997, 1999;
Grusky, 1963; Soebbing & Washington, 2011) and non-sport industries (Carroll, 1984;
Haveman, 1993b).
Ritual Scapegoating Theory. The third theory of organizational performance following
executive succession is the Ritual Scapegoating Theory. The Ritual Scapegoating Theory states
that the occurrence of an executive succession event has no significant effect on organizational
performance. Rather, executive successions merely reflect a perceived change in organizational
direction, however, do not necessarily cause actual changes in organizational performance
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(Dohrn et al., 2015; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994;
Soebbing et al., 2015). Consistent with the other two theories of post-succession organizational
performance, evidence to support the Ritual Scapegoating Theory has also been found in both
sport (Brown, 1982; Cannella & Rowe 1995; Eitzen & Yetman 1972; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake,
1986) and non-sport settings (Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Samuelson, Galbraith, & McGuire,
1985).
Several other researchers examined the post-succession organizational performance
theories by providing possible explanations for the mixed results (Kesner & Sebora, 1994).
Among the explanations, researchers found the pre-succession performance of the organization
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Tushman, Virany, & Romanelli, 1985), successor competence
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986), and executive compensation (Zajac,
1990) may moderate the effects of post-succession organizational performance.
Timing. The timing of successions can have an impact on organizational performance in
a few different ways, including the optimal time to dismiss an executive as well as the time of
year. In terms of choosing the right time to dismiss an executive, without regard to time of year,
Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) found waiting too long to dismiss an executive could be
substantially detrimental to an organization. More specifically, boards of directors that wait to
dismiss a CEO increase their probability of filing for bankruptcy by about 4%, increase their
probability of delisting their stock by about 8% (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). However, boards
of directors that elect to proactively dismiss their CEO experience a decrease in their firm’s share
price by almost 5%, yet there is no significant share price decrease for CEOs being fired too late
following poor performance (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011).
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Succession timing could also affect subsequent organizational performance based on the
time of year the succession event occurs. To examine this phenomenon, many scholars analyzed
sport data to identify whether there is a difference between dismissing an executive during the
season as opposed to during the off-season and have compared seasons in sport to similar peak
seasons outside of sport (de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005).
That is, most industries and firms experience highs and lows throughout a given year which
provide opportunities for turnover among top executives to mitigate potential performance
disruptions (de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). Literature
examining performance during and between seasons in team sports indicates during season
successions are more disruptive than between season successions (Allen et al., 1979; Brown,
1982; de Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007; Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005).
How researchers decide to define organizational performance, in terms of time, may also
affect results regarding the effect succession events have on organizational performance. Day
and Lord (1988) identified that under certain circumstances short term performance may increase
following a succession event, for example, when the new executive is able to increase morale,
external funding, or stockholders’ perceptions. However, long-term increases in organizational
performance are often created by acquiring and developing personnel or technology,
restructuring the organization, or other means of strategic change–all of which often require a
new executive to be in office for at least a few years (Day & Lord, 1988).
Though many studies examined the effects of successions, and reached varying
conclusions based on the three theories of succession, it is evident post-succession performance
is contingent upon more factors than simply the existence of a succession event. Factors
influencing the effect a succession will have on subsequent performance include executive-firm

198

fit, executive/organization ability, succession timing, and post-succession performance
measurements. However, before trying to understand organizational performance following
successions, a deeper understanding of dismissals is required (Fredrickson et al., 1988).
Conclusion
Executive dismissals and successions can be difficult to accurately examine for several
reasons. The sport industry provided important data to assist in examining executive dismissals
and successions; however, difficulties still exist in identifying factors related to dismissals, and
subsequently, successions. Fredrickson et al. (1988) developed a framework to better understand
executive dismissals, which, in turn, would provide for a better understanding of successions but
this model of CEO dismissals is not perfect. Research based on their four socio-political forces
of CEO dismissals often resulted in inconsistent or contradictory results. These inconsistent or
contradictory results may be due to misinterpretations of the model, difficulties operationalizing
the four socio-political forces, errors in accurately measuring organizational performance or any
of the four socio-political forces, or an incomplete model proposed by Fredrickson et al. (1988).
Executive dismissals and successions are also contingent upon successors, candidate
pools, and determinants of promotions. Though executive successions require and understanding
of executive dismissals, executive dismissals require an understanding of candidate pools, and
candidate pools require an understanding of promotions from the lowest rung of the career
ladder, they are often disjoined in the literature. Executive dismissal research typically identifies
candidate pools based on firm and industry size proxies which are often based on sales figures,
number of employees in a firm, or number of firms in an industry. These proxies do not consider
how tall or wide organizational structures are or whom qualified candidates to replace executives
are. Furthermore, several studies have examined various levels of management as if they were
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evaluated by decision makers using the same criteria despite job duties for these positions being
vastly different.
A large body of previous literature examines issues such as executive successions,
executive dismissals, and career trajectories, however, without understanding the antecedents of
executive successions, fully understanding executive successions themselves may not be
possible. Additionally, Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) model of CEO dismissals remained a leading
theory for understanding executive dismissals for almost three decades and has been influential
in molding research questions and empirical examinations within that time span. Furthermore,
minimal revisions or additions to the dismissal model have been proposed in that time.
There are several opportunities for future research stemming from the literature in this
review. Future research may be able to expand upon Fredrickson et al.’s (1988) executive
dismissal model or adapt the model to different types of firms or industries (e.g., family owned
firms, public sector). One socio-political force not discussed in the Fredrickson et al. (1988)
model that influences dismissals as well as the other four socio-political forces is negative
deviant behavior exhibited by executives and their firms. Empirical examinations of the
Fredrickson et al. (1988) model may also benefit from establishing whom qualified candidates
are for executive positions in various industries and allowing a pool of candidate to be
incorporated into the dismissal model, rather than proxies based on sales figures or firms within
an industry.
Several studies have examined the impact of executive dismissals on subsequent
organizational performance, however, the impact of a dismissal on an executive’s future career
prospects is less understood. Recent studies examining the glass cliff have examined how
female executives are disproportionately positioned in less successful firms and positions,
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however, further studies regarding the effects of these positions on later career outcomes are
needed. Sport provides an interesting context to examine these issues due in part to policies such
as the Rooney rule which may encourage minorities to take opportunities that could hurt their
reputations. Furthermore, the future opportunities, successes, and failures of minorities whom
have been dismissed can be easily monitored and measured.
With respect to sport-based executive dismissal and succession studies, establishing how
sports and coaching staff hierarchies and responsibilities differ may be useful in correcting
discrepancies between sport studies as well as compared to studies in various non-sport
industries. Additionally, there are several opportunities to examine the sport-based studies from
non-sport journals identified in the Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport
section of this review. Within the Recent Organization and Management Studies Using Sport
section, future research opportunities are discussed for examining the relationships between
status and organizational performance as well as human capital, employee mobility, and
organizational performance. However, several other future research opportunities exist both
inside and outside the realm of executive successions. For example, within the realm of
dismissals and promotion research, the influence of public funding for venues or the presence of
geographically close rival firms may have an effect on dismissals and promotions. Outside the
realm of dismissals and promotions, issues such as momentum and the hot hand effect can
examine moderating effects of factors such as age, race, education, or ability to handle pressure.
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Rewards/Motivation

2014 Health insurance and lifestyles

Tavares

2013 Prospective measures of competitive balance:
application to money lines in major league
baseball
2013 Scouts versus Stats: the impact of Moneyball on
the Major League Baseball draft
2013 Are betting markets efficient? Evidence from
European Football Championships
2013 A note on the ‘Linsanity’ of measuring the
relative efficiency of National Basketball
Association guards
2013 What determines the price of a racing horse?

Bowman,
Ashman, &
Lambrinos
Caporale &
Collier
Direr

2013 A cost-benefit analysis of restoring the Em River
in Sweden: valuation of angling site
characteristics and visitation frequency
2013 Competitive balance versus competitive intensity
before a match: is one of these two concepts
more relevant in explaining attendance? The case
of the French football Ligue 1 over the period
2008–2011
2013 Breeding to sell: a hedonic price analysis of
leading Thoroughbred sire stud fees
2013 An innovative approach to National Football
League standings using bonus points
2012 Hot hands and equilibrium
2012 Over the moon or sick as a parrot? The effects of
football results on a club's share price
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Sport (in
general)
Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Rewards/Motivation

Lee &
Worthington

Basketball

Ng, Chong,
Man-Tat Siu,
& Everard
Paulrud &
Laitila

Horse racing Modeling Change/
Performance
Fishing

Venues

Scelles,
Durand,
Bonnal,
Goyeau, &
Andreff
Stowe

Soccer

Rewards/Motivation

Winchester
& Stefani
Aharoni &
Sarig
Bell, Brooks,
Matthews, &
Sutcliffe

Horse racing Modeling Change/
Performance
Football
Modeling Change/
Performance
Basketball
Psychology
Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance

2012 Measuring competitive balance in sports using
generalized entropy with an application to
English premier league football
2012 Evidence of in-play insider trading on a UK
betting exchange
2012 Soccer and national culture: estimating the
impact of violence on 22 lads after a ball
2012 Market efficiency and continuous information
arrival: evidence from prediction markets
2012 The incentive effects of levelling the playing
field - an empirical analysis of amateur golf
tournaments
2012 Analysis of the determinants of sports
participation in Spain and England

2012 Expenditure elasticities of the demand for leisure
services
2012 Dyed in the wool? An empirical note on fan
loyalty
2012 Information effects in major league baseball
betting markets

British Journal of
Management

2012 Nerves of steel? Stress, work performance and
elite athletes
2012 The demand for slot machine and pari-mutuel
horse race wagering at a racetrack-casino
2014 Lessons Learned from Community
Organizations: Inclusion of People with
Disabilities and Others
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Borooah &
Mangan

Soccer

Rewards/Motivation

Brown

Tennis

Cuesta &
Bohorquez
Docherty &
Easton
Franke

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance
Psychology

Kokolakakis,
Lera-Lopez,
&
Panagouleas
Pawlowski &
Breuer
Robinson

Multiple/
sport (in
general)

Labor/Personnel

Sport (in
general)
Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance
Psychology

Ryan,
Gramm, &
McKinney
Savage &
Torgler
Thalheimer

Baseball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Soccer

Psychology

Fujimoto,
Rentschler,
Le, Edwards,
& Härtel

Golf
Golf

Modeling Change/
Performance
Rewards/Motivation

Horse racing Modeling Change/
Performance
Sports (in
Labor/Personnel
general)

California
Management Review
Economic Inquiry

2014 Organizational Cultural Perpetuation: A Case
Study of an English Premier League Football
Club
2014 Perceived Support and Women's Intentions to
Stay at a Sport Organization
2013 Coach McKeever: Unorthodox Leadership
Lessons From the Pool
2015 Sequential Judgment Effects in the Workplace:
Evidence From the National Basketball
Association
2015 Are Winners Promoted too Often? Evidence
From the NFL Draft 1999-2012
2015 Are Sunk Costs Irrelevant? Evidence From
Playing Time in the National Basketball
Association
2015 Competitive Balance Measures in Sports
Leagues: The Effects of Variation in Season
Length
2015 Profit-Maximizing Gate Revenue Sharing in
Sports Leagues
2015 You are Close to Your Rival and Everybody
Hates a Winner: A Study of Rivalry in College
Football
2014 Reference-Dependent Preferences, Loss
Aversion, and Live Game Attendance
2014 Identifying changes in the spatial distribution of
crime: evidence from a referee experiment in the
National Football League
2014 League-Level Attendance and Outcome
Uncertainty in U.S. Pro Sports Leagues
2014 The Harder the Task, the Higher the Score:
Findings of a Difficulty Bias
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Ogbonna &
Harris

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance

Spoor &
Hoye
Schroth

Multiple

Labor/Personnel

Swimming

Labor/Personnel

Gift

Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Kitchens

Football

Labor/Personnel

Leeds,
Leeds, &
Motomura
Owen &
King

Basketball

Labor/Personnel

Multiple

Rewards/Motivation

Peeters

Multiple

Rewards/Motivation

Quintanar,
Deck, Reyes,
& Sarangi
Coates,
Humphreys,
& Zhou
Kitchens

Football

Psychology

Baseball

Rewards/Motivation

Football

Modeling Change/
Performance

Mills & Fort

Multiple

Rewards/Motivation

Morgan &
Rotthoff

Gymnastics

Modeling Change/
Performance

2013 Incidence and Consequences of Risk-Taking
Behavior in Tournaments-Evidence From the
NBA
2013 Loss Aversion and Managerial Decisions:
Evidence From Major League Baseball
2013 Interracial Workplace Cooperation: Evidence
From the NBA
2013 Testing Bayesian Updating With the Associated
Press Top 25
2013 Consumption Benefits of National Hockey
League Game Trips Estimated From Revealed
and Stated Preference Demand Data

Economics Letters

2012 Talent and/or Popularity: What Does it Take to
be a Superstar?
2012 Spatial Competition and Strategic Firm
Relocation
2015 Choosing “Flawed” aggregation rules: The
benefit of social choice violations in a league
that values competitive balance
2015 When pressure sinks performance: Evidence
from diving competitions
2015
2014
2013
2013

Grund,
Höcker, &
Zimmermann
Pedace &
Smith
Price,
Lefgren, &
Tappen
Stone

Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Basketball

Labor/Personnel

Football

Whitehead,
Johnson,
Mason, &
Walker
Franck &
Nüesch
Henrickson

Hockey

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Boudreau &
Sanders

Cross
Country
Running
Diving

Genakos,
Pagliero, &
Garbi
Betting lines and college football television
Salaga &
ratings
Tainsky
Within-series momentum in hockey: No returns
Knifflin &
for running up the score
Mihalek
Inelastic sports pricing and risk
Andersen &
Nielsen
Leadership at school: Does the gender of siblings Brunello &
matter?
De Paola
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Soccer

Labor/Personnel

Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance
Rewards/Motivation

Psychology

Football

Rewards/Motivation

Hockey

Psychology

Sport (in
general)
Sport (in
general)

Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

2013 The effect of an agent’s expertise on National
Football League contract structure
2012 Returns to education in professional football

European Journal of
Operational
Research

2012 Working under pressure: Evidence from the
impacts of soccer fans on players’ performance
2012 A test of monopoly price dispersion under
demand uncertainty
2015 Decision analysis under ambiguity

2015 What is a good result in the first leg of a twolegged football match?

2015 Misunderstanding of the binomial distribution,
market inefficiency, and learning behavior:
Evidence from an exotic sports betting market
2015 A study of the powerplay in one-day cricket

2015 Two exact algorithms for the traveling umpire
problem
2014 A dynamic paired comparisons model: Who is
the greatest tennis player?
2014 On the decisiveness of a game in a tournament
2014 Decomposition and local search based methods
for the traveling umpire problem
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Conlin,
Orsini, &
Tang
Böheim &
Lackner
Braga &
Guillén
Humphreys
& Soebbing
Borgonovo
& Marinacci

Football

Labor/Personnel

Football

Labor/Personnel

Soccer

Psychology

Baseball

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Flores,
Forrest,
Pablo, &
Tena
Hwang &
Kim

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance

Volleyball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Silva,
Manage, &
Swartz
Xue, Luo, &
Lim
Baker &
McHale
Geenens

Cricket

Modeling Change/
Performance

Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Tennis

Wauters,
Van
Malderen, &
Vanden
Berghe

Baseball

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Auto racing

Soccer

2014 OR analysis of sporting rules – A survey

Wright

Multiple

2013 Unoriented two-stage DEA: The case of the
oscillating intermediate products

Lewis,
Mallikarjun,
& Sexton
McHale &
Asif

Baseball

Cricket

Modeling Change/
Performance

Flores,
Forrest, &
Tena
Lessmann,
Sung,
Johnson, &
Ma

Soccer

Labor/Personnel

Model for
competitive
events
including
sports
Hockey

Modeling Change/
Performance

2013 A modified Duckworth–Lewis method for
adjusting targets in interrupted limited overs
cricket
2012 Decision taking under pressure: Evidence on
football manager dismissals in Argentina and
their consequences
2012 Stochastics and Statistics: A new methodology
for generating and combining statistical
forecasting models to enhance competitive event
prediction

Human Relations

Human Resource
Management
Industrial Relations

2012 A hybrid constraint programming and
enumeration approach for solving NHL playoff
qualification and elimination problems
2012 Locally Optimized Crossover for the Traveling
Umpire Problem
2014 Smells like team spirit: Opening a paradoxical
black box

2012 From hero to villain to hero: Making experience
sensible through embodied narrative
sensemaking
2012 Performance implications of knowledge and
competitive arousal in times of employee
mobility:“The immutable law of the ex”
2015 Positive Assortative Matching: Evidence from
Sports Data
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Russell &
van Beek

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Modeling Change/
Performance

Trick &
Baseball
Yildiz
Silva, Cunha, Soccer
Clegg,
Neves, Rego,
& Rodrigues
Cunliffe &
Rugby
Coupland

Labor/Personnel

Pazzaglia,
Flynn, &
Sonpar
Filippin &
Ours

Soccer

Labor/Personnel

Running

Labor/Personnel

Labor/Personnel

Labor/Personnel

2014 Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the
NBA

Journal of Economic
Behavior and
Organization

2012 Salary Distribution and Collective Bargaining
Agreements: A Case Study of the NBA
2012 Home Safe: No-Trade Clauses and Player
Salaries in Major League Baseball
2015 Managers’ external social ties at work: Blessing
or curse for the firm?
2015 Does society underestimate women? Evidence
from the performance of female jockeys in horse
racing
2015 The impact of pressure on performance:
Evidence from the PGA TOUR
2015 Reference-dependent preferences, team
relocations, and major league expansion
2015 A study of a market anomaly: “White Men Can’t
Jump”, but would you bet on it?
2015 Game, set, and match: Do women and men
perform differently in competitive situations?
2015 Confidence enhanced performance? – The causal
effects of success on future performance in
professional golf tournaments
2014 The role of surprise: Understanding overreaction
and underreaction to unanticipated events using
in-play soccer betting market
2014 Conflicts of interest distort public evaluations:
Evidence from NCAA football coaches
2014 Endogenous peer effects: local aggregate or local
average?
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Ducking,
Groothuis, &
Hill
Hill & Jolly

Basketball

Rewards/Motivation

Basketball

Rewards/Motivation

Pedace &
Hall
Brandes,
Brechot, &
Franck
Brown &
Yang

Baseball

Rewards/Motivation

Basketball

Labor/Personnel

Hickman &
Metz
Humphreys
& Zhou
Igan,
Pinheiro, &
Smith
Jetter &
Walker
Rosenqvist
& Skans

Golf

Psychology

Multiple

Venues

Basketball

Labor/Personnel

Tennis

Labor/Personnel

Golf

Psychology

Choi & Hui

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance

Horse racing Labor/Personnel

Kotchen &
Football
Potoski
Liu,
Sport (in
Patacchini, & general)
Zenou

Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

2014 Deception and decision making in professional
basketball: Is it beneficial to flop?

2014 Exuberance out of left field: Do sports results
cause investors to take their eyes off the ball?
2013 Frustration, euphoria, and violent crime
2012 Performing best when it matters most: Evidence
from professional tennis

2012 Gender differences in a market with relative
performance feedback: Professional tennis
players
2012 Forensic Economics

Journal of Economic
Literature
Journal of Economic 2015 The Case for Paying College Athletes
Perspectives
Journal of Economics 2012 Subperfect Game: Profitable Biases of NBA
and Management
Referees
Strategy
Journal of
2014 Resetting the Shot Clock: The Effect of
Management
Comobility on Human Capital
2014 A Multilevel Investigation of Individual- and
Unit-Level Human Capital Complementarities
2014 The Roles of Recruiter Political Skill and
Performance Resource Leveraging in NCAA
Football Recruitment Effectiveness
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Morgulev,
Azar, Lidor,
Sabag, &
Bar-Eli
Pantzalis &
Park
Munyo &
Rossi
GonzálezDíaz,
Gossner, &
Rogers
Wozniak

Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Multiple
Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance
Psychology

Tennis

Psychology

Tennis

Labor/Personnel

Zitzewitz

Sport (in
general)
Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance

Basketball

Labor/Personnel

Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Football

Labor/Personnel

Sanderson &
Siegfried
Price,
Remer, &
Stone
Campbell,
Saxton, &
Banerjee
Crocker &
Eckardt
Treadway,
Adams,
Hanes,
Perrewé,
Magnusen, &
Ferris

Journal of
Management History

2015 Technology brokering in action: revolutionizing
the skiing and tennis industries

2015 Conceptualizing the body and the logics of
performing
2014 A review of the North American Society for
Sport Management and its foundational core:
Mapping the influence of “history”
Journal of Political
Economy

2015 Suspense and Surprise
2012

Journal of the Royal
Stat Society, Series A

2015
2015

2015

2015

2014
2013

Laudone,
Liguori,
Muldoon, &
Bendickson
Stec
Seifried

Ely, Frankel,
& Kamenica
From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation among
Stoop,
Fishermen
Noussair, &
van Soest
Time varying ratings in association football: the
Baker &
all-time greatest team is..
McHale
A dynamic bivariate Poisson model for analysing Koopman &
and forecasting match results in the English
Lit
Premier League
Home bias in officiating: evidence from
Sacheti,
international cricket
GregorySmith, &
Paton
Joint modelling of goals and bookings in
Titman,
association football
Costain,
Ridall, &
Gregory
Form or function?: the effect of new sports stadia Ahlfeldt &
on property prices in London
Kavetsos
The group size and loyalty of football fans: a
Brandes,
two-stage estimation procedure to compare
Franck, &
customer potentials across teams
Theiler
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Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance

Sport (in
general)
Sport
Management
as a
discipline
Sport (in
general)
Recreational
fishing

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Soccer

Rewards/Motivation
Modeling Change/
Performance

Cricket

Modeling Change/
Performance

Soccer

Modeling Change/
Performance

Multiple

Venues

Soccer

Psychology

Journal of the Royal
Stat Society, Series C

2013 Dynamic Bradley-Terry modelling of sports
tournaments

Journal of Urban
Affairs
Labour Economics

2012 Are Basketball Arenas Catalysts of Economic
Development?
2015 Is there a taste for racial discrimination amongst
employers?
2015 Labor market effects of sports and exercise:
Evidence from Canadian panel data
2014 Cross-assignment discrimination in pay: A test
case of major league baseball
2013 When drains and gains coincide: Migration and
international football performance

Management Science

MIS Quarterly

2015 Sticking with What (Barely) Worked: A Test of
Outcome Bias
2014 A General Multiple Distributed Lag Framework
for Estimating the Dynamic Effects of
Promotions
2014 Seeing Stars: Matthew Effects and Status Bias in
Major League Baseball Umpiring
2013 Momentum and Organizational Risk Taking:
Evidence from the National Football League
2013 The Loser's Curse: Decision Making and Market
Efficiency in the National Football League Draft
2012 Psychological Pressure in Competitive
Environments: New Evidence from Randomized
Natural Experiments
2015 Hummel's Digital Transformation Toward
Omnichannel Retailing: Key Lessons Learned
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Cattelan,
Varin, &
Firth
Propheter

Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance

Basketball

Venues

Bryson &
Chevalier
Lechner &
Sari
Bodvarsson,
Papps, &
Sessions
Berlinschi,
Schokkaert,
& Swinnen
Lefgren,
Platt, & Price
Kappe,
Stadler
Blank, &
DeSarbo
Kim & King

Fantasy
football
Sport (in
general)
Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Soccer

Labor/Personnel

Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Lehman &
Hahn
Massey &
Thaler
Kocher,
Lenz, &
Sutter
Hansen &
Kien Sia

Football

Modeling Change/
Performance
Psychology

Football

Labor/Personnel

Soccer

Psychology

Sport
fashion
company

Modeling Change/
Performance

Baseball

Baseball

Labor/Personnel
Labor/Personnel

MIT Sloan
Management Review
Organization Science

Organization Studies
Public Choice

2014 What Businesses Can Learn From Sports
Analytics
2015 Driving Performance via Exploration in
Changing Environments: Evidence from
Formula One Racing
2015 Redundant Heterogeneity and Group
Performance
2013 Looking Inside the Dream Team: Probing Into
the Contributions of Tacit Knowledge as an
Organizational Resource
2012 How Does Status Affect Performance? Status as
an Asset vs. Status as a Liability in the PGA and
NASCAR
2012 The division of gains from complementarities in
human-capital-intensive activity
2012 Psyched up or psyched out? The influence of
coactor status on individual performance
2015 Identity Threats, Identity Work and Elite
Professionals
2015 Sabotage in contests: a survey
2012 Regulators and Redskins

RAND Journal of
Economics

2015 Race effects on eBay

Review of Industrial
Organization

2015 Competition Between Sports Leagues: Theory
and Evidence on Rival League Formation in
North America
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Davenport

Multiple

Marino,
Auto racing
Aversa,
Mesquita, &
Anand
Smith & Hou Basketball

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Shamsie &
Mannor

Baseball

Bothner,
Kim, &
Smith
Ethiraj &
Garg
Flynn &
Amanatullah
Brown &
Coupland
Chowdhury
& Gürtler
Coffey,
McLaughlin,
& Tollison
Ayres,
Banaji, &
Jolls
Che &
Humphreys

Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance

Basketball
Golf

Modeling Change/
Performance
Psychology

Rugby

Labor/Personnel

Sport (in
general)
Football

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance

Baseball

Labor/Personnel

Multiple

Modeling Change/
Performance

2014 The Relationship Between Outcome
Uncertainties and Match Attendance: New
Evidence in the National Basketball Association
2014 Time to Unbridle U.S. Thoroughbred
Racetracks? Lessons from Australian Bookies
2014 Revenue Sharing with Heterogeneous
Investments in Sports Leagues: Share Media,
Not Stadiums
2013 The Effects of Cross-Ownership and League
Policies Across Sports Leagues Within a City
2012 Peak-Load Versus Discriminatory Pricing:
Evidence from the Golf Industry
Southern Economic
Journal

Strategic
Organization
The American
Economic Review

2015 Using ESPN 30 for 30 to teach economics
2015 (Not Finding a) Sequential Order Bias in Elite
Level Gymnastics
2015 The National Football League season wins total
betting market: The impact of heuristics on
behavior
2014 What Are SEC Football Tickets Worth?
Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions
2013 The Impact of Early Commitment on Games
Played: Evidence from College Football
Recruiting
2012 Examining Agency Conflict in Horse Racing
2015 Who shall get more? How intangible assets and
aspiration levels affect the valuation of resource
providers
2015 Bankruptcy Rates among NFL Players with
Short-Lived Income Spikes
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Jane

Basketball

Moul &
Keller
Salaga,
Ostfield, &
Winfree
Mongeon &
Winfree
Limehouse,
Maloney, &
Rotthoff
Al-Bahrani
& Patel
Rotthoff

Horse racing Modeling Change/
Performance
Multiple
Rewards/Motivation

Woodland &
Woodland

Football

Sanford &
Scott
Bricker &
Hanson

Football

Brown
Ertug &
Castellucci

Horse racing Labor/Personnel
Basketball
Modeling Change/
Performance

Carlson,
Kim,
Lusardi, &
Camerer

Football

Multiple
Golf

Sport (in
general)
Gymnastics

Football

Rewards/Motivation

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel
Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Psychology

2015 I Take Care of My Own: A Field Study on How
Leadership Handles Conflict between Individual
and Collective Incentives
2015 Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A
Framed Field Experiment
2013

The Economic
Journal

2014
2014

Noussair,
van Soest, &
Stoop
Taxation and International Migration of
Kleven,
Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Landais, &
Market
Saez
Information Processing Constraints and Asset
Brown
Mispricing
Information and Efficiency: Goal Arrival in
Croxson &
Soccer Betting
Reade
The many (distinctive) faces of leadership:
Olivola,
Inferring leadership domain from facial
Eubanks, &
appearance
Lovelace

The Leadership
Quarterly

2014

The Review of
Economics and
Statistics

2013 The Effects of Coworker Heterogeneity on FirmLevel Output: Assessing the Impacts of Cultural
and Language Diversity in the National Hockey
League
2015 From Fan Parks to Live Sites: Mega events and
the territorialisation of urban space
2014 ‘Borrowing’ Public Space to Stage Major
Events: The Greenwich Park Controversy
2013 Urban Youth, Worklessness and Sport: A
Comparison of Sports-based Employability
Programmes in Rotterdam and Stoke-on-Trent

Urban Studies

Gauriot &
Page
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Kahane,
Longley, &
Simmons

Cricket

Rewards/Motivation

Recreational
fishing

Modeling Change/
Performance

Soccer

Labor/Personnel

Tennis

Modeling Change/
Performance
Modeling Change/
Performance
Labor/Personnel

Soccer
Football (as
well as
corporate
and political
leaders)
Hockey

Labor/Personnel

McGillivray
& Frew
Smith

Olympics

Venues

Olympics

Venues

Spaaij,
Magee, &
Jeanes

Sport (in
general)

Labor/Personnel
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From North American Business Press website (i.e., http://www.na-businesspress.com/
Copyright.html):

Copyright
The creator of an original work is the prime owner of intellectual property. Copyright confers
exclusive legal rights to control that work on the owner of intellectual property. A copyright
owner has the right to copy, adapt or distribute the work by any means and to authorize others to
do so by the transfer (assignment) or licensing of copyright. Without permission of the copyright
owner, a work cannot be copied, adapted or distributed. Fair Dealing (Fair Use) for the purpose
of non-commercial research, private study, criticism or review, instruction or examination does
not infringe copyright. An author's moral rights are:
•to be identified as the author
•to object to derogatory treatment of their work and
•not to have work falsely attributed to them
We ask for transfer of ownership of copyright from authors. This enables us to distribute our
authors' published research via a number of means to a wide range of readers, to take advantage
of new technologies as they arise to distribute and store authors' work, and to protect our authors
from copyright and moral rights violation. We only work with third party distribution partners
with assured copyright policies, and monitor usage to ensure that it is in accordance with our
principles. We do not restrict authors' rights to re-use their own work. This is an important
difference. Authors don't have to ask our permission, and if they do, the answer is always yes.
North American Business Press authors who assign their copyright to us retain unlimited free
reproduction rights for their own work. Authors do not give up their rights to use, republish or
reproduce their work for course notes, in another journal or as a book chapter, or electronically
including their own institutional website, subject to acknowledging first publication details.
Authors who publish with North American Business Press are not required to seek our
permission with regard to their own work. We aim to bring our authors' work to the widest
audience, under the protection of our copyright policy.
North American Business Press takes its responsibilities to both its existing and potential authors
very seriously. Every effort is made to provide the service that most fully meets your publishing
requirements for:
•Quality journals
•Peer review, where stated
•Editorial excellence
•Due respect and credit for your work
•Global readership for your work.
North American Business Press believes that as an author you have the right to expect your
publisher to deliver:
•An efficient and courteous publishing service at all times
•Prompt acknowledgement of correspondence and manuscripts received
•A high professional standard of accuracy and clarity of presentation
•A complimentary journal issue in which your article appeared plus article reprints
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•A timely service for permission and reprint requests
Assigning copyright of your work to North American Business Press allows us to act on your
behalf to:
•promote your rights
•facilitate dissemination of your work by granting permissions for educational use or
republication
•target other North American Business Press journals whose readership may benefit from
accessing your work
•endeavor to protect your work from any infringement of your rights which are brought to our
attention.
This does not restrict your right or academic freedom to contribute to the wider distribution and
readership of your work. This includes the right to:
1.Distribute photocopies of your own version of your article to students and colleagues for
teaching/educational purposes within your university or externally. Please note, this does not
refer to the North American Business Press branded, published version.
2.Reproduce your own version of your article, including peer review/editorial changes, in
another journal, as content in a book of which you are the author, in a thesis, dissertation or in
any other record of study, in print or electronic format as required by your university or for your
own career development.
3.Deposit an electronic copy of your own final version of your article, pre- or post-print, on your
own or institutional website. The electronic copy cannot be deposited at the stage of acceptance
by the Editor.
All authors should be aware of the importance of presenting content that is based on their own
research and expressed in their own words. Plagiarism is considered to be bad practice and
unethical. As part of the North American Business Press Copyright Policy, we have prepared
these guidelines to assist authors in understanding acceptable and unacceptable practice. Our
approach is specifically aimed at promoting and protecting authors' work.
Verbatim copying of more than 10 per cent (or a significant passage or section of text) of another
person's work without acknowledgement, references or the use of quotation marks. Improper
paraphrasing of another person's work is where more than one sentence within a paragraph or
section of text has been changed or sentences have been rearranged without appropriate
attribution. Significant improper paraphrasing (more than
Re-use of elements of another person's work, for example a figure, table or paragraph without
acknowledgement, references or the use of quotation marks. It is incumbent on the author to
obtain the necessary permission to reuse elements of another person's work from the copyright
holder.
North American Business Press requires that all authors affirm that their submitted work has not
been published before. If elements of a work have been previously published in another
publication, including a North American Business Press publication, the author is required to
acknowledge the earlier work and indicate how the subsequent work differs and builds upon the
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research and conclusions contained in the previous work. Verbatim copying of an author's own
work and paraphrasing is not acceptable and we recommend that research should only be reused
to support new conclusions. We recommend that authors cite all previous stages of publication
and presentation of their ideas that have culminated in the final work, including conference
papers, workshop presentations and listserv communications. This will ensure that a complete
record of all communication relating to the work is documented.
Original work is published in North American Business Press journals with a small number of
exceptions only. These exceptions include conference papers, archival papers that are
republished in an anniversary or commemorative issue, papers that are of particular merit and
that have received only limited circulation (for example through a company newsletter). These
papers are republished at the discretion of the Editor. The original work is fully and correctly
attributed and permission from the appropriate copyright holder obtained. Attributions will be
added to archive content that has been found to have been republished in an North American
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